THE 






WAR IN THE CRIMEA 



GENERAL SIR EDWARD HAMLEY. K.C.B. 



^(£ 













-I <>rcJ ■ /icLQ, /ft . 



THE 



WAR IN THE CRIMEA 



BY 

GENERAL SIR EDWARD aHAMLEY, K.C.B. 



With Portraits and Plans 



Third Edition 



CHARLES SCRIBNERS SONS 
743-745 BROADWAY 
NEW YORK 
1 891 



Mzz 



GIFT 
OOL. G. M. TOWNSEND 
OCT. 22. 194C 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE WAR IN THE CRIMEA. 

Why Russia covets Constantinople — Why other Powers oppose her Desire — Why the 
Time seemed Favourable — The Czar's Confidence in his Design — The Quarrel 
of the Churches — The Sultan accedes to the Czar's Claim — Russia puts forth Fresh 
Pretensions — The Vienna Note — Turkey declares War with Russia — How England 
was drawn into War — How the Czar was misled into War — His False View of 
the English Spirit — England supports Turkey — Why Louis Napoleon joined with 
England — Result of sending Allied Fleets to the Bosphorus — Russia chafes the 
Western Nations — France and England declare War — The War at first on the 
Danube — Austria's Summons to the Czar — The Russians leave the Danube — The 
Allies turn their Designs to the Crimea — Feeling excited in England, . i 

CHAPTER II. 

THE LANDING IN THE CRIMEA. 

Prospects of the Invasion — Instructions to the British Commander — A Siege contem- 
plated — Preparations for Invasion — The Cholera — The Fleets and Flotillas — 
Composition of the English Army — Its Commanders — The French Generals 
— Description of the Crimea — Its Products and Population — The Coast recon- 
noitered — The Landing Place — The Troops landed— Transport obtained, - 24 

CHAPTER III. 

BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 

Operations open to the Russians— The Bulganak reached— The Valley of the Alma 
— The Russian Bank — Omissions of the Russian Commanders — The French 
ascend the Heights — Position in Front of the British — Russian Forces there — 
Delay to allow French to gain Heights— English ordered to advance — First 
Onset of the English — The Light and Second Divisions — The Russian Heavy 
Guns withdrawn — Our First Onset fails — Advance of the Guards and Highlanders 
— English Artillery in the Action— General Retreat of the Russians — The Losses 
— Tactical Views of the Battle — General Advance wanting in ensemble — The 
Cavalry, .......... 42 



iv Contents. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE MARCH ROUND SEBASTOPOL TO BALAKLAVA. 

March to the Belbec — Question of attacking the North Side — Menschikoff bars the 
Harbour — Reasons against Attack of North Side — Todleben's Strange Con- 
tention — Impolicy of moving Allies Inland — The Flank March begun — 
Rencontre with MenschikofFs Rear — The English reach the Tchernaya — First 
View of Balaklava — Question of Bases for the Two Armies — Lord Raglan 
chooses Balaklava — Features of the South Side — Positions of the Allies, . 66 



CHAPTER V. 

BEGINNING OF THE SIEGE. 

Sir John Burgoyne— Our First Siege Batteries — Chapman's and Gordon's— The First 
French Batteries — Co-operation of the Fleets demanded — The Fleets to join 
in the Cannonade — Ships versus Forts — Risk to no Purpose — Positions of the 
Fleets— The Cannonade begins — French Fire silenced — English Fire successful 
— Losses on both Sides — Action of the Fleets — English Batteries still 
efficient, .......... 91 



CHAPTER VI. 

xVTTACKED AT BALAKLAVA AND ON THE UPLAND. 

Outworks before Balaklava — Russians capture Them — Movements of the Heavy 
Brigade — Charge of the Heavy Brigade — Russian Cavalry defeated — The Orders 
to the Light Brigade — Russians both sides of Valley — Nolan and Lord 
Lucan — Charge of the Light Brigade— Charge of the Chasseurs — Return of 
the Light Brigade — Close of the Action — No Attempt at Recapture— Weak 
Point in Allied Defences — French Measures too exclusive — First Action of 
Inkerman — Object of it — The Sandbag Battery — Preparation for an Assault 
— Assembly of Russian Forces, ... .... 109 



CHAPTER VII. 

BATTLE OF INKERMAN. 

Rumours before the Battle— Description of the Ground — British Position — The Russian 
Plan of Battle — How carried out — Proximity of Corps to Battlefield — Soimonoff 
attacks — Effects of the Fog — SoimonofFs Right in Advance — The British 
repulse Him — Pauloff's Troops engage — Pauloff also repulsed — Causes of Russian 
Repulses — Dannenberg's Attacks — Greater Obstinacy of the Attack — Action and 
Death of Cathcart — The French drive back the Russians — Allies defeat another 
Resolute Attack— Allied Artillery begins to prevail — What delayed Bosquet — 
Crisis before the French arrived — GortschakofFs part — Close of the Battle — 
Terrible Carnage — The Operations discussed — The Attack suitably met — The 
Sandbag Battery — Russian Exaggeration — What was at Stake — Consequence 
of Victory, .......... 131 



Contents. V 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE HURRICANE AND THE WINTER. 

The Hurricane— Its Effects — Privations of the Troops— Want of Transport — Transport 
done by the Men— The Cavalry Horses starved — Sufferings of the Sick — The 
Hospitals— Indignation in England — The French take part of our Duties- 
Relief begins — Why a Road was not made at first— Roads now made— Improve- 
ment in the Hospitals — Miss Nightingale arrives — The Influence she acquires— 
The Ratio of Deaths— Resignation of the Ministry— The Crimean Commission— 
The Commissary-General blamed — Defends himself — General Airey refutes 
Charges - — Departments have their Proper Limits — The Fault lay in the 
System, ......... 165 

CHAPTER IX. 

EXTENSION OF THE SIEGE WORKS AND DEFENCES. 

Burgoyne's Proposal for our Relief — The French prefer another Mode— Want of 
Fuel in the Camps — Fortress increasing in Strength — New System of Rifle- 
pits — Underground Warfare — New Russian Works — Failure of the French 
Attack — Great Sortie against the French and English Trenches — The Burial 
Truce — Charles Gordon's Experiences — Russians recross the Tchernaya — Niel's 
View of the Operations — Burgoyne goes Home — Renewed Preparations — 
Another Cannonade — The Russians slow to reply— Severity of Fire upon the 
Fortress— Two Well-fought Batteries— Carnage in Sebastopol — Impatience for 
Assault, ...... . • . 190 

CHAPTER X. 

IMPORTANT EVENTS ELSEWHERE. 

Death of the Czar — The Vienna Conference — Louis Napoleon's Plan — He intends 
to go to the Crimea — Lord Clarendon sent to dissuade him — The Emperor 
visits the Queen — Terms proposed at Vienna — Austria frames a Proposal — The 
Emperor abandons his Intention — English Advocates of Russian Interests — 
First Embarkation for Kertch— The Expedition recalled — Conference of Com- 
manders — Canrobert resigns the Command, . ... 213 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE NEW GENERAL. 

Errors in the Emperor's Theory — Pelissier's View of the Problem — His Previous Action 
in May — He declares his Determination — Niel remonstrates in vain — Displeasure 
of the Emperor — Course taken by Vaillant — New Russian Work — The French 
attack it — And capture it — Expedition to Kertch — Its Complete Success — The 
Extended Position — Ancient Remains — Valley of Baidar, . . . 230 



vi Contents. 



CHAPTER XII. 

A SUCCESSION OF CONFLICTS. 

The Emperor persists in his Plan — Pelissier opposes it — The Objects of the Attack 
— Assault of the White Works — Assault of the Mamelon — The Struggle for 
it — Assault of the Quarries — The Emperor still persists — Error of Pelissier — 
His Second Error — His Insufficient Reason — Failure at the Malakoff — Failure 
at the Redan — A Partial Success — Todleben wounded — Pelissier's Persistency 
in Prosecuting the Siege — Vaillant sides with Pelissier — Death of Lord 
Raglan— His Funeral — Sufferings of the Defenders — Russian Plans of Battle 
— Russian Advance for Battle — Battle of the Tchernaya — Retreat of the 
Russians — Russian Losses in the War, ...... 246 

CHAPTER XIII. 

THE DESTRUCTION OF SEBASTOPOL. 

Wnat Gortschakoff saw in Sebastopol — Yet he resolves to sustain an Assault — French 
Plan of Assault — The Final Bombardment — The French Attacking Forces 
— The English — The Assault — Cost of taking the Malakoff — Failure of the 
French elsewhere — Failure at the Redan — Predominance of the Malakoff — 
Incidents on Following Days — Constancy of the Garrison — Final Destruction 
of the Fleet, ......... 273 

CHAPTER XIV. 

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. 

A Further Question — Views of the Emperor and his Generals — Fresh Operations 
— Destruction of the Docks — The Government's Wish to push on — Vaillant's 
Views — Pelissier's Views — Excellent State of the British Army — A Diplomatic 
Difficulty — The Emperor and the Queen — New Proposal of Russia — Good 
Faith of Louis Napoleon — The Treaty of Peace — Strength of the British 
Army — The Results of the War — Russia repudiates the Treaty later — England 
retains Interest in the Crimea — The Graves of the Crimea — All that remains 
of the War, . ......... 289 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



PORTRAIT OF LORD RAGLAN, 

MAP OF PART OF THE CRIMEA, . 

PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA. . 

MAP OF THE CHERSONESE UPLAND, 

PLAN OF SF.BASTOPOL, .... 

PORTRAIT OF GENERAL TODLEBEN, 

PLAN OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF INKERMAN, . 

PORTRAIT OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS, 

COUNCIL OF WAR BEFORE THE ASSAULT OF THE MAMELON, 



PAGE 

Frontispiece 



35 
47 
75 
89 
90 

135 
216 
248 



%* The plates of Lord Raglan and the Council of War are engraved 
by permission of Messrs Henry Graves &■> Co. 



The War in the Crimea. 



-o 



CHAPTER I. 

EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE WAR IN THE CRIMEA. 

Why Russia covets Constantinople — Why other Powers oppose her De- 
sire — Why the Time seemed Favourable — The Czar's Confidence 
in his Design — The Quarrel of the Churches — The Sultan accedes 
to the Czar's Claim — Russia puts forth Fresh Pretensions — The 
Vienna Note — Turkey declares War with Russia — How England 
was drawn into War — How the Czar was misled into War — His 
False View of the English Spirit — England supports Turkey — 
Why Louis Napoleon joined with England — Result of sending 
Allied Fleets to the Bosphorus — Russia chafes the Western Nations 
— France and England declare War — The War at first on the 
Danube — Austria's Summons to the Czar — The Russians leave the 
Danube — The Allies turn their Designs to the Crimea— Feeling 
excited in England. 

In considering the Empire of Russia it might at first 
sight appear that a country at once so vast and so back- 
ward in civilisation would find ample employment for 
the wisest and most energetic ruler in endeavours to 
develop in all directions — physical, intellectual, and moral 
— its latent resources, rather than in the maintenance of 
great armies for designs of conquest. And that this 
course would greatly increase the wealth and influence 
of Russia, and the happiness of its people, cannot be 



2 Why Russia covets Cojistantinople. 

doubted. But there are other considerations which have 
prevailed to dictate a policy of aggression. 

In the first place, what we call progress is opposed to 
absolutism. If the immense populations of such vast 
portions of the earth were imbued with the ideas of the 
peoples of Europe, they would no longer submit to 
the will of one man ; and when under these circum- 
stances a Czar should become impossible, no one can 
say what kind of government, or what number of separate 
governments, might replace him. For the maintenance 
of his power it is necessary to keep the people ignorant, 
and, further, to divert their attention from their own lot by 
fixing it on the alluring spectacle of foreign conquests. 

Yet, besides this motive, it must be confessed that a 
great temptation stands for ever before the eye of a Czar 
when he looks towards Turkey. He sees there all that 
Russia wants to give her power and prosperity commen- 
surate with the extent of her dominion. He sees the 
beautiful harbours of the Bosphorus, whence a Russian 
navy, secured from all enemies by the narrow passage of 
the Dardanelles, might dominate the Mediterranean ; 
and he sees, too, a city marked out by nature to be- 
come a splendid capital, and an overflowing 'emporium 
of commerce. Possessed of these, he need set no limit 
to his dreams of the greatness of Russia. It' is not 
surprising, therefore, if a race of rulers, not less un- 
scrupulous and ambitious than autocrats in general 
have proved to be, should always have looked on 
Constantinople as what ought to be their own. 

Fortunately for Turkey, and the world, there are 



Why other Powers oppose her Desire. 3 

many difficulties in the way of the realisation of these 
aspirations. No other Power can desire that a rival should 
attain to such an overshadowing height. Neither England, 
nor France, nor Italy, nor Germany, could with indiffer- 
ence see Russia acquire such means of bringing her huge 
force to bear. And Austria has an interest beyond others 
in preventing the design. For Russia, if established in 
Turkey, would enclose within her new territory a large 
portion of the Austrian Empire, producing there a state 
of permanent insecurity and alarm, and would, more- 
over, include and control the lower Danube. 

It is, therefore, only at some favourable conjuncture 
that Russia can hope to prosecute her cherished design. 
And in the beginning of 1853 circumstances seemed 
to be exceptionally promising. The Emperor of 
Austria, almost a boy, repaid with affection and rever- 
ence the kindness evinced for him by the potent and 
experienced autocrat. He was, too, under an obli- 
gation of the most onerous kind to his great neigh- 
bour, who, when Austria was almost crushed by 
Hungary, had intervened, suppressed the revolt, and 
restored the discontented kingdom to its allegiance. 
Moreover, the Kaiser had allowed himself just then to 
assume an attitude menacing to the Porte, for, in sup- 
pressing an insurrection in Montenegro, the Turkish 
troops, operating near the Austrian frontier, had re- 
ceived from him a peremptory notice to withdraw. 
The Czar had readily joined in enforcing the demand, 
and thus it happened that Austria found herself acting 
with Russia against Turkey — a position which illus- 



4 Why the Time seemed Favourable'. 

trates the consequences that may ensue when a State 
allows itself to be drawn into trivial issues divergent 
from its main policy. Nicholas, therefore, assumed 
with confidence that he would meet with no opposi- 
tion from the Kaiser. 

Prussia's interest in the question was not so obvious 
or pressing as Austria's, while the King (the Czar's 
brother-in-law) had always expressed for him the utmost 
deference, a sentiment which was found to be a constant 
source of difficulty when endeavours were made for the 
concurrent action of the Four Great Powers. 

As to France, it was not easy to foresee what policy 
might commend itself to Louis Napoleon. New to the 
throne, and engaged in feeling around for support in 
that as yet precarious seat, no indications were visible 
of the course to which his interests might incline him. 
But whatever his tendencies might prove to be, it seemed 
very unlikely that the Empire would begin its career as 
a belligerent either by singly opposing Russia, or by 
ranging itself against England, who, in the course of the 
summer, gave proof, in a great naval review, of her 
ability to bring a paramount influence into any military 
enterprise in which command of the sea would be a 
main condition. 

Assuming, then, that Austria were favourable, or 
neutral, the course which England might take became 
the prime consideration. Hitherto she had done no- 
thing to encourage the design of Russia, for to maintain 
Turkey as an independent state was her traditional 
policy. But, in the long interval of peace since Waterloo, 



The Czars Confidence in his Design. 5 

not only had we given no sign of an intention to support 
that policy by force of arms, but we were believed to 
be absorbed as a people in those commercial pursuits 
of the success of which peace is one very favouring 
condition ; while, as if to emphasise this supposed 
state of feeling, Lord Aberdeen, our Prime Minister, 
had become noted for his repugnance to any course 
which might tend to a resort to arms. The Czar was 
led by all these considerations to believe that the oppor- 
tunity had come for giving effect to the idea which, 
during his visit to England in 1844, he had conveyed to 
the British Government. While expressing his convic- 
tion " that it was for the common interest of Russia and 
England that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself 
in a condition of independence," yet "they must not 
conceal from themselves how many elements of dis- 
solution that empire contains within itself: unforeseen 
circumstances may hasten its fall " ; and thence he came 
to the conclusion that "the danger which may result 
from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished 
if Russia and England have come to an understanding 
as to the course to be taken by them in common." It 
was in unison with these utterances that he addressed 
to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at 
St Petersburgh, on the 9th of January 1853, the parable 
which has become historical. 

Meanwhile, a cause of dispute already existed be- 
tween Russia and Turkey. A jealousy had long been 
cherished between the monks of the Greek and Latin 
Churches in the Holy Land — which of these should 



6 The Quarrel of the Churches. 

enjoy most privilege and consideration was a question 
that, some little time before, had once more risen into 
prominence. Which of them should enter earliest in 
the day into the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at 
Jerusalem, or should have possession of the key of the 
Great Church of Bethlehem, were the questions of 
immediate concern. The Czar took up warmly the 
cause of the Greek Church, of which he was the head, 
and which looked to him as its champion ; and it may 
be urged in reply to those who look on the dispute 
as trivial, that it did not seem so to the Russian people, 
and, therefore, could not seem so to the Czar. The 
French Emperor had taken the side of the Latin 
Church. It is not to be supposed that he could be 
actuated by any superstitious, or even earnest, feeling 
in favour of such claims. But he was only following 
the policy pursued by the French monarchy in 1819, 
during a similar ferment of the question, when it claimed 
to act as the hereditary protector of the Catholics in 
the East since the time of Francis the First, and he 
must therefore be acquitted of taking his course merely 
from a desire to do what was hostile or provocative to 
Russia. Each of these sovereigns endeavoured to put 
pressure on the Sultan for a decision in favour of his own 
clients ; and that hapless potentate, who could not be 
expected to evince any warmer sentiment than tolera- 
tion towards either of the two infidel sects, which every 
true Mahometan must hold in abhorrence, made it his 
aim to satisfy both sovereigns, and offend neither. But 
his attempt, though clever, was ineffectual, and the 



The Sultan accedes to the Czar s Claim. 7 

result was that he only partially satisfied the Latin 
sect, while he excited such indignation, real or simu- 
lated, in the Czar, that Nicholas at once moved two 
army corps to the frontier of the Danubian Princi- 
palities as a menace, and immediately afterwards sent 
Prince Menschikoff as a Special Envoy to Constantin- 
ople, whose instructions must have been such as were 
quite inconsistent with a desire for an amicable settle- 
ment, for the British Ambassador described the language 
conveying his demands as "a mixture of angry com- 
plaints and friendly assurances, accompanied with per- 
emptory requisitions as to the Holy Places in Palestine, 
indications of some ulterior views, and a general tone 
of insistence bordering sometimes on intimidation." 

Thus the hostile menace was made to appear to 
turn on the matter of the Holy Places. But, in con- 
sidering the origin of the war, it must not be forgotten 
that all the Czar professed to demand was the posses- 
sion, and possibly the monopoly, of certain religious 
privileges, whereas the event which he desired to pre- 
cipitate was something very different, and entirely dis- 
proportionate, namely, the dismemberment of Turkey. 
This was presently made plain when the Sultan put 
an end to the immediate dispute by acceding to the 
claims of Menschikoff. The question of the Holy 
Places, thus settled, could no longer supply the pretext 
for war ; what it did supply was the opportunity for 
prolonging the quarrel, by confusing fresh demands 
with the original dispute, and for rousing religious 
feeling in Russia against Turkey. Accordingly, the 



8 Russia puts forth Fresh Pretensions. 

Czar's Envoy, instead of accepting the concession as 
closing the dispute, put forth a fresh and larger pre- 
tension, requiring the Sultan to join in a convention 
which would virtually give Nicholas the protectorate 
of all the Christian subjects of the Porte. The nature 
of this demand was thus characterised by our Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Clarendon : " No sovereign, having 
proper regard for his own dignity and independence, 
could admit proposals which conferred upon another 
and more powerful sovereign a right of protection over 
his own subjects. Fourteen millions of Greeks would 
henceforth regard the Emperor as their supreme pro- 
tector, and their allegiance to the Sultan would be 
little more than nominal, while his own independence 
would dwindle into vassalage." And, indeed, there was 
a terrible precedent to warn Turkey, for the Empress 
Catherine had claimed a similar protectorate in Poland, 
in which she had very soon found the means of extend- 
ing her dominion over its territory. 

The Sultan's Ministers, therefore, no doubt counselled 
and supported by our Ambassador, Lord Stratford, who 
exercised a control over our relations with Turkey of a 
singularly independent character, promptly refused to 
entertain Menschikoffs proposal. To this refusal the 
Czar responded by causing his troops, on the 2d of 
July, to pass the frontier river, the Pruth, and occupy 
the Danubian Principalities ; and next day he issued a 
manifesto, stating that in doing so " it was not his in- 
tention to commence war, but to have such security as 
would ensure the restoration of the rights of Russia." 



The Vienna Note. 9 

This invasion might have been justly met by the 
Sultan with a counter declaration of war, and the mar- 
tial spirit of his people was so thoroughly roused as to 
render the step imminent. But the Western Powers, 
in their solicitude to preserve peace, stayed it for a 
moment, while the representatives of France, England, 
Austria, and Prussia, met in conference at Vienna, in 
the hope of finding a means of averting war. They 
framed a diplomatic instrument known as the Vienna 
Note, which, in their eagerness to soothe the Czar, was 
couched in terms that might be interpreted as sanction- 
ing his pretensions, and which indeed (as the Austrian 
Government had taken means to ascertain) he would 
accept. On receiving this Note he at once signified 
his readiness to assent to it. The reply of the Turkish 
Government was not so speedily given, and the Media- 
tory Powers strongly urged it to signify acceptance. 
But when its reply. came, it was found to point out that 
the Note could be construed as re-embodying the danger- 
ous pretensions of the Gzar, and that, unless certain 
specified modifications were introduced, the Porte must 
refuse its assent ; while Lord Stratford advised his 
Government that these objections were well founded. 
This made fresh correspondence necessary, in the course 
of which it slipped out that the Russian interpretation 
of the Note confirmed the apprehensions of the Porte. 
The Mediatory Powers, at last aware of their singular 
error, perceived that their Note could be held to affirm 
new rights of interference on the part of Russia, and not 
merely (as the Czar had hitherto pretended) the confir- 



io Turkey declares War with Russia. 

mation of old privileges. They could no longer, there- 
fore, support their original Note ; the Czar, on his part, 
refused to accept the Turkish modifications of it, and 
the Porte felt itself compelled to demand the evacuation 
of the Principalities within fifteen days, with war as the 
alternative. This summons being disregarded, a state 
of war between the two countries ensued on the 23d 
October 1853; but for some time no acts of hostility 
took place beyond the assembly and movement of their 
respective forces. 

The course of events that led to war between Russia 
and Turkey having been thus traced, it remains to follow 
the steps by which the Western Powers were drawn on 
to join in it. It has often been said that England drifted 
into the war. This was so far true that there was for us 
no sharp crisis, no clash of great national interests, which 
only the appeal to arms could compose. Our part in the 
war was the result of a state of feeling gradually aroused 
by observation of what was passing in the East, and of 
the steps which the British Government, with intentions 
anything but warlike, had slowly taken, tending to 
commit it to the active support of Turkey. Up to the 
time (after the issuing of the Turkish ultimatum) when 
the French and English fleets were ordered to move 
to the Bosphorus, it had been possible for England 
to restrict her part to the field of diplomacy. And 
that she should have committed herself to the side of 
Turkey was not due to her traditional policy only, 
for the ostensible grounds of quarrel between the two 
Eastern Powers were not such as necessarily to draw 



How England was drawn into War. i i 

her from her attitude of mediator. What had impelled 
her on her course was the knowledge that below these 
grounds lurked the true design of the Czar. This had 
been made clear by his own words to the British 
Ambassador, already adverted to, and in various con- 
versations in January and February 1853. "We have 
on our hands a sick man, a very sick man. ... If your 
Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains 
any elements of existence, your Government must have 
received incorrect information. I repeat to you that the 
sick man is dying, and we can never allow such an event 
to take us by surprise. We must come to some under- 
standing." But this view was not left to stand alone ; it 
was enforced by an inducement. " I can only say, that 
if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession, 
upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession 
of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I would 
say the same thing of Candia : that island might suit you 
and I do not know why it should not become an English 
possession." The voice which uttered this was the voice 
of the one potentate who had an interest in precipi- 
tating the catastrophe, and who was then taking such 
a course as might immediately lead to it. Vain in- 
deed the effort to spread his net in the sight of those 
whom he had thus himself enlightened. But it seems 
likely — indeed there is no other explanation — that he 
had forgotten, or dropped out of sight, this complete 
showing of his hand. As was natural in an autocrat 
whose faculty for rule lay in the strength of his will, 
not of his judgment, he had accustomed himself to 



1 2 How the Czar was misled into War. 

confound what he desired with what he believed in ; 
and absorbed for the moment in his parade of sym- 
pathy with the Christians in Turkey, he had come to 
consider this as his true motive, and expected others 
to adopt that view also. So complete was this illusion, 
that it was long before he had begun to realise the possi- 
bility of being opposed by England. At first he had 
assumed her toleration, if not her concurrence, to be 
certain. And even when he was at war with Turkey, 
and the fleets had been despatched to the Bosphorus, he 
sent an autograph letter to the Queen, expressing sur- 
prise that there should be any misunderstanding between 
the Queen's Government and his own as to the affairs of 
Turkey, and appealing to Her Majesty's "good faith" 
and " wisdom " to decide between them. Thus it is evi- 
dent that it was Russia that had been the first Power to 
" drift " into war, and this was owing to the false view 
taken by the Czar. Starting with the belief that Turkey 
would be left unsupported, he had gone on to assume that 
he would, by the display of his forces, coerce her into com- 
pliance with the measure which would give him the means 
of, at any time, quarrelling with and crushing her, that 
England would acquiesce, and that, if she did, he might 
disregard the other Powers ; and thus he had been led 
into a position from which he could not recede without 
war. And the delusion under which he took these 
steps contains one of the important lessons that render 
history of value as a guide and a warning. There is a 
general concurrence that he confided in the belief that 
England was entirely absorbed in the pursuit of wealth, 



His False Views of the English Spirit. 1 3 

through manufactures and commerce, and could no 
longer be induced to fight for a principle, a sentiment, 
or an ally. Even after Lord Aberdeen had been im- 
pelled to take action directly tending to war, the Czar 
still believed that a community which made the exalta- 
tion and worship of trade the mainspring of its policy, 
and which listened complacently to the denunciation of 
war as an unmixed evil, would never be roused into 
armed resistance to his projects. How far a more deter- 
mined tone on the part of our Ministry, at an early stage 
of his course of aggression, would have effectually checked 
it, may be matter of speculation. But there can be no 
doubt, judging from his own language and his own acts, 
that his not unreasonable persuasion of the degeneracy 
of our national character was a main element in producing 
the state of mind which rendered him so fatally domineer- 
ing and precipitate in the pursuit of his ends, and so 
regardless of the decencies of public law. 

At the time of MenschikofFs mission, Lord Stratford, 
having resigned his post, was in England. But the diffi- 
culties which that mission was creating seemed again 
to demand his commanding influence on the spot, and he 
had been desired to resume his functions. The instruc- 
tions given to him, conceived in a spirit of conciliation 
to Russia, in a matter which, on the surface, did not 
vitally concern us, were to admonish the Porte to show 
increased consideration for its Christian subjects. But, 
at the same time, remembering what lay under the sur- 
face, the Government empowered him,in case of imminent 
danger to Turkey, to request the Commander of our 



14 England supports Ttirkey. 

Mediterranean Squadron, then lying at Malta, to hold it 
in readiness to move, though he was not to call it up 
without orders from the Home Government. But when 
Menschikoff, on the removal of his first grievance, put 
forth his other and more dangerous claim, the British 
Government perceived that it could no longer rest in any 
degree on the good faith of the Czar. At the end of 
May 1853, when Menschikoff departed from Constan- 
tinople, breathing war, Lord Clarendon instructed Lord 
Stratford that it was indispensable to take measures for 
the protection of the Sultan, and to aid him by force, if 
necessary, in repelling an attack upon his territory, and 
in defence of the independence of Turkey, which England, 
he declared, " was bound to maintain." At the same time, 
in a despatch to St Petersburgh, he required to be in- 
formed what object the Czar had in view, " and in what 
manner, and to what extent, the dominions of the Sultan, 
and the tranquillity of Europe were threatened ? " A few 
days afterwards the Allied squadrons moved up the 
Mediterranean, and anchored in the neighbourhood of 
the Dardanelles, which the Sultan was bound by treaty 
to keep closed to the fleets of other Powers so long as 
Turkey was at peace. On the 22d October, the day 
before Turkey declared war, the fleets entered the 
Dardanelles. The Ambassadors had been instructed to 
call them up to Constantinople, " for the security of 
British and French interests, and, if necessary, for the 
protection of the Sultan." The step was precipitated 
by the apprehension of fanatical disturbances in the 
Turkish capital. 



Why Louis Napoleon joined with England. 15 

It has been generally assumed that the circumstances 
under which the French Empire had recently come into 
existence demanded that its chief should make war on 
somebody, in order to divert attention from the origin of 
his power, and to give employment to an army which 
might otherwise become dangerous. It may be readily 
granted that it was most expedient, both for him and his 
people, to make his influence immediately felt. But 
that, in allying himself with England on the Eastern 
question, he was seizing on an opportunity for war is 
only a surmise for which it would be difficult to adduce 
proof. It was inevitable that he should throw his 
weight into the question, and he could hardly hesitate 
in his choice of a side. It was scarcely possible for the 
champion of the Latin Church in the East, who had 
just stood forth in defence of its claim, to abet the 
Czar in his demand for the protectorate of the Christian 
subjects of the Porte. Moreover, Nicholas, in his arrogant 
way, had given just offence both to Louis Napoleon 
and the French people by refusing to address him, as 
all other reigning potentates did, as " Mon Frere ; " as 
if he, the choice of the French people, were not entitled 
to be admitted to the brotherhood of sovereigns ; which 
was one of those gratuitous and unprofitable affronts 
which wise men are careful not to offer. On the other 
hand, the advantage was obvious of arraying himself by 
the side of, instead of against, the great Sea-Power his 
neighbour ; while as for individual predilections he had 
acquired, in his long residence in England, a hearty 
esteem for our institutions and our people, and the 



1 6 Result of sending Allied Fleets to the Bosftkorus. 

kindnesses which he had received as an exile were 
always cordially acknowledged by him as a sovereign. 
But the evidence points altogether to the view that at 
first his design in associating himself with England was, 
while gaining the benefit of the alliance, to make use of 
it for peace, and not for war. Martin, in his Life of the 
Prince Consort, says, " Amity with England, and a close 
political alliance, had been uniformly declared to be the 
Emperor's dearest wish." On ascending the throne he 
had said, " Certain persons say the Empire is only war. 
But I say the Empire is peace, for France desires it." 
At the time of the Vienna Note, the Prince Consort, 
discussing the parties to it, said, " Louis Napoleon wishes 
for peace, enjoyment, and cheap corn." On the 8th 
August 1853 the Queen's speech said, "The Emperor 
of the French has united with Her Majesty in earnest 
endeavours to reconcile differences the continuation of 
which would involve Europe in war." And after the 
fleets were in the Bosphorus, the Prince Consort wrote : 
" Louis Napoleon shows by far the greatest statesman- 
ship, which is easier for the individual than the many; 
he is moderate, but firm ; gives way to us even when his 
plan is better than ours, and revels in the advantages he 
derives from the alliance with us." No conjectures can 
hold their ground against this testimony, and it may be 
taken for certain that the Emperor faithfully co-operated 
with our Government throughout in its endeavours to 
settle the quarrel by diplomatic pressure, backed by the 
display of force. 

When, however, they took the last step of sending their 



Russia chafes the Western Nations. 17 

fleets to the Bosphorus, the control of events passed 
out of their hands. If Russia should choose to disregard 
the moral pressure of their presence, and, resenting their 
entry into the Bosphorus, to avenge it on the Turks, 
the Allies could no longer preserve a mediatory attitude. 
They must become principals. This was foreseen by 
the Queen when she wrote thus to Lord Clarendon : 
" It appears to the Queen that we have taken on our- 
selves, in conjunction with France, all the risks of a 
European war, without having bound Turkey to any 
conditions with respect to provoking it." The justice 
of this view of the matter was presently made evident. 
The Turks, while keeping most of their fleet in the 
Bosphorus, had left a squadron of light war-vessels in 
the Black Sea. On the 30th November it was at 
anchor in the port of Sinope, when Admiral Nakimoff 
attacked it with six ships of the line, and absolutely 
destroyed it, with its crews to the number of 4000 men. 
It is not necessary to argue that the Russians were 
exceeding their rights as belligerents in order to show 
the impolicy of this stroke. While the disparity of 
force deprived it of all glory, it roused public feeling, 
hitherto not too favourable to the Czar, to a pitch which, 
certainly in England, could only be appeased by arms. 
For long the English people had been chafing at the 
wrongs inflicted on the Turks, aggravated by the 
patience with which they were endured. Each succes- 
sive step of the Czar had aroused deeper indignation. 
In the original difficulty, the position of the Sultan, 

pressed by such powerful rivals for an award which 

B 



1 8 France and England declare War. 

could bring him only unmitigated trouble, seemed to 
entitle him to special indulgence. But MenschikofT's 
bearing throughout his mission was arrogant and pro- 
vocative. The setting up of the second pretext, on the 
failure of the first, revealed the real intention of grind- 
ing Turkey to dust. The seizure of the Principalities 
showed a contempt for public law and common justice 
so gross that the popular mind could easily appreciate 
it. His manifestoes, outrageous in tone and matter, 
had been fuel to the flame ; and now the crash at 
Sinope, under the very shadow of our ships, was of 
a character thoroughly to exasperate a people whose 
element was the sea. The French could probably in 
no case have endured to see their fleet return without 
some substantial triumph, but a reckless utterance of 
the Czar effectually roused them from what had hitherto 
been a somewhat supine view of the situation. The 
French Emperor had addressed to him, as a final 
attempt, a letter suggesting a scheme of pacification, 
and assuring him that if it were rejected the Western 
Powers must declare war. In his reply, among other 
taunts, Nicholas said, "Russia will prove herself in 1854 
what she was in 18 12." This allusion to the disasters 
in Russia, so ruinous to the first Napoleon's power, and 
so humiliating to France, effectually dispelled the 
apathy of the French people. 

When Louis Napoleon proposed to our Govern- 
ment that the fleets should enter the Black Sea, and if 
necessary compel all Russian ships met with there to 
return to Sebastopol, the measure hardly kept pace 



The War at first on the Danube. 19 

with the feelings aroused in both countries. On the 
27th February 1854 France and England demanded 
the evacuation of the Principalities by the 30th April 
as their ultimatum. No answer was vouchsafed, and 
in March they declared war. If any further stimulus 
had been needed for the British people, it was now 
supplied in the publication of the Czar's conversations 
with Sir Hamilton Seymour, hitherto held in official 
secrecy. His parable of the sick man then proved much 
more striking and suggestive than he could have desired. 
It caught the popular fancy — it was seen to have indi- 
cated a foregone conclusion — and he who could foretell 
the sick man's dissolution, and arrange for the distribu- 
tion of his possessions, was judged to have been intent 
ever since on fulfilling his own prophecy. 

At this time everything pointed to a campaign on 
the Danube. When the Turks declared war, the 
Russians in the Principalities, not yet ready to advance, 
remained on the defensive along the river. Omar 
Pasha, facing them, crossed and seized Kalafat, and 
desultory combats, much more calculated to exalt the 
military repute of the Turks than of the Russians, had 
gone on there during the autumn and winter. But it 
was obvious that it could serve no purpose to the Czar, 
that it must rather destroy his military along with his 
diplomatic repute, to let the war drag on in this way. 
Accordingly, by May 1854 Russian troops had been 
concentrated in the Principalities in sufficient force to 
begin an offensive movement. The preliminaries to the 
passage of the Balkans, in the march on Constantinople, 



20 Austria's Summons to the Czar. 

were to be the sieges of the Turkish fortresses of 
Silistria and Shumla ; and the invasion of Turkey be- 
gan with the passage of the Danube by the Russians, 
who opened their first parallel before Silistria on the 19th 
May. Thus it happened that the troops of England 
and France, as they arrived in Turkish waters, were at 
first conveyed to Varna, and were now encamped 
between that place and Shumla, in the expectation of 
defending the fortresses by fighting the army in the 
field. But now another influence intervened, which 
entirely changed the aspect of the war. 

On the 13th January 1854 the Four Powers, none of 
them at that time at war with Russia, had obtained the 
agreement of Turkey to fresh terms to be submitted to 
the Czar, and were sending back his envoys with an 
avowal of their intention to oppose his acts of aggres- 
sion. Kinglake says that Nicholas had been so slow to 
believe that the young Kaiser could harbour the thought 
of opposing him in arms, that on receiving the assurance 
of their alienation he was wrung with grief. This is a 
fresh proof that his autocratic temper had been so 
fostered by long exercise of irresponsible power that he 
could no longer read facts truly where his wishes were 
strongly concerned ; that he believed only what he 
desired to believe ; and that his faith in the friendship 
of the Kaiser, and the pacific temper of England, had 
been of paramount effect in blinding him to the diffi- 
culties in his path. Well might the Prince Consort 
write, just after Sinope, "the Emperor of Russia is 
manifestly mad." 



The Russians leave the Danube. 2 1 

On the 3d of June, Austria, with the support now 
finally secured of Prussia, summoned the Czar to evacu- 
ate the Principalities. In February she had moved 
50,000 men up to the frontier of the territory seized by 
the Czar. Her territorial position on the north bank 
of the Danube is such as to enable her effectually to 
check a Russian invasion of Turkey in that direction. 
The operation can only be persisted in by first repelling 
the Austrian advance. For this the Czar was not pre- 
pared. He continued his operations on the river just 
long enough to give a victorious aspect to the valiant 
defence of Silistria, and to a subsequent passage of the 
Danube at Giurgevo by the Turks, led by English 
officers. Austria was on the point of war, and had sent 
an officer to the English headquarters to form a joint 
plan of operations, when the Czar at last perceived 
that the pressure on him could not be resisted. 
The siege of Silistria was raised ; the Russians im- 
mediately began to withdraw from the Principalities, 
and on the 2d August they recrossed the frontier. The 
Austrian troops thereupon occupied, in the interests of 
Turkey, the territories thus abandoned. 

Now Austria did not then, or afterwards, declare 
war against Russia. But, as has been related, France 
and England had done so in March. It may be, and 
has been, said that had the Western Powers gone step 
by step with Austria, leaving it to her, who had most 
concern in a war on the Danube, to give the word for 
the commencement of hostilities, the Czar would, as 
the event proved, have been forced to abandon his prey 



22 The Allies turn their Designs to the Crimea. 

and the final settlement of the quarrel between him 
and Turkey might still have been effected by negotia- 
tion. It is impossible to deny this, but at the same 
time it is impossible absolutely to affirm it. For no 
negotiations could have been satisfactory which did 
not provide some compensation for Turkey ; and it is 
very unlikely that the Czar would have conceded this 
without the compulsion of arms. But the determining 
cause may well have been the savage blow delivered 
at Sinope, which roused the impatience of the Western 
peoples to a pitch beyond control. 

But now, with the abandonment of the Principalities, 
that which had hitherto been the ground of contention 
had suddenly vanished, and with it had vanished also 
the immediate concern in the quarrel of Austria and 
Prussia, whose alliance for the coercion of the Czar had 
been formed expressly " in defence of the interests of 
Germany." But English views had for long gone against 
the acceptance of a drawn game. To withdraw the 
Allied fleets from the Euxine without having fired a 
shot, while its waters were still strewed with the 
wrecks of the Turkish ships ; to leave the shores of 
Turkey unprotected, while opposite to them stood the 
embodied menace of Sebastopol, with its forts and 
arsenal, from whence had just issued the destroying 
squadron ; and to abandon the Ottoman Empire to 
the impulses of so grasping, so unscrupulous, and so 
vindictive a personality as that of Nicholas, had not 
in this latter period been included within the range 
of possibilities. On the first declaration of war the 



Feeling excited in England. 23 

French Emperor had sketched, and our Ministry had 
approved, a plan for the attack of Sebastopol. " In 
no event," said Lord Lyndhurst in June, " except 
that of extreme necessity, ought we to make peace 
without previously destroying the Russian fleet in the 
Black Sea, and laying prostrate the fortifications by 
which it is defended." On the 24th July the Times 
wrote, " the broad policy of the war consists in striking 
at the very heart of the Russian power in the East, and 
that heart is at Sebastopol." And its editor, Mr John 
Delane, who had gone to Constantinople to observe 
events, told Lord Stratford that if our army were to 
perish before Sebastopol, the first thought of the nation 
at home would be to raise another, and go on. And 
this state of feeling had been aroused by the sense 
entertained in this country of the dangerous nature of 
the Czar's designs, and of the dishonesty which had 
marked his pursuit of them. " It is," wrote the Queen, 
in discussing the causes of the war, " the selfishness, and 
ambition, and want of honesty of one man and his 
servants which has done it." Such were the circum- 
stances in which France and England prepared to 
transfer their armaments from Turkey to the Crimea. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE LANDING IN THE CRIMEA. 

Prospects of the Invasion — Instructions to the British Commander — A Siege 
contemplated — Preparations for Invasion — The Cholera — The Fleets 
and Flotillas — Composition of the English Army — Its Commanders 
— The French Generals — Description of the Crimea — Its Products 
and Population — The Coast reconnoitered — The Landing Place — 
The Troops landed — Transport obtained. 

The land which the armies were about to invade was 
that known to the ancients as the Tauric Chersonese. 
It was quite beyond the range of the ordinary tourist, 
it led to nowhere, and had little to tempt curiosity. 
Thus it was as completely an unknown country to the 
chiefs of the Allied armies as it had been to Jason and 
his Argonauts when they voyaged thither in search of 
the Golden Fleece. It was known to contain a great 
harbour, and a city with docks, fortifications, and 
arsenal ; but the strength and resources of the enemy 
who would oppose us, the nature of the fortifications, 
and even the topography, except what the map could 
imperfectly show, lay much in the regions of specula- 
tion. It was believed, however, that any Russian force 
there must be inferior to that of the Allies, that the 
country would offer no serious impediments to the 



Prospects of the Invasion. 25 

march, and that, with the defeat of the defensive army, 
the place would not long resist the means of attack 
which would be brought to bear on it. There was no 
thought of a protracted siege ; a landing, a march, 
a battle, and, after some delay for a preliminary bom- 
bardment, an assault, were all that made part of the 
programme. 

These anticipations were by no means so ill-founded 
as, after the many contradictions by the event, they 
were judged to have been. It was unlikely that a large 
Russian army should be permanently kept in a spot 
not easy of approach by land, and where its supply 
would be difficult, at a time when Sebastopol was 
not imminently threatened ; and, since the sudden ces- 
sation of operations on the Danube, there had been 
little time for preparation against so formidable an 
attack as was now impending. The command of the 
sea conferred on the assailants inestimable advantages, 
and there was very fair reason to expect that, long 
before Russia could bring her huge numbers to bear, 
the conflict would be decided in closed lists by the 
armies which should at first enter them. In any 
case, it would have been very difficult to point to any 
more vulnerable spot on Russian territory. 

It must not, however, be thought that no siege of 
Sebastopol was contemplated. Immediately after the 
Russians had retreated from the Danube, the Duke 
of Newcastle, Secretary for War, wrote thus to the 
Commander of the British Forces, on the 29th June 
1854:— 



26 Instructions to the British Commander. 

" I have to instruct your Lordship to concert measures 
for the siege of Sebastopol, unless, with the informa- 
tion in your possession, but at present unknown in this 
country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it 
could not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of 
success. The confidence with which Her Majesty placed 
under your command the gallant army now in Turkey 
is unabated, and if, upon mature reflection, you should 
consider that the united strength of the two armies is 
insufficient for this undertaking, you are not to be pre- 
cluded from the exercise of the discretion originally 
vested in you, though Her Majesty's Government will 
learn with regret that an attack from which such im- 
portant consequences are anticipated must be any 
longer delayed. 

"The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear 
to Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to in- 
crease than diminish by delay ; and as there is no pro- 
spect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is 
reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is, on all 
accounts, most important that nothing but insuperable 
impediments, such as the want of ample preparations 
by either army, or the possession by Russia of 
a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that 
which can be brought against it, should be allowed 
to prevent the early decision to undertake these 
operations. . . . 

" It is probable that a large part of the Russian army 
now retreating from the Turkish territory may be poured 
into the Crimea to reinforce Sebastopol. If orders to 



A Siege contemplated. 27 

this effect have not already been given, it is further pro- 
bable that such a measure would be adopted as soon as 
it is known that the Allied armies are in motion to com- 
mence active hostilities. As all communications by sea 
are now in the hands of the Allied Powers, it becomes of 
importance to endeavour to cut off all communication 
by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the 
Russian dominions." 

This despatch had been preceded by a private letter 
containing this passage : — 

" The Cabinet is unanimously of opinion that, unless 
you and Marshal St Arnaud feel that you are not suffi- 
ciently prepared, you should lay siege to Sebastopol, 
as we are more than ever convinced that, without the 
reduction of this fortress, and the capture of the Russian 
fleet, it will be impossible to conclude an honourable 
and safe peace. The Emperor of the French has ex- 
pressed his entire concurrence in this opinion, and, I 
believe, has written privately to the Marshal to that 
effect." 

A siege, then, was in the programme, but it is certain 
that even a probability that it would last through the 
winter would have put an end to the project. 

While awaiting embarkation, the troops were em- 
ployed in making fascines and gabions for the siege 
works, the material for which, abundantly supplied by 
the woods around them, might not be found on the 
plains before Sebastopol ; and great quantities of these 



28 Preparations for Invasion. 

were collected, ready for conveyance, on the south side 
of Varna Bay. 

It was at this time, while the armies were expecting 
to begin the enterprise, that the cholera broke out 
among them. Cases had occurred among the French 
troops while on the voyage from Marseilles ; the pest 
followed them to their camps, and late in July it reached 
the British army. Out of three French divisions, it de- 
stroyed or disabled 10,000 men, and our own regiments 
in Bulgaria lost between five and six hundred. It then 
attacked the fleets, which put to sea in hopes of thus 
baffling it, but it pursued them, and reduced some ships 
almost to helplessness. This was a main reason, among 
others, why the stroke, which could not be dealt too 
swiftly, was delayed. 

Meanwhile the preparations went on. In order that 
the guns might be available immediately on landing, it 
was desirable that they should be conveyed complete 
as for action, and, to this end, boats, united in pairs, were 
fitted with platforms bearing the guns ready mounted 
on their carriages ; and steamers were bought and char- 
tered for the transport of other material. And now the 
naval resources of England showed forth in their superi- 
ority. The French, in default of sufficient transport, 
crowded their war-ships with troops, thus unfitting them 
for battle ; so did the Turks ; while the sea was covered 
with the small sailing-vessels of both loaded with material. 
But in one great compact flotilla of transports, in which 
the steamers were numerous enough to lend the propel- 
ling power to all, a British force, of all arms, namely, 



The Cholera. 29 

four divisions of infantry, the Light Brigade of cavalry 
and sixty guns, with all that was necessary to fight a 
battle, was embarked ; and our war-ships, thus preserving 
all their efficiency, were left in condition to engage the 
enemy's should they issue from Sebastopol. 

It was at Varna that the huge multitudinous business 
of embarkation went on. Piers had been improvised by 
the engineers, but of course the operation was accom- 
plished under difficulties vastly greater than would have 
been met with in home ports. The troops moved down 
slowly from their camps ; the poison in the air caused a 
general sickliness, and the men were so enfeebled that 
their knapsacks were borne for them on packhorses 
during even a short march of five or six miles, all they 
could at once accomplish. As they were embarked, they 
sailed for the general rendezvous in the Bay of Balchick, 
about fifteen miles north of Varna. The mysterious 
scourge still pursued them on board ship, and added a 
horrible feature to the period of detention, for the corpses, 
sunk with shot at their feet, after a time rose to the 
surface, and floated upright, breast high, among the 
ships, the swollen features pressing out the blankets or 
hammocks which enwrapped them. 

After all were assembled, an adverse wind still 
delayed them ; but on the 7th September the whole 
armament got under weigh in fine weather. Each great 
British merchant steamer wheeled round till in position 
to attach the tow-rope to a sailing transport (most of 
these were East Indiamen of the largest class), and then 
again wheeled till the ship in rear attached itself to 



30 The Fleets and Flotillas. 

a second ; then all wheeled into their destined positions 
for the voyage. They were formed in five columns, each 
of thirty vessels, and each distinguished by a separate 
flag ; and the five columns carried the four divisions 
of infantry, with their artillery, namely, the Light, the 
First, Second, and Third, complete, and the Light 
Brigade of cavalry. Few sights more beautiful could 
be seen than the advance, and the manoeuvres which 
preceded it, of this orderly array of ships, all among 
the largest in existence, on the calm blue waters, under 
the bright sky. The French and Turks, notwithstand- 
ing the use of their men-of-war for transport, were 
unable to carry any cavalry. Our flotilla was com- 
manded and escorted by Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons 
in the Agamemnon. Our naval Commander-in-Chief, 
Admiral Dundas, directed the British Force that was 
held ready to engage the enemy, including ten line-of- 
battle ships, two screw- steamers, two fifty- gun frigates, 
and thirteen smaller steamers carrying powerful guns. 
The French fleet numbered fifteen line-of-battle ships 
and ten or twelve war-steamers, and the Turkish eight 
line-of-battle ships and three war-steamers. 

The Russian fleet had, since the first entry of the 
Allies into the Black Sea, remained in the fortified har- 
bour of Sebastopol. It consisted of fifteen sailing line- 
of-battle-ships, some frigates and brigs, one powerful 
steamer, the Vladimir^ and eleven of a lighter class. 
Considering the encumbered condition of the French and 
Turkish squadrons, it seems clear that if, with a fair 
wind and good officers, the Russian armament had 



Composition of the English Army. 31 

issued from its shelter, it might in a bold attack (though 
of course at heavy cost) have inflicted tremendous havoc 
on the transports and troops. 

It is to be noted that the Fourth Division of in- 
fantry, the Heavy Brigade of cavalry, and five or six 
thousand baggage horses belonging to the English 
army, were still at Varna awaiting embarkation, and 
the siege train was also there in the ships which had 
brought it from England. Of these the greater part 
of the Fourth Division was immediately embarked, and 
landed in the Crimea in time to advance with the army. 

Our five infantry divisions were formed each of two 
brigades, each brigade of three regiments, and each 
division numbered about 5000. 

The First Division was commanded by the Duke of 
Cambridge, and was formed of the brigade of Guards, 
viz., a battalion each of the Grenadiers, Scots Guards, 
and Coldstream, under General Bentinck ; and the 42d, 
79th, and 93d Highlanders, under Sir Colin Campbell ; 
with two field batteries. 

The Second Division was commanded by Sir De 
Lacy Evans, and composed of the brigades of Penne- 
father, 30th, 55th, 95th, and Adams, 41st, 47th, 49th; 
with two field batteries. 

The Third Division was under Sir Richard England, 
with Brigadiers Campbell and Eyre, 1st, 38th, 50th ; 
4th, 28th, 44th regiments ; with two field batteries. 

The Fourth Division was at first incomplete, its 46th 
and 57th regiments being still en route. It was under 
Sir George Cathcart, having the 20th, 21st, 63d, 68th 



32 Its Commanders, 

regiments, and the first battalion of the Rifle Brigade ; 
with one field battery. 

The Light Division was commanded by Sir George 
Brown, with the 7th, 23d, and 33d, under General 
Codrington ; and the 19th, 77th, and 88th, under 
General Buller; also the second battalion of the Rifle 
Brigade ; with one troop of horse artillery, and one field 
battery. 

The Light Brigade of cavalry, under Lord Cardigan, 
included the 4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 8th and 
nth Hussars, and the 17th Lancers ; with one troop of 
horse artillery. 

Lord Raglan, Commander of the English Army, was 
sixty-six years old. He had served on Wei ington's 
staff, and lost his arm at Waterloo. Since those days his 
sole military experience had been in the office of Military 
Secretary at the Horse Guards. He was so far well ac- 
quainted with military business, but he had never held any 
command, and while no opportunity had been afforded 
to him of directing troops in war, his life, for forty years, 
had been no adequate preparation for it. But he was a 
courteous, dignified, and amiable man, and his qualities 
and rank were such as might well be of advantage in 
preserving relations with our Allies. 

Sir George Brown had distinguished himself in the 
Peninsula as an officer of the famous Light Division — 
the reason, perhaps, for now giving him the command 
of it — and had been severely wounded at Bladensburg ; 
since when his military life, like his chiefs, had been 
passed chiefly in office work. He had held many 



No. 



Part of the 
Western and Southern Coasts 

of the 

CRIMEA 

with the adjacent country 
Showing Landing- and March of the Allies 

English Miles 

? f 2 3 4 3 x ,° y 





Walker 6- Bontallsc. 



The French Generals. 35 

posts, including that of Adjutant-General at the Horse 
Guards. 

Sir De Lacy Evans had a brilliant record from the 
Peninsular, American, and Waterloo campaigns, and had 
been Commander of the British Legion in Spain in two 
very honourable campaigns and many battles. 

Sir George Cathcart had in his youth, as aide-de-camp 
to his father, British Commissioner with the Russian 
Army, been present at the chief battles in 181 3. He was 
also on Wellington's staff at Quatre Bras and Waterloo. 
He was favourably known as the writer of commentaries 
on the campaigns of 18 12 and 181 3 in Russia and Ger- 
many ; he had commanded various regiments of cavalry 
and infantry; and, as Governor of the Cape, had recently 
conducted successful campaigns against the Kaffirs and 
the Basutos. On these grounds, his reputation stood so 
high that a " dormant commission " had been given to 
him, entitling him to command the army in case Lord 
Raglan should cease to do so. 

Of the Brigadier- Generals the best known was Sir 
Colin Campbell, who had established a great reputation 
as a commander of large forces in our Indian wars, after 
very honourable service in the Peninsula. 

Most of the French generals had seen much active 
service in Algeria. St Arnaud was a gallant man, 
experienced in the warfare suited to that country, but 
frothy and vainglorious in a notable degree — and much 
too anxious to represent himself as taking the chief 
part to be a comfortable ally. 

Though part of the English army had seen service 



5 



6 Description of the Crimea, 



in India, though a large portion of the French troops 
had made campaigns in Algeria, and though the 
Russians had for years carried on a desultory war in 
Circassia, yet the long European peace had left them 
all with little except a traditional knowledge of civilised 
war. No change of method had taken place since the 
Napoleonic era. But the British and French had both 
abandoned the musket for the rifle, ours being the 
Minie ; both it and the French arm were muzzle- 
loaders ; some Russian regiments had a rifle, but a 
large proportion of them were still armed with the old 
brass-bound musket which had served them throughout 
the century ; the artillery also of all remained as 
before. 

As the fleets sailed eastward from Varna across the 
Black Sea, their course was crossed at right angles by 
the coast on which they were to land, and of which they 
might almost be said to know as little as knight-errants, 
heroes of the romances beloved by Don Quixote, knew 
of the dim, enchanted region where, amid vague perils, 
and trusting much to happy chance, they were to seek 
and destroy some predatory giant. 

Crim Tartary, better known now as the Crimea, 
forms part of the Government of Taurida, a province of 
Southern Russia. From the coast of the Euxine it 
stretches southward, as an extensive peninsula, into the 
midst of that sea. Its neck is the Isthmus of Perekop, 
five miles wide, and its length from thence to Balaklava 
at its southern end is, in direct line, 120 miles. Ail the 
northern and middle portion is a flat and arid steppe, 



Its Products and Population. $y 

where are sprinkled at wide intervals small villages 
inhabited by Tartars, whose possessions are flocks and 
herds ; but the remaining and southern end of the penin- 
sula is different indeed in aspect, and in climate. Here 
begins a mountain region sheltering from the northern 
blasts the slopes and hollows, the lesser hills of which, 
covered with pine and oak, enclose valleys of bounteous 
fertility. Multitudes of wild flowers spring up amid the 
tall grass ; the fig, the olive, the pomegranate and the 
orange flourish, and the vine is cultivated with success 
on the southern slopes. The seaward end runs out into 
capes resting upon high cliffs, and is indented on its 
western side by the deep and sheltered harbour of 
Sebastopol, which, as the chief and indeed only large 
and safe harbour of the Black Sea, had by the work of 
generations been converted into a great arsenal and 
dockyard, defended towards the sea by strong forts, and 
affording ample anchorage for the Black Sea fleet, and 
around these works had sprung up a city. The area of 
the whole peninsula is nearly twice that of Yorkshire, 
and its population at the time of the invasion numbered 
something short of 200,000. Going along the road 
from Sebastopol to Perekop, the first considerable 
town reached, sixteen miles distant, is Bakshisarai, " the 
Garden Pavilion," and in another sixteen miles, where 
the road quits the hills for the steppe, is Simpheropol, 
the nominal capital. The part of the country with which 
the reader has at present to do is included in a parallelo- 
gram, one side of which is a line outside the western 
coast from Eupatoria to the level of Balaklava, and the 



$8 The Coast reconnoitered. 

opposite side passes through the hill region, south from 
Simpheropol to the sea. 

In this region the mountains have subsided into hill 
ranges of some 400 feet high, and through these the 
watershed pours five streams flowing westward into the 
Black Sea, all of which formed features in the campaign. 
The first of these is the muddy rivulet called the Bul- 
ganak ; seven miles south of it is the valley of the Alma 
(Apple River) ; another space of seven miles divides the 
Alma from the Katcha ; four miles further the Belbek is 
reached ; and five miles from that the Tchernaya, north- 
westerly in its course, flows into and forms the head of 
the harbour of Sebastopol. 

The distance from Varna to Eupatoria is about 300 
miles. The armament arrived on the 9th at the rendez- 
vous first assigned, " forty miles west of Cape Tarkan." 
It remained anchored there throughout the 10th, while 
Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, with the Com- 
manding Engineer, Sir John Burgoyne, and other English 
and French officers, naval and military, reconnoitered the 
coast for a landing-place, and observed its character 
throughout. At dawn, in a swift steamer, the Caradoc, 
escorted by the Agamemnon, they were off Sebastopol, 
and could look through the entrance of the inlet upon 
the forts, the ships, and the city ; then, rounding Cape 
Kherson, they passed the cliffs on which stood the 
plateau destined to bear the camps of the besiegers, 
and arrived off the inlet of Balaklava, deep down be- 
tween its two ancient high-perched forts. Then, turning 
back north, they took note of the rivers already enumer- 



The Landing-place. 39 

ated, from the Belbek to the Bulganak, and the coast 
thence to Eupatoria, when the space for the landing was 
fixed on, south of that town, in Kalamita Bay. All the 
nth and 12th the Turkish and French fleets, great part 
of which was not propelled, as was ours, by steam, were 
drawing together, and on the 13th nearly all were 
opposite the beach, while those still at sea were coming 
on with a fair wind. 

The considerations which had been main elements in 
the question of the selection of a point of disembarkation 
were, first, a space sufficient for the armies to land to- 
gether, and in full communication with each other ; and 
secondly, that the ground should be such as the fire of 
the ships could protect from the possible enterprises of 
the enemy. Ship's guns are so formidable in size and , 
range that no batteries capable of rapid motion can 
hope to contend with them. No ground fulfilling these 
conditions was found on the southern coast, where the 
cliffs stand up steep and high out of the water, nor did 
the mouths of the rivers afford the necessary advantages. 
On the other hand, the western coast north of Sebastopol 
offered no harbour of which the armies could make a 
secure base, or even a temporary depot ; while, south of 
Sebastopol, the inlet of Balaklava, though small, was 
deep and well-sheltered, where large steamers could un- 
load close to the shore, and the small bay of Kamiesch 
was capable of being made a base. These facts will 
tend to throw light on some questions raised during the 
progress of the war. 

The piece of beach selected to land on, five or six 



4-0 The Troops landed. 

miles north of the Bulganak, was very happily adapted 
for the purpose. 

Two small lakes at the foot of the sea-banks are 
separated from the sea by strips of beach, and from 
these strips roads went up the banks. Thus, when the 
troops were landed here, no attack could be made on 
them (by night, let us suppose) except by penetrating 
into the narrow and easily defended space between the 
lakes and the sea ; while, on the other hand, full facilities 
existed for their movement to the plains above. Here 
the disembarkation, quite unopposed, began on the 14th, 
the French and Turks landing about two miles lower down 
the coast, on a similar strip. In the afternoon a ground 
swell arose, to a degree so violent that many boats were 
hurled on the strand, and several rafts were dashed to 
pieces, the troops, drenched with rain, making fires of 
the fragments. Next day the surf abated, but it was 
not till the 18th that the whole of the forces were landed, 
and in condition to advance. 

The Fourth Division having arrived and landed, the 
British force numbered about 26,000 infantry, sixty guns, 
and the Light Brigade of cavalry, about 1000 sabres. The 
French had 28,000 infantry, and the Turks 7000, with 
sixty-eight guns, but with no cavalry. In order that the 
men might march lightly, especially when so many were 
still low in strength from the effects of the atmosphere, the 
knapsacks of the British were left on board ship, the more 
indispensable articles being taken from them and carried 
by the soldier, wrapt in the blanket which was to cover 
him at night. No tents were landed except for the sick 



Transport obtained. 41 

and for general officers. Except such part of the pack- 
horses as could be conveyed in the flotilla, there was no 
transport landed, but some convoys of the enemy were 
intercepted, and a number of country vehicles were 
procured from the Tartars. In this way were collected 
350 arabas (the waggons of the country, a rude frame- 
work of poles surmounting the axle), and a thousand 
cattle and sheep, with poultry, barley, fruit, and 
vegetables. 



CHAPTER III. 

BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 

Order of March of the Allies — Operations open to the Russians — The 
Bulganak reached — The Valley of the Alma — The Russian Bank — 
Omissions of the Russian Commander — The French ascend the 
Heights — Position in Front of the British — Russian Forces there — 
Delay to allow French to gain Heights — English ordered to advance 
— First Onset of the English — The Light and Second Divisions — The 
Russian Heavy Guns withdrawn — Our First Onset fails — Advance 
of the Guards and Highlanders — English Artillery in the Action — 
General Retreat of the Russians — The Losses — Tactical Views of the 
Battle — General Advance wanting in ense7?ible — The Cavalry. 

On the 19th the advance of the armies began. The 
French were on the right, next the sea. The fact that 
we had cavalry and they had none indicated the inland 
flank as ours. The four French divisions were ranged 
in lozenge form, the apex heading south for Sebastopol, 
the four points marked each by a division with its 
guns ; and in the space thus enclosed were the Turks, 
and the convoy of provisions, ammunition, and baggage. 
The British were formed in two columns of divisions, 
that next the French of the Second Division followed by 
the Third ; the other of the Light Division followed by 
the First and Fourth ; the batteries on the right of their 
respective divisions. The formation of the divisions was 
that of double companies from the centre, giving them 
the means of forming with readiness either to the front or 
the left flank, which was also the object of placing three 



Operations open to the Russians. 43 

of the five divisions in the left column. If the Russians, 
after leaving a sufficient garrison in Sebastopol, were to 
keep an army in the field, it might, from its natural line 
of communication with Southern Russia, namely, the 
road thither by Bakshisarai and Simpheropol, assume 
a front at right angles to the front of the Allies, and 
advancing thus, might attack either their flank or rear 
without risk to its own. On this account, also, the Cavalry 
Brigade was divided, two of its regiments covering the 
front, the other two the left flank, while the fifth closed 
the rear. If the Russians were to threaten that flank, 
the three divisions of our left column would be the first 
to confront them, with the other two in second line, while 
the French and Turks must come up on their right, or 
left, or both, according to the direction of the Russian 
attack, and with fair chance, on those open plains, oi 
meeting it in time, and also, if forced to retreat with their 
backs to the sea, they might expect effectual support 
from their ships. But, at the best, persistent attacks on 
this side by the Russians, with such a wide space to 
manoeuvre on at pleasure, and with cavalry in superior 
force (as, with our deficiency in that arm, it was certain 
to be) would greatly, perhaps decisively, embarrass our 
advance unless we should succeed in inflicting on the 
enemy a crushing defeat. 

The combined armies, then, were moving, in suffi- 
ciently compact formation, straight for Sebastopol, about 
twenty-five miles distant from the starting point of the 
British ; through their front ran the post-road to that 
city from Eupatoria ; but roads were needless, for the 



44 The Bulkanak reached. 

ground was everywhere smooth, firm, grassy, and quite 
unenclosed. In rear of the divisions moved the cattle, 
sheep, the close array of arabas, and the pack-mules with 
the reserve ammunition, while the cavalry regiment in 
rear kept all in motion. In this order the Bulganak, 
an insignificant sluggish stream, was reached early in the 
afternoon. It was while our divisions were crossing its 
bridge that they first saw the enemy. A force of the 
three arms, about 2000 cavalry, 6000 infantry, and two 
batteries of artillery, was drawn up among the hills, at 
some distance beyond the stream ; insufficient for a 
battle, but capable of an action with an advanced guard. 
It appeared to have been brought there only to effect 
an armed reconnaissance, for after a short and distant 
exchange of shots with our foremost batteries, with some 
trifling loss on either side, it retired without any note- 
worthy collision of foot or horse. The army thereupon 
bivouacked on the stream (for the sake of water), with 
its front some hundred yards on the further bank ; the 
British right wing parallel to the stream, and the left 
thrown back to the rivulet, in case of an attack on that 
side. But it passed the night unmolested. 

Next morning, the 20th, the troops were under arms 
early, but did not move for some time. Marshal St 
Arnaud, returning from a visit to Lord Raglan, passed 
along our front ; a tall, thin, sharp-visaged man, reduced 
by illness, but alert and soldier-like, and manifestly much 
pleased as he saluted our ranks in return for the cheers 
with which they greeted him. In less than ten days he 
was a dead man. 






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The Valley of the Alma. 47 

Between nine and ten o'clock the army moved for- 
ward, surmounting a succession of grassy ridges. It 
was well known that we were to try conclusions with 
the Russians that day. About noon a steamer, coasting 
along on our flank, began to fire towards the land, just 
where a sharp, steep cliff ended the shore, and where, 
in fact, was the mouth of the Alma. When the British 
surmounted the next ridge, they looked down on the 
arena of battle. 

The valley of the Alma lay before them, at the foot 
of a smooth, sloping plain. The river, as it flows at the 
foot of this plain, makes somewhat of an angle, enclos- 
ing the Allies ; and the apex just marks the junction of 
the French left with the English right. Just within the 
apex is the village of Bourliouk, and noting that as the 
place where the two Allied armies touched, the share of 
each in the battle becomes clear. 

The ground on the Russian bank was, as befitted a 
defensive position, much more difficult and commanding 
than on the other. Beginning at the sea, for more than 
a mile and a half thence up the stream, there rises close 
to it a perpendicular rocky wall, as if the sea-cliff were 
bent backward. Then comes another mile where the 
cliffs have receded somewhat, and subsided into hills, 
still steep and difficult, though not forbidding ascent. 
Near the mouth of the Alma the stream was fordable, 
and from thence a path led up the cliff. 

Three-quarters of a mile up the stream from its mouth 
there is on the Allies' bank the village of Alma Tamack ; 
and opposite this a cleft in the cliff allows of a road 



48 The Rzissian Bank. 

practicable for guns, which ascends the heights. A 
mile further up is a farm, opposite which the cliff has 
subsided and receded, and here is another road. Finally, 
at another half mile up the stream, a few hundred 
yards to the right of the village of Bourliouk, where, on 
the Russian side, the hills have still receded and become 
more practicable, another road crosses, ascending the 
heights to a telegraph tower. Everywhere, the hills, 
whether standing up in cliffs, as near the sea, or reced- 
ing from the stream, were the buttresses which supported 
on their tops a high plain stretching away towards the 
next river that crossed our line of march on Sebastopol. 

The part of the stream thus described marks the front 
of the French and Turks, who may be said to have 
faced south-south-west. 

The other face of the angle made by the stream 
marks the British front, which may be said to have 
faced south-south-east. And now the character of the 
Russian side of the river changes materially. Here 
the crest line has receded much farther back, and the 
ground is easy of ascent for all arms. Just opposite the 
centre of the British front it shoots up to a pinnacle, 
called the Kourgane Hill, from the sides of which long, 
smooth, wide slopes descend to the river. The one of 
these which chiefly concerns us, that on our right front, 
is broken in its even descent from the summit by a high 
knoll surmounted by a terrace, at some hundred yards 
from the river. Remembering that ground is good for 
defence, not so much because of the difficulties it opposes 
to movement, as because of the facilities it affords for 



Omissions of the Russian Commaiider. 49 

bringing the fire of the defenders to bear on the 
assailants, and for counter-attacks, it will be understood 
why Menschikoff had occupied this part of his line most 
strongly both with infantry and artillery. 

The great post-road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol, 
on each side of which the British had been marching, 
passes the river by a bridge a little to the left of the 
apex of the angle formed by the stream, and then 
ascends to the plateau, through the hollow between the 
Telegraph Hill on the right and the Kourgane Hill on 
the left. There was good reason for Menschikoff to 
take position across the road. But in doing so he had 
of course to consider what extent of ground was suited 
to his force, very inferior to that of the Allies. Bearing 
in mind the inaccessible nature of the cliffs, and also 
that troops ascending them would be very near the 
edge of the precipitous face above the sea — remem- 
bering too that the ships, as he presently found, 
could throw their big projectiles on to that part of the 
ground — he massed the chief part of his force about the 
Kourgane slopes, and nearly all the remainder between 
the Sebastopol road and the Telegraph Hill. And this 
arrangement would have been so far unimpeachable 
had he done what he easily could have done to debar 
the enemy from the roads leading up the cliffs, either 
by breaking them up, or by placing works at the points 
where they reached the plateau. With the aid of other 
fieldworks on his front and flanks he might have justly 
considered himself as occupying, despite his inferior 

numbers, a strong position for the direct defence of 

D 



50 The French ascend the Heights. 

Sebastopol. But no such means were taken of adding 
to the strength of the ground, for the two bits of trench 
work made by him were not intended as defences. 

A halt of some length was made by the Allies on 
coming in sight of the enemy, while Lord Raglan and 
St Arnaud, moving out to the front, concerted the 
general order of the attack. When the advance was 
ordered, about one o'clock, it was begun by Bosquet's 
division, which was next the sea, and faced the cliffs. 
After laying down their knapsacks, one of his brigades 
crossed the Alma near its mouth, and ascended the path 
there, followed by the Turks ; and the other entered the 
road through the cliff opposite Alma Tamack, by which 
passed also the divisional artillery. At the same time 
French ships near the mouth of the stream threw their 
projectiles on to the plateau, the surface of which they 
could see. The remainder of the French forces followed 
in a line of columns at some considerable distance in 
rear of Bosquet. Next to his division was Canrobert's, 
which entered the road opposite the farm, and debouched 
on the plateau nearly a mile west of the Telegraph ; but 
he was obliged to send his guns by the road followed by 
Bosquet's left brigade. Next to Canrobert's came Prince 
Napoleon's division, and behind both was Forey's in 
second line. All these troops then were directed on the 
right face of the angle formed by the stream, and all 
were on the right of the post-road to Sebastopol. The 
ground may be at once cleared for the battle by saying 
that Bosquet's right brigade and the Turks, passing at 
the mouth of the stream, found themselves far from the 



Position in Front of the British. 5 1 

enemy, on whom they never fired a shot ; and his 
other brigade was a mile west of Canrobert's division, 
which, it has been said, was nearly a mile from the 
Telegraph, while all its artillery was following Bosquet's 
left brigade. Prince Napoleon's division bore directly 
on the ground immediately around the Telegraph. All 
this makes it plain that a little engineering science on 
the part of Menschikoff would have almost neutralised 
the action of the French and Turks in the battle. As it 
was, the chief result achieved by St Arnaud was that he 
gained a position threatening MenschikofFs left flank at 
the moment when his front was assailed by the English. 
The British divisions moved down abreast of the 
French, at first in column formation, the Second Division 
on the right, the Light Division on the left, in first line ; 
the Second followed by the Third, the Light by the First, 
in second line, and the Fourth in echelon in rear of the 
left. Beyond the left moved four regiments of the Light 
Brigade, while the remaining one closed the rear. As 
they advanced, the Russian forces became more clearly 
discernible, as did also the ground our line was to 
occupy. It was marked on the right by the village of 
Bourliouk, already mentioned, and on the left, about two 
miles up the stream, by the village of Tarkhanlar, to 
which, however, the left of our infantry did not quite 
attain. Between the two were gardens and vineyards, 
enclosed by low stone walls, stretching down to the 
stream, which proved fordable nearly throughout. Right 
opposite our centre, as we moved, was the slope of the 
Kourgane Hill, with its terraced knoll a few hundred 



52 Russian Forces there. 

yards from the river, on which appeared an earthwork 
of some kind, with twelve or fourteen guns, some of them 
bearing on the post-road, some directly on our front, 
some on our right wing, and thus sweeping our whole 
front. A thousand yards from this battery, and facing 
our left, another earthwork with guns was visible. As 
already said, these works were not intended for defence, 
for they were easily surmounted, being banks of earth only 
two or three feet high, so that the guns looked over them ; 
they were probably intended to prevent the pieces from 
running down the slope, and also might afford some 
slight shelter to the gunners. Behind the battery on 
the Kourgane, and on its flanks, the Russian battalions 
were thickly posted, their front extending to the battery 
facing our left ; and on the other flank they were massed 
on the knolls close to the post-road. The columns in 
reserve were higher up on the slopes, where also were 
drawn up the 3400 cavalry of Menschikoffs army. 
Besides the battery on the knoll, he had on this part 
of the field nine field batteries (the Russian battery 
is of eight guns), of which one was in the earthwork 
on his right, another supported the twelve-gun battery, 
two in reserve on the upper slope, two across the post- 
road, bearing on the bridge, and three attached to the 
cavalry. The force confronting the English may be 
taken as 21,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and eighty-four 
guns; those opposing the French as 12,000 infantry, 
400 cavalry, and thirty-six guns : making the totals 
of Menschikoffs army 33,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry and 
120 guns. Part of the British Fourth Division had been 



Delay to allow French to gain Heights. 53 

left behind at the place of disembarkation to clear the 
beach, and did not arrive till after the battle. Our force en- 
gaged was 23,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and sixty guns. 
The French and Turks together numbered about 35,000 
infantry, with sixty-eight guns. Deducting the column 
that passed the Alma at its mouth, they had 25,000 
infantry, and sixty-eight guns ; these when brought to bear 
would of course overwhelm the force opposed to them, 
which, moreover, only came by degrees on the French 
part of the field, where no attack had been provided 
for by the Russians. It is impossible, therefore, that the 
French could have met with any very strong opposition. 
As the skirmishers on our right approached Bourliouk 
they were met by the fire of Russian light troops and 
light guns in the village ; while the skirmishers in front 
of the Light Division (four companies of its rifle 
battalion), encountered a large number of the enemy's 
skirmishers in the vineyards ; but, as our columns ad- 
vanced, these retired across the stream, first setting fire to 
Bourliouk, the conflagration of which was a notable inci- 
dent of the battle. It was now that the twelve-gun battery 
on theKourgane" Hill gave our people a taste of itsquality ; 
shot and shell, of a size far greater than that of field- 
artillery, began to tear the ground, and to burst in the 
air. The Light and Second Divisions began thereupon 
to deploy ; but our right was much too close upon the 
French, and a great deal of marching and counter-, 
marching now took place, without mending the fault, 
for too little ground was taken, and our troops w T ere 
crowded in their advance to a most damaging degree. 



54 English ordered to advance. 

The delay was not accidental, however, but was accord- 
ing to the plan, in pursuance of which the advance 
against the front of the strongly occupied part of the 
position was only to take place when Bosquet's move- 
ment against the left should begin to take effect. His 
voltigeurs, and afterwards those of Canrobert, had been 
seen swarming up the heights, and some guns (Bos- 
quet's twelve) had been heard, along with the Russian 
batteries opposing them. But, as already said, the 
French artillery had all to advance by one road ; the 
process was slow, and Canrobert's main body of infantry, 
as well as Prince Napoleon's division, waited for the 
support of the guns — hence the delay. Kinglake says 
that, while their movement was still incomplete, a French 
staff-officer came from St Arnaud to ask Lord Raglan 
to advance. The order to attack was thereupon given 
to the Second and the Light Divisions. 

Having issued this command, the English general 
took a course too extraordinary to remain unnoticed. 
Accompanied by some of his staff, he rode round the 
right of the burning village, and descending to the 
Alma, crossed it by a ford close to the left of the 
French Army. Proceeding up the opposite bank, he 
reached a knoll between the Telegraph Hill and the 
post-road, from whence he looked from a distance, 
which was at the moment beyond the effective range 
of field-artillery, upon the flank of the Russian position 
on the Kourgane Hill, and also, on his right front, on 
the columns of the Russian reserves. He was thus in 
the singular position for a commander of occupying. 



First Onset of the English. 55 

with a few officers, a point well within the enemy's lines, 
and beyond the support, or even the knowledge, of any 
of the rest of his army ; and Kinglake, the historian, 
who accompanied him in this excursion, and who records 
it with applause, says, also, he was too far from the 
scene of the main struggle on which his army had now 
entered to be able, for the time, to direct the movements 
of his own troops. 

It was fortunate, in these circumstances, that the 
divisional commanders had so plain a task before them. 
On receiving the order, the Second and Light Divisions 
had at once begun their advance ; but Evans's being 
delayed by the burning village, and having to pass 
round both ends of it to the river, Brown's, forming the 
left of our line, was the first to attack. Passing the low 
wall of the vineyards which occupied this bank, push- 
ing before it the Russian skirmishers, and losing some 
men as it went, it made its way, much disordered by 
the tangling vines, to the stream, whose clear current 
was in most places shallow, but in others formed 
pools where the men were in water to their necks. 
Wading through, they found themselves, at a very few 
yards from the stream, standing beneath an almost 
perpendicular bank about six feet high, in which the 
long slope abruptly ended, and where they were for the 
moment out of the view of the enemy's battery above 
them on the hill. A pause was made here, ended by 
Sir George Brown himself riding up the bank and call- 
ing on his regiments to follow. The whole division 
thereupon gained the slope, and began the attack — not 



56 The Light mid Second Divisions, 

in orderly lines, for, besides insufficiency of space, it 
was impossible under such a fire as now assailed it to 
form these, but with such attempts at lines as the men 
themselves, instinctively seeking their own companies, 
succeeded in making, that is to say, a line chiefly of 
groups and masses. But, whenever they were able to 
form, our regiments attacked in a two-deep line, accord- 
ing to our custom, and were met by the Russians in 
deep columns, formed of two or more battalions, so 
that the front of a British line was of greater extent 
than that of the double or quadruple force in the 
enemy's column engaged with it. Three regiments of 
the Light Division, with one of the Second Division, 
gallantly led by General Codrington, went straight up 
the slope, their too dense front torn by the great heavy 
battery, only three hundred yards in front of them, and 
firing down a smooth natural glacis. On our right 
of that battery the 7th regiment had become engaged 
with a Russian column formed by the left wing of the 
Kazan regiment, and numbering 1500 men; while the 
two left regiments of our Light Division had been halted 
on the slope near the river, because General Buller, per- 
ceiving a formation and advance of infantry and cavalry 
on his left front, formed a corresponding front to meet it. 
The regiment of the Second Division (95th) which 
had joined Codrington was one of four led by Evans 
himself across the river near the bridge, and which 
then, bearing considerably to their left, partly prolonged 
and partly supported the Light Division, while his other 
two battalions (41st and 49th), under General Adams, 



The Russian Heavy Guns withdrawn. 57 

passing round the right of the burning village, crossed 
by a ford below into the hollow space, garnished with 
knolls, between the Telegraph and Kourgane Hills, 
where stood part of the Russian left. 

The First Division, formed in second line to the 
Light, embraced much more ground, so that the brigade 
of Guards extended from near the post-road to quite 
beyond the rear of Codrington's brigade, while the 
Highlanders, forming abreast of them, were prolonging 
the front of the army. After remaining for some time, 
lying down in line during the advance of the Light 
Division, the First Division followed it through the 
vineyards and across the Alma. 

Codrington's brigade continued its brisk advance, 
and now occurred a singular event that was a turning 
point of the battle, which was nothing less than the 
sudden retreat of the great heavy battery which had 
been so formidable a feature of the Russian position. 
This withdrawal was very discreditable. Whether it 
was owing to the menacing aspect of the advancing 
troops, or to anxiety to avoid the loss of guns (and 
Kinglake says it was well known that such loss would 
draw down the displeasure of the Czar), it was a disgrace 
to such a powerful battery, so important to the battle, 
so surrounded with supporting battalions, to save itself 
just when, by continuing in action, it might cause heavy 
and perhaps decisive loss to the enemy. It vanished 
with celerity just as Codrington's men were touch- 
ing the earthwork in front of it. Cavalry horses, 
equipped with lasso harness, came up hastily, were 



58 Our First Onset fails. 

hooked on, and drew the guns away, except two which 
were captured. 

Relieved from the tremendous stress of fire which 
had poured such huge missiles, at such close quarters, 
through their ranks, Codrington's regiments, after enter- 
ing the earthwork, lined the low parapet, and extended 
on both sides of it. Those on the right were in some 
degree protected by the 7th, still holding the left Kazan 
column fast ; and on the left, by the two battalions 
that had been held back there. Facing Codrington 
were the four battalions of the Vladimir regiment, 3000 
strong, supported by the Ouglitz regiment, of the same 
strength (though it never got down into the conflict), 
and the right wing of the Kazan regiment ; the Vladimir 
was closely supported by the fire of the field battery, 
already said to be in support of the great battery. 
And had our attack been so ordered that the supporting 
divisions were now taking part in it, the conflict, assum- 
ing large proportions, might have drawn into its active 
area the whole of the forces on both sides, and have issued 
in a result more decisive than a mere victory. But the 
troops with Codrington, without close support, seeing be- 
fore and around them fresh masses of the enemy, being 
a target for their guns, and threatened by a great body 
of cavalry, gave way and descended the hill. On 
arriving at its foot the four regiments, and the four 
companies of rifles, were less in number than when 
they went up by forty-seven officers, fifty sergeants, 
and 800 rank and file, killed and wounded ; and, in 
addition, the 7th lost twelve officers, and more than 



Advance of the Gtiards and Highlanders. 59 

200 men. But they had inflicted far heavier losses on 
the enemy. 

Had they but clung to the ground they held a few 
moments longer, they would have received effectual 
support, for the Guards, after gaining the farther bank 
of the stream in good order, had already begun the 
ascent, and their centre battalion, the Scots Fusiliers, 
was disordered and swept down by the retreating troops, 
with a loss of eleven officers and 170 men. But the 
Grenadiers on its right, and the Coldstreams on its left, 
continued to advance in lines absolutely unbroken, ex- 
cept where struck by the enemy's shot. Such French 
officers on the hills on the right as, in an interval of 
inaction, were free to observe what our troops were 
doing, spoke of this advance of the Guards as some- 
thing new to their minds, and very admirable. 

At this time the whole of our troops were being 
brought to bear on the position. The three regiments 
remaining with Evans (55th, 30th, and 47th) had been 
engaged chiefly on the left of the post-road, against 
the battalions and batteries drawn up for its defence, 
and had undergone heavy losses. His two other regi- 
ments (41st and 49th), which had moved to the stream 
on the other side of Bourliouk, were towards the close 
of the battle brought up to the knoll where Lord 
Raglan stood. The Third Division was moving across 
the stream in support, and on the left of the Guards the 
Highlanders were advancing against the Russian right 
flank, while beyond them again moved our Cavalry 
Brigade. It was, then, upon troops shaken by heavy 



60 English Artillery in the Action. 

losses, and dispirited for the want of a forward impulse, 
that our whole army was now closing. 

Our artillery had also taken an effective share in the 
fight. At first, till ground was gained on the further 
bank, some batteries of the Light, Second, and First 
Divisions had, from the space behind and around the 
burnt village, brought their fire to bear on the men and 
guns defending the post-road, but as the infantry ad- 
vanced they began to cross the river. The battery of 
the First Division, already in action, now passed at a 
shallow ford just below the bridge, and going some way 
up the road, ascended a knoll to the left, where it found 
itself on the right of the 55th, and in full view of the 
field. The guns had outstripped the gunners, who 
followed on foot, and the gun first to arrive was loaded 
and fired by the officers, who dismounted for the pur- 
pose. The rest of the battery immediately came up. 
and its fire bore on and turned back a heavy Russian 
column (the only one at that time within view) which 
was descending the hill. Two batteries from other 
divisions also came into action here, and on the ground 
where Lord Raglan stood two guns, called up by him, 
had been so placed as to bear on the flank of the 
batteries guarding the post-road, causing them to retire, 
while the two troops of horse-artillery, advancing with 
the cavalry on our left, were finally directed on the 
masses still held in reserve by Menschikoff. 

The two battalions of the Guards, with some men 
rallied from the Scots battalion, went up the hill on each 
side of the gap in their centre, and were met by the four 



General Retreat of the Russians. 6 1 

battalions of the Vladimir regiment, and the two Kazan 
battalions, much shattered in the fight, which had hither- 
to been engaged with the 7th. This new phase of the 
battle was not of long duration. The columns could 
not stand before the close fire of the lines. Moreover, at 
this moment the Highland regiments, after receiving the 
badly aimed fire of the field-guns in the earthwork on 
the flank (which then rapidly withdrew from the action), 
had now approached the right of the Russian position. 
The brigade was in echelon, the right battalion leading 
and already past the earthwork defended by the Vladimir. 
This Russian regiment, after undergoing heavy loss, still 
hotly assailed in front by the Guards, and its rear threat- 
ened by the Highlanders, retreated to its right rear to- 
wards the right Kazan column, upon which it endeavoured 
to form, and both came under the fire of the leading High- 
land regiment (42d). At the same time Campbell's other 
regiments attacked the columns hitherto in reserve high up 
the Kourgane Hill. These did not maintain the contest; 
the Russian forces all over the position were quitting it. 
No attempt was made by their cavalry or artillery on 
this side of the field to cover the retreat ; they seemed to 
have shifted for themselves, leaving the infantry columns 
to make their way off the field, which they did with- 
out panic, though shattered as they went by our most 
advanced field batteries. The English, moving over 
the whole field, from the eastern slopes of the Kour- 
gane on the extreme left to the slopes of the Tele- 
graph Hill now occupied by the French, once more 
completed the connection of the Allied Forces. Lord 



62 The Losses. 

Raglan proposed to push the enemy in his retreat with 
the untouched troops of the two armies ; but the 
French Marshal declined to join in that step, on the 
ground that his men had divested themselves of their 
knapsacks before ascending the heights, and that it was 
impossible to advance till they had resumed possession 
of them. The leading English batteries continued, how- 
ever, to pursue the enemy with their fire for some little 
distance on the plateau, where some of them bivouacked 
at nightfall, covered by a few companies detached for 
the purpose. 

In the battle the English lost 106 officers, of whom 
twenty-five were killed ; nineteen sergeants killed, and 
102 wounded ; of rank and file, 318 killed, 1438 wounded ; 
and nineteen missing, supposed to be buried in the ruins 
of Bourliouk; total 2002. The French lost only three 
officers killed, yet their official accounts placed their 
total loss at the disproportionate number of 1340; but 
there were good reasons for believing that this was a 
great exaggeration. Lord Raglan (says Kinglake) be- 
lieved that their whole loss in killed was sixty, and in 
wounded 500, and there was a general belief in our 
army that the French losses were slight. The Russians 
stated their own losses at 5709. 

As to the tactics of the Allies, they had before them 
a position very difficult of access on their right, very 
advantageous for defence in the centre, and with open 
and undefended ground on their left. Supposing they 
had neglected the part so difficult of access near the sea, 
and carried their whole line inland, till their right was 



Tactical Views of the Battle, 63 

across the post-road, and their left extending far 
beyond the Russian right, in that case, if the Russians 
had held their position, with a powerful attack prepared 
against their front, and a large force turning their right, 
a defeat would have been to them absolute destruction. 
If, seeing the manoeuvre, Menschikoff had marched out 
of the position, and formed across our left, backed on 
the Simpheropol road, he would have gained a tactical 
advantage largely compensating for his numerical 
inferiority, and great chances would have been afforded 
to an able tactician thus operating on a flank with his 
own retreat assured ; in fact, there would have been a 
large field open for skilful manoeuvres on both sides, 
and the Allies would at least have had the advantage 
of drawing him from his position, when they might well 
have hoped that, with ordinary equality of skill, they 
would have forced him back, and gained the road to 
Sebastopol. On the other hand, they had to consider 
whether they would run any serious risk in thus leaving 
a space between their right and the sea. Now a Russian 
force could only have operated there by traversing the 
plateau swept by the guns of the fleet, descending the 
difficult paths through the cliffs, crossing the stream, and 
forming for attack with its back to the sea, and with a 
retreat across the Alma and up the cliffs impossible, 
except in case of the most absolute defeat of the Allies. 
This, therefore, need not be taken into the account, and 
all considerations point to this suggested movement of 
the Allied Army away from the sea as the right one. 
The battle, as fought, showed a singular absence of 



64 General Advance wanting in Ensemble. 

skill on all sides. The Russian general showed great 
incompetency in leaving the issues of the cliffs unclosed, 
in keeping his reserves out of action, in withdrawing 
his artillery when it might have best served him, and 
in leaving absolutely unused his so greatly superioi 
force of cavalry on ground very well adapted to its 
action. The part played by the French was not pro- 
portionate either to their force, or to their military 
repute. Of the two divisions brought at first on to the 
plateau, one brigade, that nearest the sea, together with 
all the Turks, never saw the enemy, and had no effect 
on the action ; and another division of the front line, 
with easier ground, only arrived very late to the support 
of the others. Though these others (three brigades) were 
opposed by no overwhelming force, they hung back, and 
never, up to the end of the battle, seriously engaged 
the Russians. No favourable impression was left on the 
minds of the English by their Allies' share in the action. 
The English divisional generals were, as we have, 
seen, left to themselves, except for the order given to 
two of them to attack ; and it was inevitable, in their 
relative position to the French, that they should advance 
straight to their front. This they did, in the face of 
a formidable resistance, and with a gallantry to which 
their losses testify. But when it had become evident 
that no great operation against our flank was to be 
attempted, and that the enemy was altogether com- 
mitted to a direct defence, our attack should have been 
so strong, so concerted, and so fed and maintained, as 
to bring our whole force to bear on the enemy. Thus, 



The Cavalry. 65 

if the Highland Brigade had crossed the river along 
with the attacking divisions and beyond them, supported 
by the Fourth Division and the cavalry, then the Light 
and Second Divisions, secure on their flanks, and closely 
supported by the Guards, could have brought their 
whole strength at once to bear, while the Russian re- 
serves would have found too much to do in meeting the 
onset on their flank to reinforce the defenders of the 
principal battery. But as there was no unity and no 
concerted plan, our troops suffered accordingly. The 
artillery, too, instead of being left to come into action 
according to the views of its different commanders, 
should have had its part in supporting the attack dis- 
tinctly assigned to it. All, therefore, that we had to be 
proud of was the dash and valour of the regiments en- 
gaged. These were very conspicuous, and worthy of 
the traditions of the Peninsular days. A French officer, 
who was viewing the field, where our men lay, as they 
had fallen, in ranks, with one of our naval captains, 
observed to him, " Well, you took the bull by the horns 
— our men could not have done it." 

Our cavalry, though so inferior in number, would 
probably not have been deterred by that consideration 
from engaging (as indeed it proved on a later occasion) 
but the part assigned to it was that of observation and 
defence only. " I will keep my cavalry in a bandbox," 
was said to have been Lord Raglan's expression ; and 
he was right, for it was all the army had to depend on 
for the many essential duties which cavalry must in 

such a case perform. 

E 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE MARCH ROUND SEBASTOPOL TO BALAKLAVA. 

March to the Belbek — Question of attacking the North Side — Menschikoff 
bars the Harbour — Reasons against Attack of North Side — 
Todleben's Strange Contention — Impolicy of moving Allies Inland — 
The Flank March begun — Rencontre with Menschikoff s Rear — The 
English reach the Tchernaya — First View of Balaklava — Question 
of Bases for the Two Armies — Lord Raglan chooses Balaklava — 
Features of the South Side — Positions of the Allies. 

The next two days were passed on the Alma. The 
many slain were buried by us. In and about the 
principal battery were about 700 or 800 bodies, of 
which two-thirds were Russians, and the dead lay 
thick on other parts of the field.* The close inter- 
mixture of Russian and English bodies showed that 
all the fighting on this part of the field had been 
between them alone. Hospitals were established in 
some empty houses in Bourliouk, where surgeons of 
the army and navy attended to the wounded before 
they were borne to the ships. And amidst these scenes 
of suffering the cholera knew no relenting. 

On the 23d the armies marched again, and as 
before, over dry grassy plains, and passing the Katcha, 
seven miles from the Alma, encamped on the heights 
beyond about noon. The village here had been deserted 



March to the Belbek. 67 

in haste by the inhabitants. It had been expected that 
the enemy might make another stand in the strong 
position which these heights offered. But their defeat 
had been too absolute, their retreat too hasty, to admit 
of such a rally. Kinglake says it became a panic flight 
for the shelter of Sebastopol. On the other hand, it 
must be observed that this panic was not evident at 
the close of the battle, and that our march on the foot- 
steps of Menschikoff's army did not show us marks 
of such complete disorder. At the mouth of the 
Katcha the Scots Greys and the 57th regiment (of 
the Fourth Division) were disembarked, and joined 
the army. 

The next day a march of six miles carried us across 
the Belbek. Here the character of the country changed 
from grassy plains to hills clothed with coppice, and 
here the army halted during the 25th. These heights 
were waterless, and the cavalry and horse-artillery led 
a hard life while covering the army ; the horses had 
neither forage nor water for forty-eight hours, all which 
time they remained accoutred and harnessed ; and the 
men and officers did not, for these and two other days, 
taste meat. 

The army was now so close to the prime object of 
the enterprise that, by going about a mile and a half 
beyond the halting place, the towers and fortifications 
were seen at no great distance in the basin below. And 
it was during the halt here that the question arose 
whether the army should at once attack the north side 
of Sebastopol. It may be doubted whether it was ever 



68 Question of attacking the North Side. 

seriously considered. The harbour of Sebastopol is 
from iooo to 1200 yards wide. On the north side, 
besides some storehouses and a factory, the only con- 
structions were forts at the entrance ; others on the cliffs, 
looking on the sea outside ; and on the heights inland a 
large permanent work, known to us afterwards as " the 
Star Fort," which, supported by earthen works and 
batteries, recently thrown up on either flank, dominated 
all the ground within range of its guns. It was on the 
south side that the city stood, with its public buildings, 
the quarters of the garrison, the docks, and the arsenal. 
The harbour between these was filled with the ships of 
war, whose broadsides could, of course, be brought to 
bear on either side, but which were at first disposed 
with the object of resisting an attack on the northern 
bank, where they swept the ground over which an 
enemy would advance. It is asserted that on the 21st, 
the day after the battle of the Alma, Sir Edmund 
Lyons, second in command of the fleet, urged Lord 
Raglan to follow up the success, and " try to take the 
northern forts by a coup de main" But, from what has 
just been said, this was manifestly not only a quite 
desperate but a fruitless enterprise, except on one 
condition, namely, that the Allied Fleet should take a 
principal part in the attack ; and it was only in such 
a case that the view of a naval commander need 
have been an element in he question. Had some 
of our ships engaged the forts, had the rest passed 
in and attacked the vessels of the enemy, while the 
Allied Army stood on the heights above ready to 



Menschikoff bars the Harbour. 69 

descend, it is conceivable that Sebastopol might have 
fallen in a storm of battle as tremendous as the world 
has ever witnessed. But those who assert that this oppor- 
tunity continued to exist when the armies were on the 
Belbek (23d and 24th September) ignore the change which 
had taken place in the problem. Menschikoff, singularly- 
inefficient as a tactician, seems to have possessed both 
sagacity and decision in other fields of the military art. 
Immediately on entering Sebastopol after his defeat, he 
perceived two measures to be necessary. The one was 
to keep open, by means of an army in the field, his 
communications with Russia, while leaving a sufficient 
garrison in Sebastopol ; the other was to bar the 
harbour against his enemies' fleet. Therefore, con- 
trary to the advice of his admiral, he caused seven 
ships of war to be sunk across the entrance of the 
harbour, in line with the forts, on the night of the 22d. 
On the 23d our vessels in observation off the port per- 
ceived that this had been done, and it was reported to 
St Arnaud the same evening. Thus an attack would 
now be made under very different conditions, for the 
rest of the Russian Fleet, thus rendered secure against 
attack, could still bring an exterminating fire to bear 
on the north side. The proper person for Lord Raglan 
to consult on the subject (if it was any longer matter 
for consultation) was his chief engineer, Sir John 
Burgoyne, who always denied that the proposition 
was ever seriously entertained, or that Lord Raglan 
had ever discussed it with him. And in support of 
this it is to be remembered that, as has been already 



yo Reasons against Attack of North Side. 

said, the shore north of Sebastopol offered landing-places, 
but no harbours. The only point it afforded for the 
disembarkation of supplies was the mouth of the 
Katcha, open to every wind, and the communications 
with which would have been liable to be intercepted at 
any time by a Russian army in the field. Finally, sup- 
posing all the success possible to be achieved, the Allies 
in possession of the north side, and the ships in the 
harbour by some miracle got rid of, it may be asked — 
what next ? How were we to compel the surrender of 
the south side by means of our field-artillery, across an 
interval of 1200 yards, against an enemy who, besides 
the artillery in his great stone forts, could from an 
inexhaustible arsenal line the whole southern shore, 
as well as the Inkerman heights on our left flank, with 
heavy guns ? It may safely be said that, after driving 
the enemy off the north side, we should have found 
ourselves in a position of greatly augmented difficulty. 

It would not have been necessary to dwell upon this 
but or the support afforded to the theory which 
Todleben, the engineer who became so famous for his 
defence of Sebastopol, has set forth in his ample, and 
in most respects excellent, account of the siege. Un- 
fortunately, not only his opinions but his facts are 
frequently more than questionable, and he gives but too 
much reason to infer that he exaggerated the insuffici- 
ency of the means of resistance in order to exalt the 
importance of his own splendid services in enabling 
the garrison to make so memorable a defence. 

For example, he desires to show that the Allies, upon 



Todleben s Strange Contention. 71 

reaching the Belbek, ought to have made an assault on the 
north side. On the highest part of the ground there was 
the Star Fort, with the trenches and batteries in extension 
of it. To carry this by assault Todleben represents as an 
easy matter. This fort was a permanent work of 700 yards 
extent round the lines of fire; it had escarps of masonry, 
and a glacis, and was surrounded by a ditch twelve feet 
deep and eighteen feet wide. It was armed with forty- 
seven guns. The ground over which the assailants must 
have advanced was swept by the broadsides of the 
ships below. Is it possible that an engineer could have 
looked on such a scheme as practicable ? But he says 
the enemies' ships, approaching the shore, could batter 
the fort almost with impunity. The impossibility of this 
is best shown by the fact that, in the subsequent engage- 
ment between the fleets and forts, one of the batteries on 
the cliffs (100 feet high) of the north side disabled several 
of our ships without receiving a shot in return, although 
they made it the object of their fire, and that the Star 
Fort is distant inland from this battery 1000 yards. 
Thus, according to Todleben, the ships, while them- 
selves under the fire of the coast batteries, which they 
could not injure in return, were to bombard a fort 
a thousand yards beyond these batteries, and which 
would be invisible from the sea. 

The second alternative suggested by Todleben is 
that the Allies should have established a force on the 
road to Bakshisarai, thus intercepting the communica- 
tions between Russia and Sebastopol, which would, he 
says, have brought the campaign to an end. Now the 



72 Impolicy of moving Allies Inland. 

nearest point at which the Allies could have touched the 
Russian communications was Mackenzie's Farm. But 
the heights there were waterless, therefore the intercept- 
ing force could not have remained there ; it must have 
gone farther, to the Upper Belbek. It would then have 
been some seventeen miles from its base on the Katcha — 
one so precarious that a strong breeze from the wrong 
quarter would render it useless. This long line of 
supply must have been covered by the rest of the army, 
throughout its length, from attacks which might be 
directed on any part of it either by the garrison of 
Sebastopol on the one side, or by MenschikofPs army 
in the field on the other. The reduction of a fortress 
by pressure of this kind must of course be slow in its 
operation, and had the Allied commanders been reck- 
less enough to put a force into such a position, it would 
have been impossible to maintain it, under the stress 
of such enterprises against their communications 
and their line as the enemy showed himself capable 
of undertaking shortly afterwards at Balaklava and 
Inkerman. 

On the afternoon of the 24th Lord Raglan visited 
Marshal St Arnaud, and the arrangements for the flank 
march were then agreed on. The French commander 
sat rigidly in his chair during the interview, and his 
manner and looks showed that his sickness was gain- 
ing on him. On leaving the French camp, Lord 
Raglan said to one of his staff, " Did you observe 
St Arnaud? — he is dying."* When the visit was 

* Kinglake 



The Flank March begun. 75 

repeated next morning, the Marshal was no longer 
able to take part in discussion. 

On the morning of the 25th the heavy cavalry, a troop 
of horse-artillery, and a battalion of rifles, were sent as an 
advanced guard on the road through the woods leading to 
Mackenzie's Farm. Towards noon the march of the main 
body began. Four field batteries advanced up one of the 
roads leading to Sebastopol. Outside a small house by 
the roadside Lord Raglan and General Airey were seated 
with a map before them, and Lord Raglan himself indi- 
cated to the officer at the head of the column the direc- 
tion in which it was to strike through the wood on the 
left of the road, and called out to him to go " south-east." 
Thereupon the guns, with their waggons and carriages, 
in long procession, plunged into the narrow woodpath, 
the wheels crashing through the coppice, and steering by 
the sun when there was a divergence of ways, kept the 
main path for about an hour, passing as they went some 
of the heavy cavalry, small bodies of which were drawn 
up on their right, on the edge of the heights that looked 
down on Sebastopol. Their further progress was stopped 
by the troop of horse-artillery which was halted in the 
path in front. The cavalry and rifles, either by accident 
or design, had diverged to the right, and the troop thus 
found itself leading the advance of the army in ground 
where it could do nothing effectual for its own defence, 
and was devoid of all proper protection or support Pre- 
sently Lord Raglan rode up with his staff, demanding 
sharply why the troop had halted, and ordered it imme- 
diately to proceed, himself leading the way. The march 



J 6 Rencontre with Menschikoff 's Rear. 

was continued in this extraordinary manner, the head- 
quarter staff first, then thirty guns in long procession, 
through a thick wood, and moving round an enemy's 
fortress and army. What this might have portended 
was presently made evident, for in an open space Lord 
Raglan came suddenly on a Russian column moving at 
right angles to his own course. 

This singular rencontre had come about in this 
way : Menschikoff, after sinking his ships, and making 
arrangements for the defence of the fortress, had left 
Sebastopol that morning, with the army which had 
fought on the Alma, in pursuance of his design of keep- 
ing open his communications with Russia by means of 
holding a position in the open country. The high- 
road from Sebastopol to Bakshisarai, after ascending 
steeply from the valley of the Tchernaya, crosses the 
end of the plateau on which the English were moving 
at the open space on which stand the buildings and 
fields of Mackenzie's Farm, before again descending to 
the plain on the way northward towards the Upper 
Belbek. He had begun his movement before dawn 
on the 25th, and the halt we made in the wood had 
enabled his army to pass by, except some of the baggage 
and its escort. Prince Menschikoff, with the leading 
troops, had at this time reached the village of Otarkoi 
on the Belbek, and thought so little of keeping himself 
informed of what might be passing near his army (being 
probably altogether intent on transporting it unobserved 
into its new positions), that he remained for several days 
in the belief that the irruption on his rear had been 



The English reach the Tchernaya. jj 

made only by a patrol. Some of his baggage train was 
captured, but many of the vehicles hurried off, on the 
one side towards Bakshisarai, on the other towards 
Sebastopol. We had been absolutely unaware of this 
march of an army across our front till we stumbled on 
it; while Menschikoff remained in such complete igno- 
rance that the Allied Army was defiling within four or 
five miles of him, that even on the 28th a messenger 
from him arrived in Sebastopol, part of whose errand 
was to get news of the movements and position of the 
enemy. 

The English forces gradually assembled on the 
ground around the farm, and then resumed their march, 
descending to the Traktir Bridge, where the road to 
Balaklava crosses the Tchernaya. There, on the banks 
of the stream, the leading troops bivouacked after night- 
fall, while the rear divisions and batteries did not arrive 
till some hours afterwards. Looking back to the heights 
we had quitted, the glare in the sky showed that 
our allies, following in our steps, were bivouacking 
there. 

Cathcart had been left with his division on the Belbek 
to send the sick to the embarking place on the Katcha, 
and to cover the march of the armies. A messenger 
sent by him succeeded in reaching the British head- 
quarters, and returned with news of the progress of the 
movement, which Cathcart sent on to the Katcha ; and 
Lyons despatched a naval officer, who also managed to 
reach Lord Raglan, and to return with a message to the 
Admiral. Thus the fleet was prepared to co-operate 



78 First View of Balaklava. 

next day in the seizure of the port of Balaklava, On 
the 26th Cathcart followed the march of the armies, and 
arrived unmolested on the Tchernaya. 

This same day, the 26th, the British resumed their 
march, crossing the valley of the Tchernaya towards the 
low hills which separated it from that of Balaklava. It 
was, perhaps, partly in consequence of the long, fatiguing 
march of the day before that men seized with cholera 
began to strew the roadside directly the advance began. 
Troops moving on the enclosing hills right and left of 
the valley protected the flanks of the main column, and 
some guns which accompanied them opened fire, while 
other and heavier shots were heard from the sea. On 
passing the ridge which divided the valleys right athwart 
our path, we looked down on the object of the whole 
movement, and very insignificant it seemed. At the 
end of a piece of richly cultivated garden ground was 
seen a pool lying deep between enclosing cliffs, which 
were crowned by walls and towers. From thence there 
presently came a shell travelling towards us at a height 
which showed it had been fired from a mortar. At the 
same time some companies of our rifles running along the 
hills on the left of the lake clambered over the walls, 
along which the garrison was seen to run, and from 
whence they presently made signs of surrender. There- 
upon a small English steamer appeared suddenly in the 
piece of water below, assuring us that the harbour was 
our own, and the communication with the fleet re- 
established. On this occasion four shots only were 
fired by the garrison (composed of militia of the place), 



Question of Bases for the Two Armies. 79 

and their commander, in excusing himself for provoking 
an assault by firing at all, said he thought he was bound 
to do so until summoned to surrender. Nobody was 
wounded on either side. But the following account 
appears in Todleben's official narrative : — " The enemy 
opened against Balaklava a powerful cannonade. Twenty 
ships approached the coast and bombarded the old 
ruins. The mortars, however, only ceased fire after 
having exhausted their ammunition. This imperceptible 
garrison had defended itself even to the last extremity. 
There remained only Colonel Minto, six officers, and 
sixty soldiers, all wounded in many places." What are 
thus described as having " remained " were all that had 
been in the place — the account belongs altogether to 
the regions of fiction. 

This day the French Army crossed the Tchernaya 
and bivouacked on the Fedukhine heights. 

A question entailing momentous consequences now 
arose. It was whether the English or the French should 
occupy as a base the harbour of Balaklava. Hitherto 
on the mere evidence of the map, it had been counted 
on as available for both armies, but now that it lay 
before their eyes, a mere pool, already crowded, with 
one straggling row of poor houses for a street, it was 
seen that it would not bear division. The French had 
a strong ground of contention on their side, for the right 
of the Allied line had hitherto been conceded to them, 
and whoever took the right now must hold Balaklava. 
General Canrobert, who had succeeded Marshal St 
Arnaud in the command, took a course very considerate 



80 Lord Raglan chooses Balaklava, 

towards us. Seeing that we were already in possession, 
and that it would be difficult in many ways for us to 
move out, he gave Lord Raglan his choice whether to 
keep the left of the line, and give Balaklava to the 
French, or to take the right and keep that harbour. 
Admiral Lyons counselled strongly for keeping Bala- 
klava, as the place best adapted for securing a due 
communication between the army and its base on the 
sea. It was an occasion which a Greek poet would 
have represented, after the event, as one in which the 
chooser, blinded by some angry god, had made choice 
of calamity. Lord Raglan took the right, and Balak- 
lava, and with them brought untold miseries on his 
army. 

We have now reached the point in the drama where 
the main action begins to which all that had passed was 
merely preliminary. The armies thenceforward assumed 
that position towards the enemy which they were to 
keep up to the final act of the war. Above them 
stood the broad Upland of the Chersonese, on which 
for nearly a year their lives were to be passed, and 
for the most part ended, and to which, after a time, 
they were chained by necessity until their task should 
be accomplished. It becomes necessary, therefore, to 
describe the conditions in which the forces opposed 
were operating. 

The outer harbour or roadstead of Sebastopol is 
a creek about four miles long from the point where it 
breaks, nearly at right angles, the coast line to its 
extremity where the Tchernaya flows into it. It main- 



Features of the South Side. 81 

tains a great depth throughout, even close to the shore. 

On the points which mark the entrance stood two stone 

forts, that on the north named Constantine, on the south 

Alexander. Outside Alexander, looking out to sea 

was the Quarantine Fort. After entering the roadstead, 

the Artillery Fort was passed on the south ; and about 

a mile from the entrance the Inner or Man-of-War 

harbour ran for a mile and a half into the southern 

shore. On the two points which marked this inlet stood 

two other forts, Nicholas and Paul. On the western 

shore of this inner creek stood the city of Sebastopol ; 

on its eastern shore, indented by the inlet on which the 

dockyards were built, was the Karabelnaia suburb, where 

stood the extensive barracks for the garrison. Nearly 

half way between this inner harbour and the head of the 

roadstead was another much smaller inlet, the Careenage 

Creek. 

The ground south of the roadstead was marked 

by very singular features. The plateau or plain, the 

ancient Chersonese (which, following Kinglake's more 

descriptive phraseology, will in future be called the 

Upland), where the Allied Armies stood was marked off 

from the valley of the Tchernaya by a wall of cliff, 

which, following up that stream southward for about 

a mile from its mouth, turns round south-west and 

defines the valley of Balaklava, passing about a mile 

north of that place, and joining the sea-cliffs. This 

plateau is channelled by many chasms or ravines, 

which, beginning with slight depressions in its midst 

descend between rocky walls to the shore, and 

F 



8 2 Positions of the Allies. 

between these rose elevated points, lying all round the 
town and suburb, which, crowned by such works as 
the MalakofT, the Redan, the Flagstaff Bastion, and 
others, afterwards acquired each a fame of its own. 
Another feature of first-rate importance w T as the con- 
formation of the coast line at Cape Cherson, where the 
northern side of its angle was indented by twin inlets, 
Kazatch and Kamiesch Bays, having a common entrance, 
which throughout the siege constituted the French base, 
being most conveniently adapted for the purpose; a 
road, paved afterwards by the French, and thus placed 
beyond the vicissitudes of weather, passed from these 
creeks along the rear of their Divisions as they faced 
Sebastopol. 

The largest of the ravines, dividing the plain from 
south to north, descends to the head of the inner harbour. 
It was at first the line of separation between the French 
and English. Two French Divisions, under General 
Forey, the Third and Fourth, forming the siege corps, 
encamped between it and the coast. Kamiesch Bay 
was immediately filled with their shipping, whose masts 
looked like a forest ; and a wharf was made for landing 
the multitude of stores which crowded the beach and 
the environs of a small city of tents. The First and 
Second French Divisions, and some battalions of Turks, 
under General Bosquet, were posted on the eastern and 
south-eastern cliffs of the Upland, to cover the siege 
against an attack from the Russian field army., 

On the right of the great ravine were the Third and 
Fourth English Divisions ; beyond them the Light Divi- 



Allied Ozitposts before Balaklava. 83 

sion rested its right on the ravine descending to the 
Careenage Creek ; on the other side of which, near the 
eastern edge of the Upland, was posted the second Divi- 
sion, looking towards the heights of Inkerman, and 
some hundred yards in rear of it the First Division was 
encamped, its right also near the edge of the Upland ; 
and both these were available for mutual co-operation 
with Bosquet, while, unlike his force, they sent their 
quota of men to the trenches. 

Bosquet set about fortifying the edge of the heights 
on which he stood ; * and, so far as the position on the 
Upland was concerned, the armies there were for the 
present (that is to say, while their force held its present 
relation to that of the garrison of Sebastopol and Mens- 
chikofTs field army) sufficiently secure. But there were 
two vulnerable points in our line ; that with which we 
will first deal was caused by the need to cover Balaklava. 
About 4000 yards from that place a row of heights 
crossed the valley, low on the side of the Upland, but 
rising into higher and sharper hills towards the heights 
of Kamara. On these, slight works were constructed, 
armed with iron twelve-pounders, and garrisoned by 
Turks. The 93d Highlanders (left there by the First 
Division) were encamped between these heights and 
Balaklava ; a thousand marines were landed and placed 
on the hills to our right of the harbour, on the heights 
before which places were found for guns brought from 
the ships ; and in the valley below the cliffs of the Up- 
land, and on the left front of the Highlanders, were the 

* Map 3. 



84 Balaklava a Vulnerable Point. 

camps of the two brigades of cavalry. A point of 
special importance was that the one metalled road, the 
Woronzoff road, which ascended the cliff of the Up- 
land, and wended thence to the town of Sebastopol, 
lay, as it crossed the valley of Balaklava, between and 
along the hills occupied by the Turks. The road con- 
tinued on to Yalta, the Woronzoff country house and 
estate on the south-eastern shore of the Crimea ; an- 
other branching from it crossed the Tchernaya, and went 
on up the Mackenzie heights to Bakshisarai. The 
Russians could approach Balaklava quite out of range 
of the guns and troops on the Chersonese ; thus the 
Allies must be drawn from their heights down to the 
valley in case of an advance of the enemy in that direc- 
tion. Therefore, the valley of Balaklava was a vulnerable 
point, and, if possible, should have been made strong 
enough to secure the Woronzoff road throughout its 
extent from Balaklava to the plateau. 

The Russians in Sebastopol now knew exactly what 
they had to face, and were at least delivered from the 
perplexities which had at first beset them. 

The tidings of defeat on the Alma reached 
Sebastopol about ten or eleven at night on the 20th, 
when Menschikoff arrived in the fortress. The Prince 
gave orders to Admiral Korniloff to bar the entrance to 
the harbour by sinking some of the war-ships. Next 
morning the Admiral summoned his naval captains, 
and after telling them of Menschikoff's design, put it 
to them whether his own proposal would not be prefer- 
able, which was to put to sea and, by attacking the 



Todleberis View of the Situation. 85 

Allied Fleet and flotilla, deprive the enemy of their 
means of subsistence. The council did not concur 
with him, believing that the time for such an enter- 
prise had gone by, and preferring to bar the harbour 
by sinking the ships. The same afternoon those which 
were to be sunk were moved into their places. 

During the 21st, Menschikoffs troops from the 
Alma, after reaching the north side, were transported 
across the harbour, in accordance with his determina- 
tion to move his army into the open country, and 
bivouacked in a field outside the town. 

During this day Colonel Todleben was occupied in 
considering how to meet the attack which he says was 
expected on the north side. As we have seen, he took 
a view of the prospect which was entirely unreasonable. 
He considered the case of 60,000 men, protected from 
the assault of an equal number by fortifications and 
heavy artillery, as absolutely desperate. In his book he 
blames the other 60,000 for not sweeping them off the 
face of the earth. He communicated his forebodings 
to Admiral KornilofT, who took command on that side on 
the 24th, and who made preparations to defend the Star 
Fort and the adjacent ground in a spirit of absolute 
despair. But on the 25th the march of the Allied 
Armies along the Mackenzie heights was discerned from 
the Naval Library, which occupied a very lofty position 
in the city. Thereupon all doubt was at an end, the 
garrison was concentrated on the south side, and the 
preparation for the long struggle began. 

The strength of the garrison was thus : six militia 



&6 Strength of the Garrison of Sebastopol. 

battalions, 4500 ; gunners at the coast batteries, 2700 ; 
marines, 2600; seamen of the fleet, 18,500; workmen, 
5000 ; the Taroutine battalion of MenschikofTs army 
left in the town, 750 ; marine battalions landed from the 
fleet, 1800 — total 35,850 men. The Russian sailors 
were habitually drilled and organised as soldiers in 
addition to their proper duties, in consideration that 
(as now happened) the fleets might easily be shut in 
by a powerful enemy. These men were therefore ex- 
cellent for their purpose, and could also supply an 
immense number of trained gunners for the heavy 
artillery which armed the works. The workmen also, 
being in Government employ, had received military 
training, and a very large proportion of the whole force 
was particularly valuable, far more so than ordinary 
troops, for constructing works, for handling the machines 
used in moving and mounting heavy guns, in fact, for 
the business of creating a fortress. 

Lieut-Colonel Todleben, henceforth the inspiring 
genius of the defence, was thirty-six years old, in the 
fullest vigour of body and mind. Educated at the 
military college at St Petersburg, he had been trained 
and commissioned as an engineer. He had just been 
employed in the siege of Silistria, and when that was 
abandoned, had been sent to Sebastopol, strongly re- 
commended to MenschikofT. Placed at first on the 
general staff, he had begun to act as chief engineer 
when the invasion was imminent. On the 14th Sep- 
tember he had added the earthworks already men- 
tioned to the Star Fort, and, a few days later, took 



An Assault desperate zvitkout Siege Guns. 89 

charge of the defences of the South Side. These had 
been traced, and partially executed, years before. Loop- 
holed walls of stone and earthen batteries formed a 
continuous line round the town itself, from the sea to 
the great ravine, and these he had begun to strengthen. 
On the other section of the line, extending from the 
great ravine to the harbour, he had raised extensive 
batteries on the sites of the Redan, the Little Redan, 
and the Bastion No. 1, close to Careenage Bay. The 
Malakoff Tower was semi-circular, of stone, five feet 
thick, fifty feet in diameter, twenty-eight feet high, 
prepared for musketry, and having five guns on the 
top ; it was covered at the foot by a slope of earth, 
but was not yet surrounded with works. These con- 
stituted, on the 26th September, very formidable de- 
fences against an assault, and were daily growing 
stronger. The whole line was armed, by that date, 
with 172 pieces of ordnance, many very heavy, and in 
great part overwhelmingly superior to field-artillery. 

The reader has now before him the means of deter- 
mining the question whether the Allies were wrong in 
not at once proceeding to assault the place. It is said 
that Sir George Cathcart strongly advised it, though 
it appears that his opinion was formed on too in- 
complete a view of the enemy's works, and was greatly 
modified afterwards. What is more surprising is that 
Todleben is found to maintain, in his official narrative, 
that Sebastopol could not have been defended against 
an assault in the last days of September. It must be 
remembered that part only of the Allied Army could 



90 Todleben s Viezv accounted for. 

have been available for the purpose. Menschikoff's army, 

of unknown strength, might have been within six miles 

of us, for, as we had no troops beyond the Tchernaya it 

was impossible to know what might be passing in 

the wooded heights on its further bank. Therefore 

Bosquet's two divisions and the Turks must remain as a 

covering force, and even our First and Second Divisions 

could only have been taken from the same duty at great 

risk, to say nothing of the necessity of protecting Bala- 

klava. Thus the assaulting forces would be actually fewer 

in number than the defenders ; moreover, it would have 

been extremely difficult to have supported the attack 

with artillery, since our field-guns in the open must have 

been at once crushed by the heavy and long-reaching 

artillery in the works, while endeavouring to get within 

their own more limited range. Thus the two French 

and three English Divisions must have advanced 

unsupported for 2000 yards, under the fire of the 

numerous and powerful artillery already described, to 

attack works defended by forces equal to their own. 

Their first object must have been limited to seizing these 

works, and occupying the ground on which they stood, 

for to advance down the slopes towards the harbour 

would have been impossible under the broadsides of the 

Russian ships. Heavy guns must have been brought 

up and placed in battery to disable the ships before 

anything further could have been attempted. And, at 

any stage of these operations, a repulse, which could 

only have taken place after heavy losses, would have 

entailed tremendous consequences. Nevertheless, this 




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''Ms. 



Noncombatants leave SebastopoL 91 

singularly able engineer represents both himself and 
Admiral Korniloff as addressing themselves to the 
business of defence in a spirit of despair. They did 
all that skill and energy could do. but without the 
hope of being able to resist the expected attack. And 
in his official narrative, written long afterwards, he still 
maintains that an assault must have succeeded ; but 
in supporting the opinion, he represents the garrison 
(the numbers of which, as stated by himself elsewhere, 
have just been given) as only 16,000, while he estimates 
the forces which the Allies could assail them with at 
40,000. These miscalculations do not diminish the 
difficulty of understanding how so accomplished an 
officer could risk his own repute by persisting in giving 
expression to conclusions so opposed by facts. 

After the commanding engineers and artillery officers 
French and English, had made a reconnaissance of the 
Russian works, it was deemed indispensable to en- 
deavour, before proceeding to assault, to silence the 
Russian artillery with the guns of our siege trains, and 
the disembarkation of these at the two ports began on 
the 28th. 

On the 2d October, at daybreak, a long train of 
carriages, escorted by troops, was seen ascending the 
heights bordering the Belbek. It conveyed the civil 
inhabitants of Sebastopol, their families, and their 
goods ; under cover of night they had passed along the 
southern side of the harbour, and crossed the bridge 
and causeway of the Tchernaya. Thus the garrison, 
freed from all encumbrance, and from the task of feed- 



92 Noncombatants leave Sebastopol, 

ing all these noncombatants, was now reduced to a large 
compact body of defenders, regular troops, sailors, and 
marines, and workmen necessary for the business of 
the siege, and was thus, in all respects, in the best 
possible condition for beginning the struggle which 
Todleben, disturbed by no anxieties from within the 
fortress, could now enter upon with the whole force of 
his rare ability. Every day saw additional strength 
bestowed on the works, the labour on which never 
ceased day or night. The Central and Flagstaff 
Bastions were heightened and thickened, and a new 
work placed between them, and new batteries above 
the inner harbour looked up the great ravine and its 
branches. The Redan received the additions of the 
formidable Barrack Battery between it and the inner 
harbour, and of another battery on its other flank. The 
Malakoff Tower was surrounded with a bastion, from 
which extended batteries on each side, and a continu- 
ous line of trench connected it with the works between 
it and the harbour. All this was effected by the time 
of the attack. These works were armed as fast as 
made with heavy artillery, Also a ship of eighty-four 
guns, moored at the head of the inner harbour, bore 
on the mouths of the ravines which issued there. 



CHAPTER V. 

BEGINNING OF THE SIEGE. 

Sir John Burgoyne — Our First Siege Batteries — Chapman's and Gordon's — 
The First French Batteries — Co-operation of the Fleets demanded 
— The Fleets to join in the Cannonade — Ships versus Forts — Risk 
to no Purpose — Positions of the Fleets — The Cannonade begins — 
French Fire silenced — English Fire successful — Losses on both Sides 
— Action of the Fleets — English Batteries still efficient. 

All this time the weather had been of the kind called 
in America the Indian summer — clear, still, and bright, 
but not sultry, with cool nights. War had as yet shown 
us none of its uglier features ; except for. the cholera, 
the armies were sanguine and cheerful, and the work 
of preparing for the cannonade was carried on in good 
spirits. Everywhere the soil of the Upland was 
firm and fairly even, and vehicles could find plenty of 
space to move on free from impediment. 

The officer upon whom the conduct of the siege 
operations of the English fell, and who, as we have 
seen, had already been called on to advise in more than 
one important crisis, was Sir John Burgoyne. He was 
the oldest officer in the Crimea, born in 1782. He was 
the son of the General Burgoyne known in history as 
the commander who surrendered at Saratoga, and in 
dramatic annals as the author of the comedy of The 



94 Sir John Burgoyne. 

Heiress. In the first years of the century the son had 
served in many climes ; afterwards was w r ith Sir John 
Moore at Corunna ; at the passage of the Douro; helped 
to construct the lines of Torres Vedras ; at the sieges and 
assaults of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo ; wounded at 
Burgos and at St Sebastian ; present at most of the 
great battles in the Peninsula ; and finally at New 
Orleans. His mind was of the sedate, deliberative order, 
keeping a strong hold of facts and principles, and most 
unlikely to be swayed by the sudden impulses of those 
around him. As an engineer he had a sound judgment, 
ripened in an uncommon degree by thought and his 
large experience. He was entirely and, as preceding 
pages have endeavoured to show, rightly, in favour of 
employing our siege trains before attempting to assault, 
and he also believed that their effect would be such as 
to render an assault possible. Although so advanced in 
years, his capacity for military service was hardly im- 
paired. The statue in Waterloo Place is an excellent 
likeness, though one peculiarity, an upstanding and 
disordered fell of hair, could perhaps hardly be ex- 
pressed in bronze. The conditions of the task that lay 
before him will now be briefly described. 

One who approaches from the south the hollow in 
which lies the harbour of Sebastopol, finds the ground 
rising to heights that form an outer line to those on 
which stood the Russian works. Between these two 
lines was an interval of about two miles. From our 
side the slopes descended for more than half way, 
and then rose again to the opposing ridges. These 



Our First Siege Batteries. 95 

slopes were cut into longitudinal slips by the ravines 
which descend from the plateau to the basin in which 
lies the great harbour. It has been said that the 
largest of these divides the Upland, descending to 
the head of the inner harbour. To our right of it is 
another, which came to be known as the Valley of the 
Shadow of Death, running into the great ravine 1400 
yards from its end ; and it was near this point of junction 
that the left of our earthworks rested on the chasm. At 
an average distance of 500 yards to the right of these 
combined ravines another cuts the plain, ending, like 
them, at the head of the inner harbour ; in this lies the 
Woronzoff road as it enters Sebastopol. It was across 
the strip of plain, called by us Green Hill, between the 
great ravine and that of the Woronzoff road, that part of 
our first batteries, with their connecting line of trench 
were constructed, known, from the engineer in charge of 
the works, as Chapman's Battery, and later as the first 
parallel of the Left Attack. The system of fortification 
which had been created by the science of Louis XIV.'s 
engineers had, with some modifications, endured down 
to this time. It was based on the range of artillery and 
musketry, and the rules prescribed that the first parallel, 
with its batteries, should be traced at 600 yards from 
the enemy's works. Chapman's Battery was at a much 
greater distance, and for this reason : — The ground slop- 
ing constantly downward, was more and more com- 
manded by the guns on the opposing heights, therefore 
the parapets must needs be higher in proportion as the 
works descended the hill. The ground here was stony, 



9 ^ Chapman s and Gordons. 

and a rocky substratum lay very near the surface ; hence 
the labour of trenching was very severe, rendering the 
construction of high parapets extremely difficult, and 
advantage was therefore taken of a terrace on the face 
of the slope to place the battery at 1300 to 1400 yards 
from the Redan. But the distance was of the less con- 
sequence, as our siege-guns were far more powerful than 
those of an earlier day, and the old rules could not 
therefore be now considered as applicable. Another 
cause of difficulty, affecting the English, but scarcely 
the French, was the power which the Russians possessed 
of placing guns in position, in the ground between our 
right and their fortifications, which would enfilade our 
trenches in proportion as they were pushed forward. 

On the other side of the Woronzoff ravine, on the 
slope between it and the Docks ravine, which, like the 
other slope, varied from 400 to 600 yards in width, was 
traced the work called, after the engineer who constructed 
it, Gordon's Battery, and known later as the first parallel 
of our Right Attack. The name of the slope was Mount 
Woronzoff, and this slope or ridge was the only one that 
led direct to the Redan without intervening obstacles. 

Again, on the next slope, which lay between the 
Docks ravine and the Careenage ravine, our sailors 
made and armed with heavy guns a work called the 
Victoria Battery. It was not less than 2000 yards from 
the enemy's works, at which distance its guns were well 
within their own range, and almost outside that of the 
opposing artillery. It was also known as the Lan- 
caster Battery, because armed with Lancaster guns. 



The First French Batteries. 97 

Of these batteries, part of Chapman's guns, which 
were forty-one in number, fired across the great ravine 
upon the Flagstaff Bastion and its dependencies, that 
lay between the French attack and the city ; part across 
the Woronzoff ravine, on the faces of the Redan, and 
the works in extension of it on its proper right. Gordon's 
guns, twenty-seven in number, bore in parts, according to 
their position, on the left face of the Redan, on the Maia- 
koff, and on the ships in the inner harbour and the Careen- 
age Creek. The naval battery bore on the Malakoff, 
which stood on the continuation of the same slope, and 
one gun was directed on a ship in the Careenage Creek. 

The task of the French was much easier. The 
ground on their side was much more easily trenched, 
and trenches there were not exposed as ours were to 
be enfiladed (fired into lengthways) by guns outside the 
fortress. A hill which they named Mount Rodolph 
gave them the means of opening their trenches against 
the Central and Flagstaff Bastions at somewhat shorter 
range than ours, being about 1000 yards, and the proxi- 
mity of their base enabled them to bring up their siege 
train with comparative facility. 

But, of course, none of the trenches, French or 
English, were begun till the work of bringing up the 
siege-guns, and their supplies of ammunition, to depots 
near at hand, was well forward. It was not till the night 
of the 9th of October, when a fresh wind from the north- 
east favoured the enterprise, by preventing the enemy 
from hearing the men at work, that the French broke 
ground on Mount Rodolph, and by morning had made 

G 



98 Co-operation of the Fleets demanded. 

a trench there 11 00 yards long. On the nights of the 
10th and the nth the English opened their works on 
Green Hill and Mount Woronzoff. Each day the 
Russians cannonaded heavily the works of the night, 
and each night these works were repaired and pushed 
steadily forward till, by the evening of the 16th, all 
the siege batteries were complete in guns and ammuni- 
tion. The French placed fifty-three guns in battery, 
making with ours 126 in all. To these the Russians 
opposed 118; besides which, 220 pieces would bear 
upon attacking troops. 

The cannonade which was expected to usher in the 
final act of the war was therefore to begin on the 
morning of the 17th. And now a question had arisen 
which must always be of interest when (as is so com- 
monly the case in England's wars) the navy is in close 
co-operation with the army. It appeared to the mili- 
tary commanders that the fleets might greatly aid the 
land attack by standing in and engaging the sea-forts. 
Writing to Admiral Dundas, on the 13th October, Lord 
Raglan says, " I know no way so likely to insure 
success as the combined efforts of the Allied naval and 
military forces." After pointing out that the recent 
success on the Alma had led all to believe that the 
capture of the place would be accomplished, he ends 
thus : " Not to disappoint these universal expectations, 
the combined efforts of all branches of the naval and 
military service are necessary, and none, I am sure, will 
be withheld. Excuse my pressing these considerations 
on your attention." 



The Fleets to join in the Cannonade. 99 

Every reader can perceive how difficult it must be for 
a commander to resist such an appeal. Dundas con- 
sented, but, as he himself said, "with reluctance." At 
a conference of the Allied admirals, on the 15th, it was 
resolved that all their ships should make a simultaneous 
attack upon the sea-forts. But all the English captains 
considered that the attack of the fleets should be made 
not at the time of the preliminary cannonade, but at the 
moment of the intended assault. The judgment of the 
admirals on this point was that it should be left to the 
military commanders to say in what stage of the con- 
flict the navy should render the aid of its broadsides, 
whether all at the time of the land cannonade, all at the 
time of the assault, or partly at each of these stages. 

The military commanders replied on the 16th. They 
chose the last alternative ; they applauded the conclu- 
sion the admirals had come to as " a great resolve," 
and expressed their belief that " moral and material 
effects " would be produced which must " insure the 
success of the attack upon Sebastopol." 

Now the primary object of the fleets had been to 
render the passage of the Black Sea secure. This had 
become less pressing since the sealing up of the harbour 
— nevertheless the possibility still existed, and must be 
provided against, of giving to the Russian Fleet still afloat 
the opportunity of sallying out upon a foe so broken by 
conflict as to be open to defeat. And the prospects of 
an engagement between ships and such forts as defended 
the harbour, solid edifices of hard stone, with casemates 
for the guns, and armed with a numerous and powerful 



ioo Ships versus Forts. 

artillery, were not hopeful for the ships. If such an 
attack were pushed home by them, no limit could be 
placed to the damage they might suffer. The chances 
of being riddled, sunk, set on fire by shell or hot shot, 
ruined as steamers, and disabled by damage to structure 
or by loss of men, were absolutely indefinite. On the 
other hand, the probability of ruining the walls of the 
forts might to some considerable extent be calculated 
beforehand, and was not promising. Only a very close 
fire could accomplish this, and that could not but mean 
unknown damage to the ships. Nevertheless, it might 
well be worth while to run great risks if the success ot 
the assault could be clearly seen to be thereby assured. 
But it is impossible to gather from the language of the 
generals what it was they expected from the co-opera- 
tion of the fleets. " If," says Lord Raglan to Admiral 
Dundas, " the enemy's attention can be occupied on the 
sea front as well as upon that of the land, there will be 
a much greater chance of making a serious impression 
upon their works of defence, and of throwing the garrison 
into confusion." Again : " Their (the fleets') presence 
would go far to make all feel that victory would be 
nearly a matter of certainty," and the Allied generals 
had, as we have seen, talked of " moral and material 
effects " to be produced by combined action, which 
must insure the success of the attack. But this brings 
us, and could have brought the admirals, no nearer 
to the actual results to be expected. The only way 
in which the assault could be facilitated would be by 
causing the withdrawal of Russian troops from the 



Risk to no Purpose. 101 

threatened land fronts. But troops could be of no 
use against an attack by ships upon sea-forts, and no 
such withdrawal would have taken place. It may be said 
that the gunners would thus be detained in the sea-forts 
who might otherwise have reinforced those employed on 
the land batteries. But that might have been effected 
equally well only by the menace of a naval attack. 
Thus the naval commanders must have been, and were, 
conscious that their fleets were about to run a great risk 
for no definite end, and with the likelihood of being 
compelled to appear to suffer defeat. 

Kinglake, who knew both Dundas and Lord Raglan, 
and who was then in the Crimea, thinks they might 
have come to a more satisfactory conclusion in a 
personal interview. But they were not on cordial terms, 
and had not met for some time. On the other hand, 
Sir Edmund Lyons, the second in command in the 
fleet, was in constant communication with the General. 
We have seen that he offered advice both as to the 
expediency of attacking the north side, and of an imme- 
diate assault after the flank march ; it was owing to his 
counsel that we took Balaklava for a base ; and now it 
was he who urged that the fleets should join in the 
attack. It was very unfortunate that he enjoyed such 
credit with Lord Raglan as to be listened to even when 
giving opinions about the operations of the armies, con- 
cerning which Lord Raglan had legitimate advisers at 
hand. He was always in favour of unhesitating and 
adventurous action, a course to which he may have been 
inclined, more than he was conscious of, by a chance 



102 Positions of the Fleets. 

similarity of person to the commander whose whole life 
was an example of valorous resolve. He was very like 
Nelson, and was naturally proud of the resemblance, 
though Nelson was no beauty, and may have secretly felt 
that a conformity in spirit also would be becoming. In 
these earlier stages of the war, his rash desire to do 
something effective rendered him Lord Raglan's evil 
genius, and how rash his impulses could be was shown 
a little later when he succeeded Dundas in the command 
of the fleet ; for he who now so hotly urged a naval 
attack never made the slightest attempt on Sebastopol 
when he had become responsible for such an action, and 
had found by experience how fruitless it would be. 
Dundas must have felt himself placed at a great dis- 
advantage with such an associate, as any commander 
must feel in having a too self-assertive subordinate, who 
wants to take the lead, and who fancies he has a popular 
repute to maintain. 

The naval attack was not, however, executed as had 
been arranged. At the urgent instance of the French, a 
change was made in the morning. It was decided that 
the French Fleet should approach to within 1600 to 1800 
yards of the coast line, from Cape Cherson to the middle 
of the mouth of the roadstead, and anchor there, firing 
on the Quarantine Fort and Alexander ; and that the 
British should prolong the line so as to include in their 
fire Fort Constantine and the Telegraph and Wasp 
Batteries, on the coast of the north side. Several hours 
were occupied in thus anchoring the ships, and the land 
attack began without them. 



The Cannonade begins. 103 

Both sides had received reinforcements during the 
period of preparation. Menschikoff had by the transfer 
of troops from his army increased the number of soldiers 
in the garrison by 25,000. On the other hand, the Allied 
Fleets had sent men, guns, and ammunition to help 
the armies. More than 3000 seamen and marines were 
landed by Dundas, and the sailors became, as the Naval 
Brigade, a well-known feature of the siege. Of the guns 
already enumerated as arming the English batteries, 
twenty-nine were manned by the sailors. The French 
received from their admiral aid of the same kind. 

One other circumstance of this period remains to be 
noticed. The Russians had pushed their outposts con- 
siderably in advance of their line of works on the side 
of the Malakoff, and Sir John Burgoyne had therefore 
desired, for the better security of his siege batteries 
(which had indeed been established at such a distance 
from the enemy's works partly because of the forward 
positions of these outposts) that the investing armies 
should be, in the main, pushed nearer to the enemy's 
lines. Our generals of division did not concur in 
this desire. They considered that a more advanced 
position could only be maintained at a perilous risk. 
But the French took advantage of the shelter afforded 
by Mount Rodolph to establish close behind it a brigade 
of infantry, and thus their batteries there were strongly 
supported, and the troops which would form the head of 
their column of assault were as near as possible to the 
Flagstaff Bastion. 

At the earliest dawn on the 17th the Russians, as 



104 French Fire silenced. 

they descried the embrasures in the hitherto blank faces 
of the batteries, began a desultory fire upom them. At 
the concerted hour, half-past six, three French shells 
from Mount Rodolph gave the signal, and the Allied 
batteries opened throughout their extent, the Russian 
works replied, and spectators gathering from the camps 
in rear looked down upon the most tremendous conflict 
of artillery which, up to that time, the earth had ever 
witnessed. For four hours it continued almost un- 
abated, while the onlookers could draw no conclusion 
from the incessant streams of fire which crossed between 
the opposing works. For although the English batteries 
had ruined the Malakoff Tower, dismounting the guns 
on its roof, and disabling the batteries below by the 
fall of its fragments, and though considerable damage 
had been done to all the Russian works, yet all except 
the Malakoff maintained their fire, and on the side of 
the French attack no superiority had become evident. 
It was about ten o'clock that an explosion took place 
on Mount Rodolph. A shell had blown up the principal 
magazine, killing about fifty men, and silencing the fire 
of the nearest battery. On the remaining French guns 
the Russians concentrated their fire, and at half-past ten 
the batteries of our allies were reduced to silence. 
Henceforth the hope of delivering a general assault had 
vanished, and the fire of the English batteries was main- 
tained only to cover the discomfiture of their allies. 

On our side things had gone, and continued to go, 
very well. Great havoc was wrought on the parapets 
and gorges of the opposing works, on their guns and 



English Fire successful. 105 

gunners, and on the battalions drawn up in support. 
At half-past eleven Admiral Korniloft was mortally 
wounded in the Malakoff. The batteries in the earth- 
works around the tower gradually ceased to fire. By 
three o'clock a third of the guns in the Redan were 
silenced, and very soon afterwards we blew up a large 
magazine there, reducing great part of the parapet and 
embrasures to a shapeless ruin, killing more than 100 
men, and silencing the rest of its guns. Todleben says 
the defence in that part of the lines was completely 
paralysed, and that an immediate assault was expected, 
while the troops drawn up to meet it in rear of the work 
had become so demoralised that they fell back and 
sought the shelter of the scarped edge above the inner 
harbour. 

It will be seen, then, that the purpose of establishing 
the siege batteries had on our side been accomplished. 
All that was expected from them had come to pass ; 
the way was cleared, so far as it lay in them to clear it, 
by opening a passage for our troops into the Redan, 
and silencing its supporting work the Malakoff. But 
the disaster to the French had put an end to all thoughts 
of an assault by them on the Flagstaff Bastion, and the 
two attacks being interdependent, the design could not 
be executed. Our fire continued till dusk, and then the 
cannonade ceased everywhere. 

The event had thoroughly justified the prevision 
of Sir John Burgoyne. The Russian heavy batteries 
opposed to us had been extinguished by our fire, and 
the assault would probably have been delivered in the 



106 Losses on both Sides. 

hour before dawn next day, or possibly just before 
nightfall on the 17th, when it seems more than pro- 
bable that the first step in the capture of the place 
would have been accomplished, namely, a secure lodg- 
ment on the enemy's main works. Had the French 
been equally successful in clearing the way to the 
Flagstaff Bastion, the success of the enterprise would 
have been assured so far as undertakings can be 
which are so largely imbued with the element of 
chance. 

Our losses were slight, that of the French in killed 
and wounded about 100 men, the English forty-seven. 
The Russians lost more than 1100; not only were 
whole detachments repeatedly swept from the guns by 
our shot, and 100 men destroyed by the explosion, but 
their casualties were vastly increased by the necessity 
of keeping ready behind the works the troops which 
were to meet the expected assault, who could not be 
sheltered from the storm of missiles which swept over 
the fortified line. 

As the ships effected nothing which could influence 
the fortunes of the day, it has not been essential to 
describe earlier the part they took. At one o'clock 
they had taken up their positions. The British ships 
prolonged the line across the outside of the harbour 
until met by a shoal between them and the coast of the 
north side. Inside that shoal a channel was found, and 
was entered by Lyons in the Agamemnon (brought out 
of Balaklava for the action), followed by the Sanspareil 
and London. These ships approached Fort Constantine 



Action of the Fleets. 107 

to from 800 to 1000 yards, and their broadsides speedily 
destroyed the batteries on its roof. But they made 
small impression on its casemates, and found themselves 
under a fire from the batteries on the cliff which they 
were powerless to return. Many other ships entered the 
channel to help them, but all experienced the power of 
these small, high-placed batteries, which they were 
unable to reach with their fire. Nearly all were set on 
fire, some in many places. All suffered great damage, 
and considerable loss of men, and all were compelled to 
withdraw from the action. It was with these facts before 
him that Todleben ventured, in enumerating the ad- 
vantages with which, according to him, the Allies would 
have attacked the north side, to assert that the ships 
could have silenced the very works which inflicted this 
damage with impunity, and could also have brought 
their fire to bear on the Star Fort, 1000 yards farther 
inland. 

After the cannonade had lasted about four hours 
and a half, the fleets withdrew out of action. They had 
brought 1 100 guns to bear; the forts replied with 152. 
The French ships lost 203 men ; the English, 317 ; the 
Russian garrison, 138. 

On the 1 8th the French batteries were still unable 
to reopen fire, while the English works and guns, little 
damaged, once more asserted their superiority over the 
Redan and Malakoff. But dawn had disclosed a new 
feature in the problem. At nightfall we had looked on 
works reduced to shapeless heaps, on ruined batteries 
and disabled guns. Before morning the parapets had 



108 English Batteries still efficient. 

been rebuilt, the batteries repaired, and fresh guns from 
the inexhaustible supplies of the ships and arsenal had 
occupied the embrasures ; and the Allies could now 
begin to realise how formidable was the opponent 
who could thus, as chief engineer, wield the resources 
of the place. The recuperative power of the enemy, 
taken along with the failure of the French batteries, 
diminished indefinitely the chances of taking the place 
by assault. Nevertheless the hope of achieving that 
result was far from being abandoned, and there was 
yet a space of time in which the operations of the 
Allies were concentrated on the preparation for a re- 
newal of the cannonade as the preface to a combined 
assault on the chief works between the French and the 
town. It should be noted, to the credit of our engineers, 
siege - artillery, and seamen, that while explosions 
frequently took place in the French and Russian 
batteries, our magazines remained intact ; while their 
works and the occupants of them suffered severely from 
enfilade, our losses continued to be slight. On the 18th, 
19th, and 20th, when we met single-handed the whole 
weight of the enemy's fire (the French being for so long 
unable to resume the contest) our aggregate loss in 
killed and wounded was only seventy-five men. Up 
to the 25th October our daily average loss was 
seventeen, while at the same date the aggregate of 
Russians killed and wounded in their works amounted 
to 3834 men. 



CHAPTER VI. 

ATTACKED AT BALAKLAVA AND ON THE UPLAND. 

Outworks before Balaklava — Russians capture them — Movements of the 
Heavy Brigade — Charge of the Heavy Brigade — Russian Cavalry 
defeated — The Orders to the Light Brigade — Russians both sides 
of Valley — Nolan and Lord Lucan — Charge of the Light Brigade 
— Charge of the Chasseurs — Return of the Light Brigade — Close 
of the Action — No Attempt at Re-capture — Weak Point in Allied 
Defences — French Measures too exclusive — First Action of Inker- 
man — Object of It — The Sandbag Battery — Preparation for an 
Assault — Assembly of Russian Forces. 

The drama now shifted into a new act, in which the 
Allies were to be themselves attacked, and forced to 
fight for their foothold in the Crimea. 

Immediately after he quitted Sebastopol, Menschikoff 
had been joined by the remainder of his forces in the 
peninsula, hitherto beyond the sphere of action, being 
stationed in its south-western corner. These amounted 
to 12,000 men, and he also received the further reinforce- 
ments which, as already said, were on their way from 
Russia. In fact, the troops which might come to him 
from thence had, practically, no other limit than the 
means of transporting them. He therefore drew closer 
to the place, and while keeping his main force beyond 
our ken, had begun on the 7th October to send parties 
down to the Tchernaya. Soon afterwards his lieu- 
tenant, General Liprandi, established his headquarters 



1 10 Outworks before Balaklava. 

at Tchorgoun, on the further bank, and the force of 
all arms placed under him began to assemble about 
that place. It gradually grew till it reached, according to 
Russian official accounts, the number of 22,000 infantry, 
3400 cavalry, and seventy-eight guns, when it was con- 
sidered strong enough for immediate action. 

It has been said that the valley between Balaklava 
and the Tchernaya is crossed by a line of low heights, 
stretching from the foot of the plateau to the village of 
Kamara, and that along their course lies the Woronzoff 
road. Four of these hills had earthworks on their sum- 
mits — mere sketches with the spade ; a donkey might 
have been ridden into some of them — and they had been 
armed with, in all, nine twelve-pounder iron guns. The 
extent of this line of works was more than two miles. 
Their garrisons had no support nearer than the 93d 
regiment, and the Turks and marines immediately 
around the harbour, who were 3000 yards off. The 
Russians had, of course, observed this, and also the 
weakness of the works, from the high hills above Kamara, 
and at daybreak on the 25th October their attack began. 
Crossing the Tchernaya from the Traktir Bridge up- 
wards, and keeping at first altogether on the side of the 
valley nearest Kamara, their advanced guard came 
rapidly on, brought ten guns into positions commanding 
the hill (known as Canrobert's Hill) most distant from 
us and nearest Kamara, and began to cannonade it. 
Liprandi's main body was coming up, and he at length 
brought thirty guns, some of them of heavy calibres, to 
bear upon Canrobert's Hill and the next to it. These 



Russians capture Them. I r 1 

replied from their five twelve-pounders ; and about this 
time a troop of our horse-artillery and a field battery, 
supported by the Scots Greys, were brought up to the 
ridge, and joined in the artillery combat, till the troop, 
having exhausted its ammunition, was withdrawn with 
some loss in men and horses. 

When the formidable character of the attack was 
seen, our First and Fourth Divisions, and two French 
brigades, were ordered down to the scene of action. 
Reaching the point where the Woronzoff road descends 
from the plateau, the First Division made a short halt. 
If its orders had enabled it to march down to the plain 
there, followed by the other troops mentioned, the 
enemy must have hastily withdrawn over the Tchernaya, 
or have accepted battle with his back to the Kamara 
Hills. Instead of this, it was marched along the edge of 
the heights towards the other road down from the 
plateau at Kadikoi. Moving at a height of several 
hundred feet above the valley, it saw the plain spread 
out like a map, and what next occurred there took place 
immediately below it, and in full view. The Russians 
had just captured the two assailed outworks. That on 
Canrobert's Hill was occupied with a battalion of Turks 
and three of the guns already mentioned, the other with 
half a battalion and two. After silencing the guns, 
the Russians had stormed Canrobert's Hill with five 
battalions, the Turks, thus outnumbered, maintaining the 
combat so stubbornly that 170 of them were killed 
before they were driven out. Pushing on, the enemy 
captured more easily the next and smaller work ; and 



:i2 Movements of the Heavy Brigade. 

the garrisons of the others, thus menaced by an army, 
and seeing no support anywhere, hastily left them and 
made for Balaklava, pursued by the cavalry, who rode 
through the feeble earthworks with perfect ease, seven of 
the nine guns remaining in the hands of the Russians. 

Near these hills the ground on either side rises to 
a ridge which forms their base, thus dividing the valley 
into two plains, the one on the side of Balaklava, the 
other stretching to the Tchernaya, and it was these that 
presently became the scene of two famous encounters. 

The Heavy Brigade of Cavalry, under General 
Scarlett, had joined the army. It included the 4th and 
5th Dragoon Guards, and the 1st, 2d, and 6th Dragoons 
(Royals, Scots Greys, and Inniskillings), and formed 
with the Light Brigade the cavalry division commanded 
by Lord Lucan. 

Our two cavalry brigades had been manoeuvring so 
as to threaten the flank of any force which might 
approach Balaklava, without committing themselves to 
an action in which they would have been without the 
support of infantry. The Light Brigade, numbering 
670 sabres, was at this moment on the side of the ridge 
looking to the Tchernaya ; the Heavy Brigade, say 
900 sabres, on the side towards Balaklava.* Its com- 
mander, General Scarlett, was at that moment leading 
three of his regiments (Greys, Inniskillings, 5th Dragoon 
Guards) through their camping ground into the plain; 
a fourth, the Royals, was for the moment behind, at no 
great distance, while the 4th Dragoon Guards was 

* Map 3. 



Charge of the Heavy Brigade. 113 

moving at the moment in the direction of the Light 
Brigade. Having witnessed the hasty retreat of the 
Turks, the many spectators on the Upland, consisting of 
the French stationed on it, and the English marching 
along it, next saw a great body of Russian cavalry ascend 
the ridge. Scarlett, unwarned till then, wheeled the Greys 
and half the Inniskillings into line ; the 5th Dragoon 
Guards and the other squadron of the Inniskillings 
were in echelon behind the flanks ; the Royals, galloping 
up, formed in extension of the 5 th. The Russians, after 
a momentary halt, leaving the Light Brigade unnoticed, 
perhaps unseen, on their right, swept down in a huge 
column on the Heavy Brigade, and at the moment of 
collision threw out bodies in line on each flank; the 
batteries which accompanied them darting out and 
throwing shells, all of which burst short, against the 
troops on the Upland. Just then three heavy guns, 
manned by Turkish men and officers, in an earthwork 
on the edge of the Upland, were fired in succession on 
the Russian cavalry, and those troops nearest on the 
flank of the column losing some men and horses by 
the first shot, wavered, halted, and galloped back. At 
the same moment the mass slackened its pace as it 
drew near, while our men, embarrasssd at first by the 
picket lines of their camp, as soon as they cleared them, 
charged in succession. All who had the good fortune 
to look down from the heights on that brilliant spectacle 
must carry with them through life a vivid remembrance 
of it. The plain and surrounding hills, all clad in sober 
green, formed an excellent background for the colours 

II 



1 1 4 Russian Cavalry defeated. 

of the opposing masses ; the dark grey Russian column 
sweeping down in multitudinous superiority of number 
on the red-clad squadrons that, hindered by the obstacles 
of the ground in which they were moving, advanced 
slowly to meet them. There was a clash and fusion, 
as of wave meeting wave, when the head of the column 
encountered the leading squadrons of our brigade, all 
those engaged being resolved into a crowd of individual 
horsemen, whose swords rose, and fell, and glanced ; so 
for a minute or two they fought, the impetus of the 
enemy's column carrying it on, and pressing our com- 
batants back for a short space, till the 4th Dragoon 
Guards, coming clear of the wall of a vineyard which 
was between them and the enemy, and wheeling to the 
right by squadrons, charged the Russian flank, while the 
remaining regiments of our brigade went in in support 
of those which had first attacked. Then — almost as it 
seemed in a moment, and simultaneously — the whole 
Russian mass gave way, and fled, at speed and in dis- 
order, beyond the hill, vanishing behind the slope some 
four or five minutes after they had first swept over it. 

While this was going on, four of the enemy's 
squadrons, wheeling somewhat to their left, made a 
rush for the entrance of the harbour. The 93d were 
lying down behind a slope there ; as the cavalry ap- 
proached, they rose, fired a volley, and stood to receive 
the charge so firmly that the horsemen fled back with 
the rest of the column. 

All this had passed under the observation of Lord 
Raglan. He does not seem to have made any comment on 



The Orders to the Light Brigade. 1 15 

the strange inaction of the Light Brigade, which was after- 
wards explained to be due to Lord Cardigan's impression 
that he was expected to confine himself strictly to the 
defensive. But Lord Raglan sent the following written 
order to Lord Lucan : " Cavalry to advance and take 
advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. 
They will be supported by the infantry, which have 
been ordered to advance on two fronts." The last 
sentence referred to the two English Divisions on the 
march, and still at some distance. This order did not 
commend itself to Lord Luean's mind so clearly as to 
cause him to act on it. He moved the Heavy Brigade 
to the other side of the ridge, where he proposed to await 
the promised support of infantry, and this, under the 
circumstances, was not an irrational decision. After a 
while a disposition seemed manifest on the Russian side 
to carry off the captured guns, which might very well 
seem to signify a general retreat of the forces. There- 
fore a second written order was sent to Lord Lucan, thus 
worded : " Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance 
rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy 
carrying away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may 
accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate." 
This order was carried by the Quartermaster-General's 
aide-de-camp, Captain Nolan, author of a book on 
cavalry tactics, in which faith in the power of that arm 
was carried to an extreme. He found Lord Lucan be- 
tween his two brigades, Scarlett's on the further slope of 
the ridge, Cardigan's* beyond the Woronzoff road, where 

* Map 3. 



1 1 6 Ritssians both Sides of Valley. 

it ascends to the Upland, drawn up across the valley 
and looking down it towards the Tchernaya. D'Allon- 
ville's French brigade of cavalry had descended into 
the plain, and was now on the left rear of the Light 
Brigade. 

In order to appreciate the position of the Russian 
army at this time, it is necessary to note an additional 
feature of this part of the field. Rising from the bank 
of the Tchernaya, close to the Traktir Bridge, and 
stretching thence towards the Chersonese upland, but 
not reaching it, is a low lump of hills called the 
Fedioukine heights. Their front parallel to the ridge, 
at about 1200 yards, forms with it the longer sides of 
the oblong valley leading to the Tchernaya. Menschi- 
koff had sent a force of the three arms to co-operate 
with Liprandi, but not part of his command ; and these 
troops and guns were posted on the Fedioukine heights. 
The situation, then, was this : the defeated Russian 
cavalry had retreated down the valley towards the 
Tchernaya, and was there drawn up behind its guns, 
a mile and a quarter from our Light Brigade ; Liprandi's 
troops were posted along the further half of the Woron- 
zoff ridge, enclosing, with those just said to be on the 
Fedioukine heights, the valley in which the hostile 
bodies of cavalry faced each other ; eight Russian guns 
bore on the valley from the ridge ; fourteen Russian 
guns from the Fedioukine heights ; Russian rifleman 
had been pushed from those slopes into the valley on 
each side ; also on each side were three squadrons of 
Russian lancers, posted in the folds of the hills, ready 



Nolan and Lord Lucan. 117 

to emerge into the valley ; and in front of the main 
body of the Russian cavalry were twelve guns in line. 

Probably anyone viewing the matter without pre- 
possession will think that Lord Raglan's orders to Lord 
Lucan were not sufficiently precise. For instance, in 
the last order, " to the front " is manifestly vague, the 
enemy being on several fronts. Lord Raglan, in a sub- 
sequent letter, explains his meaning thus : " It appear- 
ing that an attempt was making to remove the captured 
guns, the Earl of Lucan was desired to advance rapidly, 
follow the enemy in their retreat, and try to prevent them 
from effecting their objects." But the enemy were not 
removing the guns at that time, and not retreating, and 
the order, thus given by Lord Raglan under a mistake, 
did not apply. 

Here was plenty of room for misinterpretation ; and 
on receiving this order, Lord Lucan, by his own account, 
read it "with much consideration — perhaps consterna- 
tion would be the better word — at once seeing its im- 
practicability for any useful purpose whatever, and the 
consequent great unnecessary risk and loss to be in- 
curred." He evidently interpreted " the front " to mean 
his own immediate front, and was presently given to 
understand that " the guns " were those which had 
retired along with the Russian cavalry. For when he 
uttered his objections, Nolan undertook to reply, though 
there is no evidence that he had any verbal instruc- 
tions with which to explain the written order. " Lord 
Raglan's orders," he said, " are that the cavalry should 
attack immediately." " Attack, sir ! attack what ? What 



1 iS Charge of the Light Brigade. 

guns, sir?" asked Lord Lucan sharply. "There, my 
lord, is your enemy, there are your guns," replied the 
believer in the supreme potency of cavalry, pointing 
towards the valley, and uttering these words, Lord 
Lucan says, " in a most disrespectful but significant 
manner." 

Very indignant under what he held to be a taunt, 
Lord Lucan thereupon rode to Lord Cardigan, and 
imparting to him the order as he understood it, con- 
veyed to him the impression that he must charge right 
down the valley with his brigade as it stood in two 
lines (presently made three by moving a regiment from 
the first line), while the Heavy Brigade would follow in 
support. And it certainly was impossible for Lord 
Cardigan to know what he could advance against 
except the cavalry that stood facing him ; and though 
he shared and echoed Lord Lucan's misgivings, he at 
once gave the order, " The brigade will advance !" 

With these words the famous ride began. But the 
brigade was scarcely in motion when Captain Nolan 
rode obliquely across the front of it, waving his sword. 
Lord Cardigan thought he was presuming to lead the 
brigade ; his purpose could never be more than surmised, 
for a fragment of the first shell fired by the enemy struck 
him full in the breast. His horse turned round and 
carried him back, still in the saddle, through the ranks 
of the 13th, when the rider, already lifeless, fell to the 
ground. Led by Lord Cardigan, the lines continued 
to advance at a steady trot, and in a minute or two 
entered the zone of fire, where the air was filled with the 



Charge of the Chasseurs. 119 

rush of shot, the bursting of shells, and the moan of 
bullets, while amidst the infernal din the work of de- 
struction went on, and men and horses were incessantly 
dashed to the ground. Still, at this time, many shot, 
aimed as they were at a rapidly moving mark, must 
have passed over, or beside the brigade, or between the 
lines. A deadlier fire awaited them from the twelve 
guns in front, which could scarcely fail to strike some- 
where on a line a hundred yards wide. It was when 
the brigade had been advancing for about five minutes 
that it came within range of this battery, and the effect 
was manifest at once in the increased number of men 
and horses that strewed the plain. With the natural 
wish to shorten this ordeal, the pace was increased ; 
when the brigade neared the battery, more than half 
its numbers were on the grass of the valley, dead or 
struggling to their feet ; but, still unwavering, not a 
man failing who was not yet disabled, the remnant rode 
straight into the smoke of the guns, and was lost to view. 
Lord Lucan moved the Heavy Brigade some dis- 
tance forward in support of the Light ; but finding his 
first line suffering from a heavy fire, he halted and 
retired it, not without considerable loss. At the same 
time another and more effectual movement took place. 
General Morris, commander of the French cavalry, 
directed a regiment of his chasseurs d'Afrique (the 
4th) to attack the troops on the Fedioukine heights, 
and silence the guns there. The regiment ascended 
the slopes, drove off the guns, and having accomplished 
their object, retired, with a loss of ten killed and twenty- 



r20 Return of the Light Brigade, 

eight wounded. Thenceforth the retreat of our cavalry 
was not harassed by the fire of guns from this side of 
the field, and the good comradeship implied in this 
prompt, resolute, and effectual charge of the French was 
highly appreciated by their allies, and has received just 
and warm praise from the historian Kinglake. 

What the Light Brigade was doing behind the smoke 
of the battery was of too fragmentary a kind to be here 
more than touched on. The Russian gunners were 
driven off, and parties of our men even charged bodies of 
Russian cavalry ; and that these retreated before them is 
not only recorded by the survivors of the Light Brigade, 
but by Todleben, But the combat could end but in one 
way, the retreat of what was left of our light cavalry. 
They rode back singly, or in twos and threes, some 
wounded, some supporting a wounded comrade. But 
there were two bodies that kept coherence and formation 
to the end. On our right, the 8th Hussars were joined 
by some of the 17th Lancers, when they numbered to- 
gether about seventy men. The three squadrons of the 
enemy's lancers, already said to be on the side of the 
Woronzoff heights, descended from thence, and drew 
up across the valley to cut off the retreat of our men. 
Colonel Shewell of the 8th led this combined party 
against them, broke through them with ease, scattering 
them right and left, and regained our end of the valley. 
A little later, Lord George Paget led also about seventy 
men of the 4th Light Dragoons and nth Hussars 
against the other three squadrons of lancers on the side 
of the Fedioukine heights, and passed by them with a 



Close of the Action. 121 

partial collision which caused us but small loss. The 
remaining regiment, the 13th Light Dragoons, mustered 
only ten mounted men at the close of the action. The 
mounted strength of the brigade was then 195 ; it had 
lost 247 men in killed and wounded, and had 475 horses 
killed, and forty-two wounded. 

The First Division, after its circuitous march by the 
Col, was now approaching the Woronzofif ridge, fol- 
lowed by the Fourth. It could see nothing of what 
was occurring in the adjoining valley ; but it pre- 
sently began to have tokens of the charge, in the form 
of wounded men and officers who rode by on their way 
to Balaklava.* Close to the ditch of the fieldwork on 
the last hill of the ridge on our side lay the body of 
Nolan on its back, the jacket open, the breast pierced 
by the fatal splinter. It was but an hour since the 
Division had passed him on the heights, where he was 
riding gaily near the staff, conspicuous in the red forage 
cap and tiger-skin saddle cover of his regiment. 

It was now believed that a general action would 
begin by an advance to retake the hills captured by 
Liprandi, and no doubt such an intention did exist, but 
was not put in practice. The Russians were left undis- 
turbed in possession of the three hills they had captured, 
with their seven guns. At nightfall the First Division 
marched by the Woronzoff road up to the plateau, and 
thence to its camp. It was long before that road 

*The commander of the Royals, Colonel Yorke, rode by the 
writer with a shattered leg. He died in 1890, while this chapter 
was being written, at the age of seventy-seven. 



122 No Attempt at re-capture. 

was used again, for the presence of Liprandi's troops 
and batteries rendered it unavailable during great part 
of the winter. 

It is easier to point to the faults of the Allies than 
to say how they should have been remedied. To post 
men and guns in weak works commanded by neighbour- 
ing heights, and having no ready supports in presence 
of an enemy's army, was to offer them up as a sacrifice. 
But where were the supports to come from ? Then it 
has been said that the most effective way of bringing 
the Allied Divisions down from the upland would have 
been by the Woronzoff road. But that is on the sup- 
position that it was intended to bring the Russians to 
a pitched battle. That, however, if the English general 
thought of it, formed no part of Canrobert's design. He 
believed that his part was at present limited to pushing 
the siege towards the grand object of the expedition, and 
covering the besieging army from attack; and he was not 
to be drawn into doubtful enterprises outside of these. 
This accounted, too, for the failure to attempt the re- 
capture of our outworks — to what purpose retake them 
when it was proved that we had not troops enough to 
hold so extended a line ? The ruin of the Light Brigade 
was primarily due to Lord Raglan's strange purpose of 
using our cavalry alone, and beyond support, for offence 
against Liprandi's strong force, strongly posted ; and it 
was the misinterpretation of the too indistinct orders, 
sent with that veryquestionable intention, which produced 
the disaster. And yet we may well hesitate to wish that 
the step so obviously false had never been taken, for the 



Weak Point in Allied Defences. 123 

desperate and unfaltering charge made that deep im- 
pression on the imagination of our people which found 
expression in Tennyson's verse, and has caused it to be 
long ago transfigured in a light where all of error or 
misfortune is lost, and nothing is left but what we are 
enduringly proud of. 

It has been said that another blot besides Balaklava 
existed in the Allied line of defence. In front of the 
Third, Fourth, and Light Divisions, encamped on the 
strips of plain lying between the several ravines, were 
the siege works, and a direct attack made on them would 
be so retarded that the Divisions could have combined to 
meet it. But, in the space between the last ravine (the 
Careenage) and the edge of the Upland, the circum- 
stances were different * A force might sally from the 
town, and ascending the ravine, or the adjacent slopes, 
without obstacle, would then be on fair fighting terms 
with whatever troops it might find there. Or the army 
outside, descending from the Inkerman heights, and 
crossing the valley by the bridge and causeway, would 
find itself on ground well adapted for traversing the 
space between the ravine and the cliff and entering the 
Upland at that corner. And the result of the estab- 
lishment of the enemy's army there would be to open 
to it an advance which would cause all our Divisions 
engaged in the siege to form to meet it with their 
backs to the sea, and, in case of being overpowered, 
to fall back towards the French harbour (if they 
could), abandoning the siege works, with all their 

* Map 5. 



124 French Measures too exclusive. 

material ; in fact, sustaining absolute defeat, possibly 
destruction. 

The post-road going along the causeway, and 
ascending these slopes, reaches the Upland at a final 
crest, from whence it passes down and across the plain to 
join the Woronzoff road. It was on our side of the final 
ridge that the Second Division was encamped across the 
post-road. A mile behind it was the camp of the First 
Division. Then came a long interval of unoccupied 
ground, to the French camp on the south-eastern 
corner of the Upland, where Bosquet's covering corps 
may be said to have been employed in " gilding refined 
gold ana painting the lily," by constructing lines of 
defence along the edge of cliffs, several hundred feet 
high, above an almost impassable part of the valley. 
Accepting the broad principle that a commander can 
only be expected to make good the deficiencies of an 
ally so far as may be without throwing a heavy strain 
upon his own troops, still, in this case, it was the 
common safety that was threatened, and it was a 
common duty to provide against the danger. By 
leaving a small force only in observation on the im- 
pregnable heights, and placing the main body near the 
really weak point, the labour and the forces of the 
French, superfluous where bestowed, might have ren- 
dered the position practically secure. Kinglake rightly 
characterises the disposition of Bosquet's corps as an 
example of the evils of a divided command. 
" The return of the First Division to its camp may 
have been unnoticed by the Russians, taking place as it 



First Action of Inker man. 125 

did at nightfall. They may have calculated that the 
advance of Liprandi would cause the weak point on the 
plateau, for the moment, to be unoccupied ; otherwise 
it is not easy to account for the enterprise of the day 
following the action of Balaklava. At noon a force of 
six battalions and four light field-guns, issuing from the 
town, ascended the ravine and slope which led to the 
Second Division. Our pickets fell back fighting, when 
the Russian field-pieces coming within range, pitched 
shot over the crest, behind which the regiments of the 
Second Division were lying down, while their skirmishers 
maintained, with those of the Russians, a desultory com- 
bat in the hollow. The two batteries of the Second 
Division now formed on the crest, and were presently 
reinforced by one from the First Division, and before 
their fire the Russian guns were at once swept off the 
field. The enemy's battalions then came on successively 
in two columns, and these, too, were at once dispersed 
and driven back by the overpowering artillery fire. The 
men of the Second Division, launched in pursuit, pressed 
them hard, and they never halted till they were once 
more within the shelter of Sebastopol. Evans, not 
knowing of what force these might be the precursors, 
had determined to meet them on his own crest, and he 
was not to be drawn from thence till the action was 
already decided. General Bosquet sent to offer him 
assistance, but he declined it with thanks, as the enemy 
were, he said, already defeated. The Russians lost in 
this action, by their own estimate, 250 killed and 
wounded, and left in our hands eighty prisoners. We 



126 Object of It. 

had ten killed and seventy-seven wounded. The attack, 
therefore, could not be characterised otherwise than as 
weak and futile. Nevertheless, it had an object. Todle- 
ben says it was intended to draw our attention from 
another attack on Balaklava. But he is, unfortunately, 
so unreliable in his statements and views that, with 
another plain interpretation before us, supported by 
facts, we need not be drawn aside by him. No further 
serious attack on Balaklava was intended, but prepara- 
tions for the battle of Inkerman were then well advanced, 
and it was with these that the attack was connected. 
The Russians had brought out intrenching tools with 
them to Shell Hill, and, could they have established and 
armed a work there, they would not only have immensely 
strengthened their position in the future battle, but 
would also have provided for another highly important 
object, namely, the safe and unmolested passage of the 
troops outside Sebastopol, across the long causeway in 
the valley and the bridge of the Tchernaya. That the 
present attempt was not made with a larger force was 
probably owing to the desire to avoid bringing on a 
general action, and so anticipating prematurely the 
great enterprise which took place ten days later. But 
the operations of the Russians for opening that memor- 
able battle will be seen to prove how great would have 
been their advantage had they possessed a strong lodg- 
ment on Shell Hill. 

The attack on Balaklava, and its partial success, in 
depriving us of the hills held by our outposts, had 
effected its purpose of weakening the forces on the 



The Sandbag Battery. 127 

Upland, The two other regiments of the Highland 
Brigade joined the 93d bsfore Balaklava ; some com- 
panies of the rifle battalion of the Second Division 
were also posted there ; and Vinoy's brigade of Bos- 
quet's corps was so placed as to prevent the enemy 
from forcing a passage to the Upland by way of the 
Col. The whole of the forces under Sir Colin Campbell 
now executed a complete line of defence, strengthened 
with powerful batteries, around Balaklava, which might 
at last be regarded as secure. Seeing what a source of 
weakness the place was to us, by causing the great 
extension of our line, and the absorption of so much 
of our outnumbered forces, the question had been seri- 
ously considered of abandoning it, and supplying our 
army from the French harbour of Kamiesch, which 
would have infinitely lightened our toils and diminished 
our risks. But the Commissary-General declared that 
without Balaklava he could not undertake to supply 
the army, and the necessary evil was retained. 

It was in this interval, between the sortie of the 
26th October and the battle of the 5th November, that 
a work was thrown up by us on the field which, useless 
as a defence, became the object of bloody conflict. It 
was observed that the Russians were constructing a work 
on the other side of the valley to hold two guns (pro- 
bably to support the coming attack), the embrasures 
being already formed, and the gabions placed in them. 
On this being shown to General Evans, he had two 
eighteen-pounders brought from the depot of the siege 
train, not far off, and a high parapet with two embra- 



i 28 Preparation J or an Assault. 

sures, made solid with sandbags, was thrown up on the 
edge of the cliff to hold them. It was placed about 
1400 yards from the enemy's intended battery. In a few 
rounds the Russian work was knocked to pieces, and our 
guns, as being too far from our lines to be guarded, were 
then removed from what became afterwards a point, in 
the history of the battle, known as " the Sandbag Battery." 

On the 4th of November the French infantry in the 
Crimea numbered 31,000; the British, 16,000; the Turks, 
who were not permitted to develop their value, 11,000. 
They must have been very different from the Turkish 
soldiery of the present day if they were not equal in 
fighting quality to any troops in the Crimea, and superior 
to all in patience, temperance, and endurance. But it was 
a tendency of the time to disparage them, partly from 
their abandonment of the outposts at Balaklava, the 
valorous defence made by a great part of them being, 
from some accident, unknown at the time ; and they 
were employed in ways which gave them no opportunity 
of helping us in battle. 

On both the Allied and the Russian side it was 
known that a crisis was now rapidly approaching ; but 
only the Russians knew that it was a race between them 
for delivering the attack. The French siege corps, com- 
paratively strong, close to its base, and protected on both 
flanks, on one by the sea, on the other by the English, 
was now retrieving its disaster of the 17th October, by 
diligently pushing its approaches in regular form upon 
the Flagstaff Bastion. We were strengthening our bat- 
teries and replenishing our magazines ; as has been said. 



Assembly of Russian Forces. 129 

the Russian daily loss in the fortress far exceeded ours 
in the trenches. We were ready to support a French 
attack which would now be made over a very short 
space of open ground. On the 4th November the Allied 
commanders had appointed a meeting on the 5th for 
definitely arranging the cannonade and assault which, 
they hoped, would at length lay the fortress open to us. 
The Russians were, of course, alive to the peril. But, on 
the 4th they had completed the assembly of their 
forces for attack. For long the corps cCarmee stationed 
about Odessa had been in motion for the Crimea. It 
had repeatedly sent important reinforcements to the 
fortress, and the whole of those, which had reached the 
heights beyond the Tchernaya by the 4th November, 
raised the total of Menschikoff's forces in and around 
Sebastopol, according to Todleben, to 100,000 men, 
without counting the seamen, so that not less than no 
to 115,000 men were confronting the 65,000 which, 
counting seamen and marines, the aggregate of the 
Allied forces amounted to. 

Of the Russian troops which took actual part in 
the battle of Inkerman, 19,000 infantry, under General 
Soimonoff, were within the fortifications of Sebastopol; 
16,000, under General Pauloff, were on the heights 
beyond the Tchernaya. These were to combine for the 
attack, accompanied by fifty-four guns of position and 
eighty-one field-guns. On their left was the force which 
had been Liprandi's, now commanded by Prince Gortscha- 
koff, stretching from the captured hills outside Bala- 
klava, across the Fedioukine heights, into the lower valley 

H Z 



130 Arrival of the Russian Grand Dukes. 

of the Tchernaya. The remainder of the troops formed 
the ample garrison of the works of Sebastopol. Long 
before the November dawn of Sunday, the besiegers 
heard drowsily in their tents the bells of Sebastopol 
celebrating the arrival in the camp of the young Grand 
Dukes Michael and Nicholas, and invoking the blessings 
of the Church on the impending attack, towards which 
the Russian troops were even then on the march. 



CHAPTER VII. 

BATTLE OF INKERMAN. 

Rumours before the Battle — Description of the Ground — British Position — 
The Russian Plan of Battle — How carried out — Proximity of Corps 
to Battlefield— Soimonoff attacks — Effects of the Fog — Soimonoff's 
Right in Advance — The British repulse Him — Pauloff's Troops 
engage — Pauloff also repulsed — Causes of Russian Repulses — Dan- 
nenberg's Attacks — Greater Obstinacy of the Attack — Action and 
Death of Cathcart — The French drive back the Russians — Allies 
defeat another Resolute Attack — Allied Artillery begin to prevail — 
What delayed Bosquet — Crisis before the French arrived — Gortscha- 
koff's part — Close of the Battle — Terrible Carnage — The Operations 
discussed — The Attack suitably met — The Sandbag Battery — 
Russian Exaggerations — What was at Stake — Consequence of 
Victory. 

When the Czar Nicholas received the news of the 
battle of the Alma, he was, Kinglake tells us, terribly 
agitated. A burst of rage was followed by a period of 
profound dejection, when for days he lay on his bed, 
taking no food, silent and unapproachable. But a 
speedy reaction must have followed when his military 
counsellors showed how hopeful was the situation. For 
his enemies were now definitely lodged in a small 
corner of the Crimea, and bound to it by their depend- 
ence on the fleet ; Sebastopol was amply garrisoned, 
and the fortifications daily grew stronger ; the field 
army assured the concentration of the troops which were 



132 Rumours before the Baltle. 

crowding the roads of Southern Russia ; behind them 
the resources in men and material were almost bound- 
less. Only there was this limitation, that a season was 
near when the march of troops towards and along the 
Crimea would be almost impossible. But there was ample 
time to do all that was needful to raise the Russian 
Forces to an overwhelming preponderance ; and theii 
point of attack, offering at once the greatest advantages 
for entering on the battle, and the most complete results 
as the fruits of victory, was so obvious that it might 
almost be fixed, and the details arranged, at St Peters- 
burgh. Probably it was so arranged ; rumours began 
to pass through Europe of a great disaster impending 
over the invaders, and a paper was communicated to 
our Foreign Office, purporting to be a copy of a despatch 
from Menschikoff for transmission to the Czar, and be- 
lieved to be authentic, which said, " Future times, I am 
confident, will preserve the remembrance of the ex- 
emplary chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of 
the Allies. When our beloved Grand Dukes shall be 
here, I shall be able to give up to them intact the 
precious deposit which the confidence of the Emperor 
has placed in my hands. Sebastopol remains ours." 
This confidence was amply justified by the situation. 
But while such were the views of the enemy, only a few 
in the Allied Armies foresaw this particular danger. 
Evans, whose apprehensions were intensified by his 
responsibility as commander of the troops on that part 
of the ground, had indeed for long felt uneasy at our 
want of protection there, and had even begun a line of 



No.5 




Walker & Bouta U sc. 



Description of the Ground. 135 

intrenchment to cover his guns ; but it was not more 
than begun, and on the day of battle the ground was 
marked only by two small fragments of insignificant in- 
trenchment, not a hundred yards long in all, and more 
like ordinary drains than fieldworks, one on each side 
of the road as it crossed the crest behind which the 
Second Division was encamped. 

Inkerman was not the name of the ground on which 
the battle was fought, and which probably had no name, 
but was taken from the heights beyond the Tchernaya. 
Opposite the cliff which supports the north-eastern 
corner of the Upland rises another, of yellow stone, 
honey-combed with caverns, and crowned with a broken 
line of grey walls, battlemented in part, and studded 
with round towers. These are the " Ruins of Inkerman," 
and around them masses of grey stone protrude abruptly 
through the soil, of such quaint, sharp-cut forms that in 
the distance they might be taken for the remains of 
some very ancient city. From these the hill slopes 
upward to a plateau, mostly invisible from our position, 
where MenschikofPs field army was assembled. It is 
from this locality, the features of which are so striking 
to the eye when viewed from the British position, that 
the corner of the Upland, bounded on the west by the 
Careenage ravine, and on the north by the harbour, 
has received the name of Mount Inkerman. 

The Second Division camp stood on a slope, rising 
beyond it to a crest, which, nearly level for most of its 
width, bent down on the right to the top of the cliffs 
above the Tchernaya, on the left to the Careenage 







6 British Position. 



ravine, the extent from the one boundary to the other 
being about 1400 yards. On ascending to this crest, 
and looking towards the head of the harbour, the ground 
beyond was seen bending downward into a hollow, and 
again rising to a hill opposite, which, with its sloping 
shoulders, limited the view in that direction to about 
1200 yards. This opposite summit was Shell Hill, the 
post of the Russian artillery in the engagement, and 
the space between that and our crest comprised most of 
the field of battle, the whole of which was thickly clad 
with low coppice, strewn throughout with fragments of 
crag and boulders. A very few natural features marked 
the field. About 500 yards from its right boundary, our 
crest, instead of sloping down to the front as elsewhere, 
shot forward for about 500 yards, in what Mr Kinglake 
calls the Fore Ridge, and from the spine of this emi- 
nence the ground fell rapidly, still covered thickly with 
stones and coppice, to the edge of the cliffs, where, at a 
point abreast of the northern end of this Fore Ridge 
stood the famous Sandbag Battery on a point (called 
by Kinglake the Kitspur), isolated to some extent by a 
small ravine plunging north-east to the valley. Two 
other natural features complete the general character 
of the field, namely, two glens, wmich half way between 
our crest and Shell Hill, at the bottom of the dip, shot 
out right and left, narrowing the plateau between them 
to half its width, till it expanded again as they receded 
from it at the bases of Shell Hill. 

MenschikofT, whose plans of battle always showed how 
vague were his ideas about tactics, gave general orders to 



The Russian Plan of Battle. 137 

this effect : General Soimonoff was to assemble within the 
works his force of 19,000 infantry and thirty-eight guns, 
and issue from them, near the mouth of the Careenage 
ravine ; at the same time, General Pauloff, with his 16,000 
infantry and ninety-six guns, was to descend from the 
heights, cross the causeway and bridge of the Tchernaya, 
and "push on vigorously to meet and join the corps of 
Lieutenant-General Soimonoff." In another paragraph of 
the orders the object of the operation is stated to be to 
attack the English " in their position, in order that we 
may seize and occupy the heights on which they are 
established." The forces in the valley, lately commanded 
by Liprandi, now by Gortschakoff, were " to support the 
general attack by drawing the enemy's forces towards 
them, and to endeavour to seize one of the heights of the 
plateau." The garrison of Sebastopol was to cover with 
its artillery fire the right flank of the attacking force, 
and in case of confusion showing itself in the enemy's 
batteries, was to storm them. These being the general 
directions, the execution of them was left to the different 
commanders, namely, for the main attack to Soimonoff 
and Pauloff, for the auxiliary operations to Gortschakoff 
and the commandant of Sebastopol. 

If these orders had been destined to be carried out 
under Menschikoffs own superintendence, their vague- 
ness might be excusable. But, regarding himself ap- 
parently as the commander of all the forces in the 
locality, he committed the direction of the two bodies 
who were to make the main attack to another officer, 
General Dannenberg, who was to take command of 



i 38 How carried out. 



3 



them "as soon as they shall have effected their junction." 
This general only received his orders at five o'clock in 
the evening of the 4th, and neither he nor Menschikoff 
appears to have been then aware of the obstacle which the 
Careenage ravine — the sides of which were nearly inac- 
cessible — offered to the combined action of troops astride 
of it, and both of them dealt with the ground on both sides 
of it as one clear battlefield. After many perplexing orders 
had been issued, Dannenberg seems to have at length 
realised the nature of the chasm that would intersect his 
front, and he therefore made further arrangements for the 
advance of his two generals on the two sides of it. But 
Soimonoff had interpreted the orders of the Commander- 
in-Chief as directing him to advance on the eastern side of 
the ravine ; he had framed his plan for the movement, and 
submitted it to Menschikoff, who, though he must have 
seen how it conflicted with Dannenberg's scheme, seems 
to have made no attempt to decide between them. 
Soimonoff, therefore, followed his own idea, and thus 
it came to pass that 35,000 men, with 134 guns, were 
crowded into a space insufficient for half their numbers, 
while Dannenberg, who possibly only learned on the field 
of this wide departure from his design, was left to conduct 
an enterprise the plan of which he could not approve. 

Here a moment's pause may be made to point out 
that, when two bodies of troops, separated by a distance 
of several miles, were to move by narrow issues to the 
ground where they were to join forces, it would have 
been an immense advantage to possess a commanding 
fortified point between them and the enemy. Shell Hill 






Proximity of Corps to Battlefield. 139 

would have been such a point, and that circumstance 
will be seen to be amply explanatory of the Russian 
design in the action of the 26th of October. 

Against the formidable attack in preparation, the 
menaced ground was then occupied by very nearly 
3000 men of the Second Division, placed on the alert 
by the attack on their outposts. On the adjoining slope, 
the Victoria, was Codrington's Brigade, which, with some 
marines, and three companies brought in the course of 
the action from Buller's Brigade, numbered 1400 men, 
and, as these might be regarded as partly the object of 
the attack, they remained throughout the action on the 
same ground. Close to them was the Naval Battery, 
which had been placed to fire on the Malakoff, but four 
of its heavy guns had been withdrawn to the siege works, 
and only one remained, which could not be brought to 
bear till the close of the battle. 

Three-quarters of a mile in rear of the Second 
Division was the brigade of Guards, which was able to 
bring into action 1331 men. 

Two miles in rear of the Second Division were the 
nearest troops of Bosquet's army corps, stretched round 
the south-eastern corner of the Upland. 

Buller's Brigade, on the slope adjoining Codrington's, 
was a mile and a half from the Second Division. Cath- 
cart's Division (Fourth), two miles and a half from the 
Second Division, and England's (Third), three miles, 
were on the heights in rear of our siege batteries. 

Soimonoff issued from the fortress before dawn, 
crossed the Careenage ravine, and ascended the northern 



i 40 Soimonoff Attacks. 

heights of Mount Inkerman, where at six o'clock he 
began to form order of battle. For some reason never 
explained, he disregarded that part of the plan which 
prescribed that he should combine with Pauloff, and act 
under the orders of Dannenberg. Waiting for neither, 
he at once commenced the attack. Spreading 300 rifle- 
men as skirmishers across his front, he formed his first 
line of 6000 men, and the second, in immediate support, 
of 3300. The advance of these would cover the heavy 
batteries, numbering twenty-two guns, which he had 
brought from the arsenal of Sebastopol. These, cor- 
responding to our eighteen-pounder guns and thirty-two- 
pounder howitzers, were posted on Shell Hill, and the 
high slopes which buttressed it right and left. Behind 
them came his 9000 remaining infantry, as a general re- 
serve, and the light batteries (sixteen guns) which formed 
the remainder of his artillery. These operations were com- 
pleted by about seven o'clock, when the heavy batteries 
opened fire, and his lines of columns descended the hill. 
The pickets of the Second Division, each of a com- 
pany, and numbering altogether 480 men, were at once 
pressed back fighting. But the main body of the 
Division, not ranged on the crest as in Evans's recent 
action, was pushed in fractions at once down the hill 
to support the pickets, by Pennefather, who commanded 
in the temporary absence of Evans, then sick on board 
ship. He was probably less impelled to this mode of 
action by any tactical reasons, though these, too, favoured 
it, than by his fighting propensity, which always led him 
to make for his enemy. Consequently, the crest was 



Effects of the Fog. 1 4 1 

held only by the twelve nine-pounder guns of the 
Division, and a small proportion of its infantry. The 
large Russian projectiles not only swept the crest, but 
completely knocked to pieces the camp on the slope 
behind it, and destroyed the horses tethered there. 

The morning was foggy, the ground muddy, and the 
herbage dank. The mist did not, however, envelop 
the field. Shell Hill was frequently visible, as well as 
Codrington's troops across the ravine, and columns could 
sometimes be descried while several hundred yards off. 
It was chiefly in the hollow that the mist lay, but even 
here it frequently rose and left the view clear. No 
doubt it was favourable to the fewer numbers, hiding 
from the Russians the fact that there was nothing behind 
the English lines, which came on as boldly as if strong 
supports were close at hand. It needs some plausible 
supposition of that kind to account (however imperfectly) 
for the extraordinary combats which ensued, where the 
extravagant achievements of the romances of chivalry 
were almost outdone by the reality. 

On reaching the point of the plateau where it was 
narrowed by the glens, the Russian battalions halted 
to give their guns time to produce their effect. When 
they resumed their march, the battalion columns on the 
right passed first, and thus our left was the part of our 
line which received the first attack. It is to be noted 
as a feature of the field that at the point where the post- 
road enters the Quarry ravine, and where we had a picket, 
a wall of loose stones, crossing the road and stretching 
into the coppice on each side, had been thrown up as 



142 Soimonoff's Right in Advance. 

a slight defence, and to mark the ground, and this was 
known as "the Barrier." 

Here it must be remarked that the indefatigable in- 
quiries of Kinglake, and the care with which he arranged 
the information thus obtained, first disentangled the in- 
cidents of the battle from the confusion which long hid 
them, and rendered them intelligible, as they had never 
been before, even to those who fought in the action. 

The enemy, unable to advance through the narrowed 
space on a full front, such as would have enabled him to 
make a simultaneous attack all along our position, entered 
it with his right in advance of the centre and left, and 
the first attack therefore took place on our left. Only 
his foremost battalions being visible, the nature of the 
attack was not at first fully appreciated, and might have 
been supposed to be merely a very formidable sortie. 
His battalions advanced, some in a column composed 
of an entire battalion, some split into four columns of 
companies, but the broken nature of the ground dissolved 
all these more or less into dense crowds which had lost 
their formation. One of these, on the extreme Russian 
right, preceding for some unexplained reason the others, 
pressed on till it came in contact with a wing of the 
49th, which, delivering a volley, charged, drove it back, 
and pursued it even on to the slope of Shell Hill. 
Soimonoff then led in person twelve battalions, num- 
bering 9000 men, against our left and centre, while a 
column * moved up by the Careenage ravine beyond our 

* Kinglake says this column was composed of sailors, and therefore not 
included in the numbers of the army. 



The British repidse Him. 143 

left flank. At the same time there were arriving on our 
left 650 men of the Light Division, and a battery from 
the Fourth Division, raising Pennefather's force on the 
field to exactly 3600 men and eighteen field-guns. 
About 400 of Buller's men (88th), which had at first 
passed over the crest, fell back before the Russian 
masses, and three guns of the battery which was follow- 
ing them fell into the enemy's hands. At the same 
time the Russian column in the ravine, after surprising 
a picket of the Light Division, was making its way to 
the plateau in rear of our line, and close to our camp, 
by a glen which led in that direction. It was only just 
in time that Buller himself arrived with the remainder 
of his 650 men (77th), who were at once pushed into the 
fight. Part of them attacked the head of the turning 
column just emerging from the glen, while a company 
of the Guards, on picket on the other bank, fired on it 
from thence, and the column, which had so nearly 
attained to success that might have been decisive, was 
driven back, and appeared no more on the field. 
Soimonoff's right battalion, advancing on the plateau, 
was encountered by a wing of the 47th, spread out in 
skirmishing order on a wide front, which harassed it 
by so destructive a fire that it broke up and retreated, 
and two other battalions of the same regiment (the same 
which had just captured our guns) came to a halt, having 
before them the troops which had pursued the Russian 
battalions that first met us to the slope of Shell Hill, 
and had then fallen back. Passing these on the right, 
Buller's companies (260 men of the 77th) entered the 



144 Paidoff ' s Troops engage. 

fight, met two Russian battalions, fired, charged, and 
drove them quite off the field. Seeing this discomfiture 
of their comrades going on so near, the other battalions 
just spoken of as halted on our left of these, followed 
them in their retreat, leaving the captured guns to be 
recovered by our men. It was about this time that 
Soimonoff was killed. On our side General Buller was 
disabled by a cannon shot which killed his horse. 

Five of the twelve battalions, besides that other 
which attacked first, and the turning column in the 
ravine, were thus accounted for. Seven of Soimonoff' s 
still remained. One of these diverged to the Russian 
left, where it joined part of Pauloff's forces, then arriv- 
ing on the field. The remaining six advanced by both 
sides of the post-road upon our centre, and were defeated 
like the rest, partly by the close fire of the battery on 
our left of the post-road (that on the right had been 
silenced by the fire from Shell Hill), partly by the 
charge and pursuit of some companies of the 49th, and 
the pickets which had halted here, and which held the 
ground beside the guns. 

The part of Pauloff's corps, eight battalions, which 
preceded the rest had meanwhile crossed the head of 
the Quarry ravine, and, picking up the stray battalion 
of Soimonoff, and raising the whole force employed by 
the two generals in the first attack to twenty battalions, 
numbering 15,030 men, made a simultaneous but dis- 
tinct onset. They had formed opposite our right, their 
left on the Sandbag Battery, their right across the post- 
road where it enters the Quarry ravine. 



P cud off also repulsed. 145 

The four battalions composing the regiment on the 
right had begun to approach the Barrier, when a wing 
of the 30th, 200 strong, sprang over it, and charged with 
the bayonet the two leading battalions. A short and 
very serious conflict ensued — many of our men and 
officers were shot down ; but the charge proved decisive, 
and the leading battalions, hurrying back in disorder, car- 
ried the two others (of the same regiment) with them, 
and the whole were swept off the field, some towards 
Shell Hill, some down the Quarry ravine to the valley. 

Finally, it remained to deal with the five battalions 
still left of the attacking force. Against these advanced 
the 41st regiment, under its brigadier, Adams, number- 
ing 5 2 5 men. Approaching from the higher ground of 
the Fore Ridge, the regiment, in extended order, opened 
fire on the 4000 Russians before it, drove them over the 
declivities, and from the edge pursued them with its fire till 
they reached and descended the bank of the Tchernaya. 

Thus, in open ground, affording to the defenders 
none of the defensive advantages, walls, hedges, or en- 
closures of any kind, which most battlefields have been 
found to offer, these 15,000 Russians had been repulsed 
by less than a fourth of their numbers. But, in truth, 
to say they were repulsed very inadequately expresses 
what happened to them in the encounter. All the 
battalions which did not retreat without fighting left 
the field so shattered and disorganised, and with the 
loss of so many officers, that they were not again brought 
into the fight. This was in great measure owing to 
the density of the formations in which the Russians 



146 Causes of Russian Repulses, 

moved, and the audacity with which our slender bodies 
attacked them. Seeing the British come on so confi- 
dently, on a front of such extent as no other European 
troops would, at that time, have formed without very 
substantial forces behind them, the Russians inferred the 
existence of large numbers, and remained convinced 
that they had been forced from the field by masses to 
which their own were greatly inferior. This was a 
moral effect ; but there was also a material cause con- 
ducing to the result. The Russian riflemen, as we 
soon had good reason to know, were armed with a 
weapon quite equal to our Minie ; but the mass of. the 
infantry still wielded a musket not superior to the old 
Brown Bess firelock, which the Minie had replaced, 
whereas our troops, except those of the Fourth Division, 
had the rifle. Therefore, long before a Russian column 
had got near enough to make its fire tell, it began to 
suffer from a fire that was very destructive, not only be- 
cause of the longer range and more effective aim, but be- 
cause the bullets were propelled with a force capable of 
sending them through more than one man's body. But 
these reasons are merely palliative ; nothing can veil 
the fact that, supported by an overwhelming artillery, 
which frequently reduced ours to silence, these great 
bodies, once launched on their career, ought by their 
mere impetus to have everywhere penetrated our line ; 
and that had even a part been well led, and animated by 
such a spirit as all nations desire to attribute to their 
fighting men, they would never have suffered themselves 
to be stopped and turned by the imaginary enemies 



Dannenbergs Attacks. 147 

which the mist might hide, or which the intrepid, 
gallant, audacious bearing of our single line caused them 
to believe might be following in support of it. 

It was half-past seven when this stage of the action 
was finished, and a new one commenced with the arrival 
on the scene of General Dannenberg. All PaulofFs 
battalions were now ranged on Mount Inkerman, and 
with those of Soimonoff which had previously been held 
in reserve, and were still untouched, raised the number 
of fresh troops with which he could recommence the 
battle to 19,000 infantry and ninety guns. Ten thousand 
of these were now launched against our position, but 
this time they were massed for the attack chiefly in and 
about the Quarry ravine, and, neglecting our left, bore 
against our centre and right, upon which also was now 
turned the weight of the cannonade. The reason for 
this, no doubt, was that closer co-operation might 
be maintained with Gortschakoff, whose troops had 
extended down the valley till their right was nearly 
opposite the right of our position, and who, in case of 
Dannenberg's success in that quarter, might at once lend 
a hand to him. 

At the same time Penne father also had received 
reinforcements. The Guards, turning out at the sounds 
of battle, had now reached the position ; so had the 
batteries of the First Division ; and Cathcart was ap- 
proaching with 2100 men of his Division, set free by the 
absence of any sign of attack upon the siege works. 

The troops which had at first so successfully de- 
fended the Barrier had been compelled, by the large 



148 Greater Obstinacy of the Attack. 

bodies moving round their flanks, to fall back, and the 
Russians held it for a time. But these were driven out, 
and the barrier was reoccupied by detachments of the 
2 1st, 63d, and Rifles, when, from its position, closing 
the post road, it continued to be a point of great import- 
ance. The troops there, reinforced from time to time, 
held it throughout the battle, repelling all direct attacks 
upon it ; and it is a singular fact that the enemy's 
masses, in their subsequent onsets, passed it by, both in 
advancing and retreating, without making any attempt 
upon it from the rear. 

The first attack was made on Adams, with five 
Russian battalions, numbering about 4000 against the 
700 that opposed them, and took place on the slopes of 
the Fore Ridge, and about the Sandbag Battery. The 
Guards, already on the crest, were moved to the support 
of Adams. Whether the troops of Pauloff were superior 
in quality, or better led, or whether the lifting of the fog 
revealed their own superiority in number, the spirit they 
displayed was incomparably fiercer and more resolute 
than had yet marked the attack. The conflicts of the 
first stage of the battle had been child's play compared 
with the bloody struggle of which the ground between 
the Fore Ridge and the edge of the cliffs east of it were 
now the scene. Useless for defence on either side, the 
Sandbag Battery may be regarded as a sort of symbol 
of victory conventionally adopted by both, leading our 
troops to do battle on the edge of the steeps, and the 
enemy to choose the broken and difficult ground on 
which this arbitrary standard reared itself to view for 



Action and Death of Cathcart. 149 

a main field of combat. Although the disparity of 
numbers was now diminished, the Russians, instead of 
shrinking from difficulties which their own imaginations 
rendered insurmountable, or accepting a repulse as final, 
swarmed again and again to the encounter, engaging by 
groups and individuals in the closest and most obstinate 
combats, till between the hostile lines rose a rampart 
of the fallen men of both sides. For a long time the 
part played by the defenders was strictly defensive ; 
with each repulse the victors halted on the edge of 
the steeps, preserving some continuity of front with 
which to meet the next assault, while the recoiling 
crowds, unmolested by pursuit, and secured from fire 
by the abruptness of the edge, paused at a short dis- 
tance below to gather fresh coherence and impetus for 
a renewal of the struggle. It was with the arrival of 
Cathcart, conducting part of the Fourth Division, that 
the combat assumed a new phase. Possessed with the 
idea of the decisive effect which an attack on their flank 
must exercise on troops that, however strong they might 
still be in numbers, had already suffered so many rebuffs, 
he descended the slope beyond the right of our line. 
The greater part of his troops had already been cast 
piecemeal into the fight in other parts of the field where 
succour was most urgently needed, but about 400 men 
remained to him with which to make the attempt. And 
at first it was eminently effective, insomuch that Cath- 
cart congratulated his brigadier, Torrens, then lying 
wounded, on the success of this endeavour to take the 
offensive. But that success was now to be turned into 

K 



150 The French drive back the Russians. 

disaster by an event which it was altogether beyond 
Cathcart's province or power to foresee. While advanc- 
ing in the belief that he was in full co-operation with our 
troops on the cliff, he was suddenly assailed by a body 
of the enemy from the heights he had just quitted, and 
which had either turned or broken through that part of 
our front which he was endeavouring to relieve from the 
stress of numbers. Thus taken in reverse, his troops, 
scattered on the rugged hillside, suffered heavily, only re- 
gaining the position in small, broken bodies, and with the 
loss of their commander, who was shot dead. This effort 
of Cathcart's changed the restrained character of the 
defence, and was the first of numerous desultory onsets, 
which left the troops engaged in them far in advance, 
and broke the continuity of the line. For the downward 
movement had spread from right to left along the front; 
the heights of the Fore Ridge, left bare of the defenders, 
were occupied by Russians ascending the ravine beyond 
their left ; and our people, thus intercepted, had to edge 
past the enemy, or to cut their way through. The right 
of our position seemed absolutely without defence ; a 
body of Russian troops was moving unopposed along 
the Fore Ridge, apparently about to push through the 
vacant corner of the position, when, in order to enclose 
our fragments, it formed line to its left, facing the edge 
of the cliffs. It was while it stood thus that a French 
regiment, lately arrived, and thus far posted at the 
English end of the Fore Ridge, advanced, took the 
Russians in flank, and drove them back into the gorges 
from whence they had issued. 



Allies defeat another resolute Attack. 151 

The next attack was made by the Russians with the 
same troops, diminished by their losses to 6000 men, 
while the Allies numbered 5000. The disparity in 
infantry for the actual encounter (for the Russian re- 
serve of 9000 was still held back) was thus rapidly 
diminishing, but the enemy preserved his great pre- 
dominance in artillery. Again the hundred guns, which 
by this time they had in action, swept our crest through- 
out its extent. The right of our position, from the head 
of the Quarry ravine to the Sandbag Battery, was now 
held by some of our rifles, and by a French battalion. 
Leaving these on their left, the enemy's columns issued 
from the Quarry ravine, and this time pushed along the 
post-road against our centre and left. Two of their 
regiments (eight battalions) were extended in first line, 
in columns of companies ; behind came the main column, 
composed of the four battalions of the remaining regi- 
ment. This advance was more thoroughly pushed home, 
and with greater success, than any other which they 
attempted throughout the day. They once more made 
their right the head of the attack, and with it penetrated 
our line on the side of the Careenage ravine, drove back 
the troops there, and took and spiked some of our 
guns. The other parts of their front line, coming up 
successively to the crest, held it for a brief interval, 
while the main column, passing by our troops at the 
Barrier, moved on in support. But meanwhile, before 
it reached the crest, the regiments of the front line had 
been driven off by a simultaneous advance of French 
and English, and, after suffering great loss, the main 



152 Allied Artillery begins to prevail. 

column also retired. It was pressed by the Allied troops, 
part of whom reinforced those already at the head 
of the Quarry ravine, while the French regiment, which 
had defended the centre, moving to its right, took up, 
with the other already there, the defence of the ground 
where the Guards had fought. Here the French had 
yet another struggle to maintain, and with varying 
fortunes, for once they entirely lost the advanced 
ground they had held ; but their last reinforcements 
arriving, they finally drove the Russians immediately 
opposed to them not only off that part of our front, but 
off the field. 

It was now eleven o'clock, and the battle, though not 
ended, was already decided. For not only had the 
Allies, after deducting losses, 4700 English and 7000 
French infantry on the field, against the broken batta- 
lions and the 9000 unused infantry of Dannenberg's 
reserve, but the balance of artillery power, for long so 
largely against us (the Allies had in action at the close 
only thirty-eight English and twenty-four French field- 
guns) had now been for some time in our favour. At 
half-past nine the two famous eighteen-pounders had 
appeared on the field. Forming part of the siege train, 
they had as yet been left in the depot near the First 
Division camp, and were now dragged on to the field 
by 150 artillerymen. Their projectile was not much 
larger than that of the heavy Russian pieces ; but the 
long, weighty iron gun, with its heavy charge, was greatly 
more effective in aim and velocity. The two, though not 
without heavy losses in men, spread devastation among 



What delayed Bosquet. 153 

the position batteries on Shell Hill and the lighter 
batteries on its slopes ; while two French batteries of 
horse-artillery, passing over the crest on the right of 
our guns, had established themselves on the bare 
slope fronting the enemy, and had there gallantly 
maintained themselves under a shattering fire. For 
long this combat of artillery was maintained on both 
sides, though with manifestly declining power on 
the part of the enemy, while our skirmishers, press- 
ing forward on the centre and left, made such way 
that they galled the Russian gunners with their 
bullets. 

The menace of an attack by Gortschakoff on the 
heights held by Bosquet had not been without its effect. 
For an hour, while the real fight was taking place at 
Inkerman, the French troops were kept in their lines. 
At the end of that time Bosquet sent two battalions 
from Bourbaki's Brigade, and two troops of horse- 
artillery, to the windmill on the road near the Guards' 
camp, and accompanied them himself. He was there 
met by Generals Brown and Cathcart, to whom he 
offered the aid of these troops, and expressed his readi- 
ness in case of need to bring up others. The generals 
took the strange, almost unaccountable, course of telling 
him that his support was not needed, and asking him to 
send his battalions to watch the ground on the right of 
the Guards' camp left vacant by the withdrawal of the 
Guards to take part in the battle. Bosquet had there- 
upon returned to his own command ; but receiving 
fresh and pressing communication from Lord Raglan 



154 Crisis before the French arrived. 

he had directed the troops already despatched again 
to march on Inkerman. Thus it was not till the battle 
had been going on for between two and three hours 
that Bourbaki's two battalions, numbering 1600 men, 
arrived near the crest, when they were posted for some 
time in rear of it, the 6th of the Line on the right 
of the Fore Ridge, the 7th Leger near the post-road, 
and it was at these points that they first entered the 
fight. 

The next French reinforcements, consisting of four 
companies of chasseurs, and part of D'Autemarre's 
Brigade, 1900 men, arrived with Bosquet himself about 
ten o'clock, closely followed by the rest of the brigade, 
numbering 2300 more, with two other batteries of field- 
artillery ; and more than half of these troops took an 
important part in the engagement. Finally, the French 
reserve, of 2400 men came on the field at eleven o'clock, 
when the attacks of the Russian infantry had come to 
an end. 

An officer so experienced in war as Bosquet must 
have frequently considered what part he should take in 
defending Mount Inkerman against a pronounced attack 
while he should himself be threatened from the valley. 
Seeing how closely his own fate was bound up in that 
of the British troops in that quarter, he cannot be said 
to have rightly appreciated the problem. The view he 
took of it was much too exclusively a French view. 
According to all reasonable calculation, he would have 
found 20,000 Russians, followed by 15,000 more, with 
an immense force of artillery, advancing on his left rear 



Gortschakoff 's Part. 155 

long before he had moved a man to support us. In 
that case, to have continued to watch Gortschakoff 
would only have insured his own ruin. The most 
tremendous risk was incurred, by French as well as 
English, first when he placed all his troops so far from 
the point of danger, and next when he so long delayed 
to move sufficient forces thither ; and not even his own 
manifestation of goodwill, and the strange reception 
given to his battalions by Generals Brown and Cathcart, 
can altogether exonerate him. That he at last felt him- 
self free to lend effectual aid (and that it was effectual 
was owing to circumstances beyond calculation) was due 
to his perception of the fact that Gortschakoff's advance 
and cannonade was a transparent feint. A commander 
can hardly be set on a more difficult task than to execute 
a feigned attack in open ground against a commanding 
position. All the Russian movements in the valley were 
as clear to view from the plateau as if performed on a 
map. Either Gortschakoff's share of the action fell short 
of the orders given to him, or those orders ought to have 
directed him to make a real attack. About this Mr 
Kinglake says : " With respect to Gortschakoff's instruc- 
tions, the general order was worded as though it meant 
to direct against Bosquet's position an actual, unfeigned 
attack ; but on authority which I regard as indisputable, 
I have satisfied myself that the orders really given to 
Gortschakoff were of the kind stated in the text," that 
is, he was " to menace Bosquet by feints." In actually 
assaulting the heights he would no doubt have lost 
many men ; but they would have been the price of that 



1 56 Close of the Battle. 

victory, which could scarcely have been bought too dear. 
A real attack would undoubtedly have kept Bosquet 
from parting with his troops ; Dannenberg, in their 
absence, would have penetrated our line, and opened 
the road to the valley, when Gortschakoff would have 
joined him on the Upland. It was in expectation of 
such an effort on GortschakorT's part that Dannenberg 
remained on the field long after he had abandoned the 
intention of resuming his independent attacks. He held 
his ground, though suffering heavy losses, trusting that 
the storming of the heights lately held by the French, 
but now comparatively bare of troops, would open a road 
for him, and straining his ear for the sound of his 
colleague's guns on the Upland. At last the decline 
of the autumn day forced him to begin that retreat 
which the declivities in his rear rendered so tedious and 
so perilous, encumbered as he was by a numerous and 
disorganised artillery. Canrobert has been blamed for 
not attacking him with the 8000 troops he had assembled 
on the field, the greater part still unused ; and doubtless 
had the French general taken a bold offensive, the 
enemy's defeat would have become a signal disaster. 
But if Dannenberg was looking towards Gortschakoff, 
so, no doubt, was Canrobert. He could not but re- 
member that the 20,000 troops whom he had watched 
so anxiously in the morning were still close at hand in 
order of battle ; the policy he had declared at Balaklava 
of restricting himself to covering the siege, no matter 
what successes a bold aggression might promise, governed 
him now; and this seems, in the case of a gallant, quick- 



Terrible Carnage. 157 

spirited man like Canrobert — one, too, whom we had 
often found so loyal an ally — a more plausible explana- 
tion of his almost passive attitude at the close of the 
battle, than either a defect of resolution or a disinclina- 
tion to aid his colleague. 

This extraordinary battle closed with no final charge 
nor victorious advance on the one side, no desperate 
stand nor tumultuous flight on the other. The Russians, 
when hopeless of success, seemed to melt from the lost 
field ; the English were too few and too exhausted, the 
French too little confident in the advantage gained, to 
convert the repulse into rout. Nor was there among the 
victors the exaltation of spirit which usually follows the 
gain of a great battle, for the stress of the conflict had 
been too prolonged and heavy to allow of quick reaction. 
The gloom of the November evening seemed to over- 
spread with its influence not only the broken battalions 
which sought the shelter of the fortress, but the wearied 
occupants of the hardly-contested ground, and descended 
on a field so laden with carnage that no aspect of the 
sky could deepen its horrors. Especially on the slopes 
between the Fore Ridge and the cliffs had death been 
busy ; men lay in swathes there, as if mown down, inso- 
much that it was often impossible to ride through the 
lines and mounds of the slain. Of these, notwithstand- 
ing that the Allies, especially the English, had lost 
heavily in proportion to their numbers, an immense and 
almost unaccountable majority were Russians ; so that 
of no battle in which our nation has been engaged since 
Agincourt could it be more truly said, — 



153 The Operations discussed, 

"When, without stratagem, 
But in plain shock, and even play of battle, 
Was ever known so great and little loss, 
On one part and on tlr other ? — Take it, God, 
For it is only thine ! " 

The Russian losses in the battle were four times as 
great as the number of the troops with which the 
Second Division met the first attack. They lost 1 2.ooo, 
of which an immense proportion were left dead on the 
field, and 256 officers. The English lost 597, of whom 
thirty-nine officers, killed, and 1760, of whom ninety- 
one officers, wounded ; the French, thirteen officers 
and 130 men killed, and thirty-six officers and 750 men 
wounded. 

The present writer does not doubt that Dannenberg's 
plan of attacking by both sides of the Careenage ravine 
was the right one. It is true that to have attacking 
troops divided by an obstacle is a great disadvantage. 
It is also true, as Kinglake says, that "the camps of the 
Allies were so placed on the Chersonese that, to meet 
perils threatening from the western side of the Careenage 
ravine, they could effect a rapid concentration." But 
they could only effect it by robbing the eastern side of 
what was indispensable for its defence. If, instead of one 
part of the enemy's army attacking while the other was 
coming up in its rear, and therefore exercising no effect 
upon the battle, both had attacked simultaneously, it is 
hardly credible that one (and if one, both) would not 
have broken through. And if it is a disadvantage that 
the front of attack should be divided by an obstacle, it is 



The Attack suitably met. 159 

a still greater evil to restrict the attack, especially against 
very inferior numbers, to too confined a space. By 
crowding on to the eastern slope only, in numbers 
amply sufficient to have attacked both, the Russians 
were choosing the ground which best suited our numbers 
and our circumstances, and which least suited their 
own. 

It has been already remarked that as the mode of 
fighting the action by us differed radically from that of 
the 26th of October, so did the circumstances on the 
two days. On the 26th we had a great superiority in 
artillery, and plenty of room on the crest for the eighteen 
guns and the small force of infantry. On the 5th 
November nearly half of our narrow position was occu- 
pied by the line of batteries. Where, then, were the 
infantry to be posted ? Were they to be close in rear 
of the batteries ? Then the tremendous fire of the 
enemy would have swept the crest with double effect 
ravaging both guns and infantry. If posted in front of 
the guns, the result would be the same, with the addi- 
tional disadvantage that our guns would be firing over 
the heads of our infantry. By pushing the troops down 
the slope, they met the enemy before their columns could 
issue from the ravines and deploy ; and even on the ex- 
treme right we are by no means certain that to encounter 
them on the ledge near the Sandbag Battery (a mode of 
action which Mr Kinglake laments as false policy) was 
not the best way of dealing with the ground, for if we 
had withdrawn our line there to the main crest, and 
left the space between the cliff and the Fore Ridge un- 



160 The Sandbag Battery. 

occupied, the Russians, after ascending to the ledge, 
would have been able to take breath beneath its shelter 
before gaining the plateau, and when there they would 
have had the opportunity of solving what was one 
of their great difficulties throughout the day, namely, 
finding open space to deploy on at a certain dis- 
tance from our front. As it was, they came up 
rugged steeps, in disorder and under fire, to close 
with us still uphill, while yet breathless with the 
ascent, and here consequently occurred their severest 
losses. On the whole, therefore, the manner in which 
our troops fought the battle may be thought to have 
been very fortunately adapted to the topography of 
the field, and to the proportions of the contending 
forces. 

It is natural that a Russian chronicler should seek 
to extenuate this defeat, and we will not greatly blame 
Todleben for increasing the strength of the English, in 
the first phase of the combat, to 11,585 (more than 
trebling their actual force), for laying great stress on the 
" fieldworks " which strengthened the position, and for 
claiming successes which, in some mysterious way that 
he does not elucidate, were turned into disasters. In his 
visit to the field, in 1869, Mr Kinglake found the Sandbag 
Battery still there — very likely it is there now — and his 
detailed account of it is sufficiently exact. But he and 
other chroniclers advert to it, when describing the com- 
bats of which the area around it was the scene, in terms 
which would convey to those who have never seen it an 
altogether exaggerated idea of its importance, and even 



Russian Exaggerations. 161 

of its size ; and Todlebeti not only describes a Russian 
regiment 3000 strong as fighting desperately with our 
Coldstreams for the possession of it, but as capturing 
nine pieces of artillery " as the prize of this brilliant feat 
of arms " ; some of which, that imaginative chronicler 
tells us, were carried off by the victors, and the rest 
spiked. It is true that some hours later in the day one 
French gun was carried off from this part of the field, 
and was afterwards recovered in a ravine, so the Russian 
historian could at least plead that his version is not in 
this case, as it is in some others, absolutely without 
foundation. But all this gives to the battery an import- 
ance quite fictitious. It was simply a w T all of earth, 
several feet thick and twelve paces long, with two 
embrasures cut in it, the parapet, elsewhere considerably 
taller than a man's head, sloping rapidly for a few feet 
at each end. Behind it might have stood, in two ranks, 
thirty-six men in all, of whom twenty, ten of each rank, 
might have been able to fire through the embrasures and 
over the ends, while the other sixteen would have been 
better employed elsewhere. It was conspicuous from its 
height and position, and the enemy, seeing it from below, 
might easily have imagined it more formidable than it 
was ; but how could 3000 men be employed in attacking, 
or a battalion such as the Coldstreams in defending- it? 
Sixty men would have been an ample number wherewith 
to assail it. As for the intrenchments on each side of 
the road, a common bank and ditch, such as those which 
generally border our fields, would have been incompar- 
ably stronger for defence. Yet Todleben speaks of this 



1 62 What was at Stake. 

useless mound, and these insignificant banks, as "the. 
enemy's works," and another Russian writer says, "in 
spite of the accumulated forces of the enemy, our 
columns succeeded in occupying his batteries and fortifi- 
cations."* The truth is that few battlefields have been so 
devoid of obstacles of this kind as that of Inkerman. 
The difficulties of the attack lay in the hindrance which 
the coppice and crags opposed to regulated advances 
and deployments, though, on the other hand, these 
objects afforded to the enemy the not inconsiderable 
advantage of sheltering his skirmishers. 

Those who were children at the time of the Crimean 
War can scarcely realise how ardent, how anxious, how 
absorbing was the interest which the nation felt for the 
actors in that distant field, insomuch that Mr Bright, 
theoretically a man of peace, publicly said he believed 
there were thousands in England who only laid their 
heads on their pillows at night to dream of their 
brethren in the Crimea. This feeling reached its climax 
with the news of Inkerman, and it was not, nor indeed 
could it be, in excess of the magnitude of the stake 
which depended on the issue of that battle. The 
defeat of that slender Division on its ridge would have 
carried with it consequences absolutely tremendous. 
The Russians, arriving on the Upland, where the 
ground was bare, and the slopes no longer against them, 
would have interposed an army in order of battle 

* It is just possible that these writers may have supposed that some of 
the works placed on that ground long afterwards, were there at the time 
of the battle. 



Consequence of Victory. 163 

between our trenches and Bosquet's corps. As they 
moved on, disposing by their mere impetus of any dis- 
jointed attempts to oppose them, they would have 
reached a hand to Gortschakoff on the one side, to the 
garrison of Sebastopol on the other, till the reunited 
Russian Army, extended across the Chersonese, would 
have found on those wide plains a fair field for its great 
masses of cavalry and artillery. To the Allies, having 
behind them only the sea-cliffs, or the declivities lead- 
ing to their narrow harbours, defeat would have been 
absolute and ruinous ; and behind such defeat lay 
national degradation. On the other hand, when the 
long crisis of the day was past, the fate of Sebastopol 
was already decided. It is true that our misfortunes grew 
darker and darker, that six weeks afterwards most of the 
horses that charged at Balaklava were rotting in a sea of 
mud, most of the men who fought at Inkerman filling 
hospitals at Scutari, or graves on the plain. Any history 
of the war would be incomplete that failed to record, as a 
main and characteristic feature of it, the extraordinary 
misery which the besieging armies endured. Nevertheless, 
when Inkerman had proved that the Russians could not 
beat us in battle, we were sure to win, because it was 
impossible for us to embark in presence of the enemy. 
We could do nothing else but keep our hold ; and, keep- 
ing it, it was matter of demonstration that the Powers 
which held command of the sea must prevail over the 
Power whose theatre of war was separated from its 
resources by roadless deserts. Such were the conse- 
quences which hung in the balance each time that the 



164 Consequence of Victory, 

Russian columns came crowding on, while their long 
lines of artillery swept the ridge ; and it is not amiss 
that the nation, which sometimes gives its praise so 
cheaply, should be reminded how much it owed that 
day to the steadfast men of Inkerman. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE HURRICANE AND THE WINTER. 

The Hurricane — Its Effects — Privations of the Troops — Want of Trans- 
port — Transport done by the Men — The Cavalry Horses starved — 
Sufferings of the Sick — The Hospitals — Indignation in England — 
The French take part of our Duties — Relief begins — Why a Road 
was not made at first — Roads now made — Improvement in the 
Hospitals — Miss Nightingale arrives — The Influence She acquires — 
The Ratio of Deaths — Resignation of the Ministry — The Crimean 
Commission — The Commissary-General blamed — Defends himself 
— General Airey refutes Charges — Departments have Their Proper 
Limits — The Fault lay in the System. 

Three days after the battle of Inkerman, Lord Raglan 
informed his Commissary-General, Mr Filder, that our 
Army would winter in the Crimea, and desired him to 
make provision accordingly. 

Up to this time the troops had undergone no great 
privation. During October the weather had been mild 
and sunny, with cool nights ; the tents stood on dry and 
level spaces of turf. The surface of the plains had 
been good for transit. Rations for men and horses 
had been supplied with sufficient regularity ; losses of 
men from sickness or battle had been repaired ; and 
notwithstanding the excessive work which the dispro- 
portion of our numbers to their task forced the men to 
undergo, and the lingering presence of the cholera pest, 
both of these causes, which lowered the health of the 
whole force, had not, as had just been shown, impaired 

L 



1 66 The Hurricane. 

its ability to fight, or even its cheerfulness. Therefore, 
though in the first half of November mists had begun 
to overspread the Black Sea, and between these and 
the blue sky hung a low canopy of cloud, nothing 
formidable had as yet threatened us. 

But we had a sudden and rude awakening. On the 
14th of November a violent wind arose from the south, 
dashing huge billows against the iron-bound coast, and 
sweeping the Upland. It drove before it a deluge of rain, 
which lodged in the hollows of the tents, caused by the 
pressure of the wind, and the weight of both wind and 
rain, as the storm increased, prostrated whole camps, 
and dispersed them, with their contents, far over the miry 
plain, so that men returning from duty in the trenches for 
food and repose found themselves destitute of fuel and 
of shelter. The hospital tents were at once carried 
away, along with the blankets of their sick and wounded 
tenants, who were thus left bare to the mercy of the 
storm. Quantities of food and forage stored round the 
camps were spoiled, and the daily communication with 
Balaklava was stopped because the horses and waggons 
could not make head against the wind. These evils 
might have been borne, and in some degree repaired, 
but worse than these were happening on the sea. 
Twenty-one vessels, in or near the harbour of Balaklava, 
were dashed to pieces, and eight others disabled. All 
these were full of stores urgently needed by the army, 
and among them was the Prince, a magnificent steamer, 
" containing," says the Journal of the Royal Engineers, 
"everything that was most wanted — warlike stores of 



Its Effects. 167 

every description, surgical instruments, guernsey frocks, 
flannel drawers, woollen stockings and socks, boots, 
shoes, watch-coats ; in short, all that the foresight of the 
Government could devise for the equipment and com- 
fort of the troops." All these treasures went with her 
to the bottom of the sea. Our principal ammunition 
ship was also cast away, and each of the others bore 
with it to the deep a part of that which we depended on 
for existence. " Mr Filder's great fear," wrote Lord 
Raglan, "is want of forage for the horses. He lost 
twenty days' hay by the tempest." 

Next day the little harbour of Balaklava was full 
of floating timbers and trusses of hay, through which 
boats could hardly make their way, and numbers of the 
drowned were washed about the bases of the cliffs out- 
side. The French lost the most beautiful vessel in their 
navy, the Henri IV., and the garrison of Sebastopol 
shared, in less degree, the general misfortune, having 
many of the houses that sheltered them unroofed, as 
well as their naval magazines. 

With this day began our dire season of calamity. 
At the close of the storm, the evening had brought 
snow, and henceforth the soil of the devastated camps 
afforded in no respect better lodging than the rest of 
the surrounding wold. The sick, the wounded, and the 
weary lay down in mud. The trenches were often deep 
in water, and when night put an end to the rifle fire on 
both sides, the soldiers sat there, cramped, with their 
backs against the cold, wet earth. A still worse evil was 
that men seldom pulled off their wet boots, fearing they 



1 68 Privations of the Troops. 

might not be able to draw them on again; their feet 
swelled in them, the circulation was impeded, and on 
cold nights frost-bite ensued, ending at best in mutila- 
tion. Coming from the trenches, the men had to go far 
afield to seek for roots wherewith to cook their food ; it 
is hardly surprising that many preferred to employ 
these short intermissions of duty in such repose as was 
obtainable, and ate their salt pork uncooked ; and as, 
under such diet and such exposure, the numbers of the 
sick increased, so was more work thrown on those who 
remained. " Our men," wrote Lord Raglan, " are on 
duty five nights out of six, a large proportion of them 
constantly under fire." And all this time their clothing 
was such as they had first landed in in September. It 
was not from a continuous lack of food that the troops 
suffered. Except at the worst time, there was generally 
forthcoming in most camps the due allowance (not, how- 
ever, without too many intervals of scanty fare) of biscuit, 
salt meat, and rum. But there was by no means always 
forthcoming the fuel wherewith to cook it ; and if there 
had been, the diet, so limited, almost invariably pro- 
duced scurvy, and other diseases. Yet at this very 
time there was a sufficiency of fuel stored at Balaklava, 
and rice, flour, vegetables, and tea, such as might have 
rendered the diet wholesome. Here, then, seven or 
eight miles from the camps, were supplies which would 
have enabled the army to meet on much better terms 
the evils of overwork, and exposure to wet and cold. 
But these supplies could only be made partially, and 
with difficulty, available, for want of transport. As has 



Want of Transport. 169 

been seen, we had no transport corps, and the army de- 
pended, in its first movements, on the horses and carts 
which could be seized in the Crimea. From a return 
prepared by the commissariat, there appears the start- 
ling fact that, in January 1855, the whole number of 
effective animals belonging to that department was 333 
pack-horses and mules, and twelve camels. Had the 
depot which the Commissary-General had attempted 
to form near headquarters been completed, the task of 
supplying the troops would have been comparatively 
easy. But the formation of this depot, which was to 
have afforded conveyance for future supplies, as well as 
for those necessary for daily and present use, was inter- 
rupted for want of transport. In rear of each Division 
a scanty group of miserable ponies and mules, whose 
backs never knew what it was to be quit of the saddle, 
shivered, and starved, and daily died. Such were the 
means of transport on which the army depended for 
subsistence. Yet plenty of horses existed in the sur- 
rounding countries, and there was a sufficiency of ships 
in which to bring them. Why, then, were horses not 
brought in sufficient numbers to Balaklava? In answer to 
the question, the Commissary-General stated that " the 
reason for not increasing the amount of transport was 
not that a greater number of animals was unnecessary, but 
that a greater number could not be fed in the Crimea." 

Here, then, the primary cause of the sufferings of 
the army is arrived at — the want of forage. Hay and 
corn would have enabled us to maintain a land trans- 
port sufficient to feed the troops and the horses, to 



1 70 Transport done by the Men. 

shelter them with huts, to supply ammunition for the 
siege, and to form a depot against contingencies. 
Shrewd men at home might have made many guesses 
before they hit on the source of distress, for the intelli- 
gence and foresight must have been rare indeed that 
could have conducted an inquirer through such a jumble 
of calamity to so unexpected a conclusion. 

Now it has been said that the duties the men had to 
perform in the trenches, certainly when those of pickets 
and guards in camp were added to them, were as much 
as they could bear. But besides, owing to the deficiency 
of transport, they had to perform much work that ought 
to have been done by horses and mules. The journey 
through the quagmire to Balaklava and back, carrying 
up rations, clothing, huts, or ammunition, frequently 
took up twelve hours, all which time they were without 
food, shelter, or rest. Also, they were repeatedly on 
short rations ; in the Fourth and Light Divisions they 
were often on three-quarters, two-thirds, and some- 
times half rations of meat and rum ; on two occasions 
they had only quarter rations, and one day they had 
none at all. For six or seven weeks they were deprived 
of their ration of rice at the precise time when it would 
have been so beneficial, a time when scarcely any vege- 
tables were supplied, and hardly a man in the army 
escaped the prevailing diseases. 

The sufferings of the animals were frightful. They 
were dying all round the camps, and all along the route 
to Balaklava, of cold, hunger, and fatigue, and as labour 
could not be bestowed in burying them, their carcases 



The Cavalry Horses starved. 1 7 1 

formed a dismal feature in the desolate scenery. The 
artillery horses had so much extra work thrown on them 
that the efficiency of the batteries was very seriously 
impaired. Lord Lucan had remonstrated against the 
position chosen for the cavalry after the battle of Inker- 
man, as being so distant from the harbour as to endanger 
the supply of forage. Subsequently, the reason appeared 
to be that General Canrobert, anticipating a second 
attack on the same point, and thinking that the mere 
presence of cavalry might, when told to the enemy 
by their spies, deter them, had persuaded Lord Raglan 
to post them in that quarter. Lord Lucan's forebodings 
were quickly realised. Before the end of November the 
neighbouring artillery camps were invaded by ravenous 
cavalry horses, galloping madly in at the sound of the 
feeding trumpet, and snatching, undeterred by stick or 
stones, the hay and barley from the very muzzles of the 
right owners. Painful it was to see the frenzy of the 
creatures in their first pangs of hunger, more painful to 
see their quiet misery in the exhaustion that succeeded. 
Remedy (except removing the camp) there seemed none. 
The labour of toiling through the slough to Balaklava 
to fetch their own forage was so great that many 
horses sank and died in each journey; every day 
saw the survivors weaker and less fit for the effort ; 
every frosty night the cold was followed by the death 
of numbers. 

The effect of all this misery was that at the end of 
November we had nearly 8000 men in hospital. The 
journey thither was an ordeal fatal to many. Lifted 



1 7 2 Sufferings of the Sick. 

from the mud of the hospital tent, and wrapt in their 
wet blankets, the sick were placed on horses, a dismal 
troop ; some with closed eyes and livid cheeks, little 
other than mounted corpses ; some moaning as they 
went, and almost ready in their weariness to relax their 
hold of the pommel, and bury their troubles in the mire 
beneath ; some fever-stricken, glaring with wide eyes 
void of speculation, for whom the passers-by, if they 
saw them at all in their hurried, insane glances, existed 
only as more of the phantoms that haunted their de- 
lirium. Bound for the great hospital of Scutari, the 
ghostly train would toil on, wading and slipping past 
the dying horses, the half-buried bullocks, the skeletons, 
and carcases in various stages of decay ; past the wrecks 
of arabas, the squalid men with bundles, who had been 
down for the clothing they had needed for weeks, the 
waggon-load of dead Turks going to that yawning pit 
beside the road which was to be their sepulchre, the 
artillery waggons, returning at dusk with the forage 
they set out at daybreak to fetch — and on, always 
through deep mire, to the place of embarkation. 

New miseries lay in that last word. Lying amid 
crowds of other sick and wounded, on the bare planks, 
in torture, lassitude, or lethargy, without proper food, 
medicine, or attendance, they were launched on the 
wintry sea. Their covering was scanty, the roll and 
plunge of the ship were agony to the fevered and the 
maimed ; in place of the hush, the cleanliness, the quiet, 
the silent step, that should be around the sick, were 
sounds such as poets have feigned for the regions of the 



The Hospitals. 173 

damned — groans, screams, entreaties, curses, the strain- 
ing of the timbers, the trampling of the crew, the welter- 
ing of the waves. Not infrequently the machinery of 
the overladen ship broke down, and they lay tossing 
for days, a hell upon the waters. 

Scutari, the longed-for haven, was for weeks the 
very climax and headquarters of suffering — crammed 
with misery, overflowing with despair. In those large 
chambers and long corridors lay thousands of the 
bravest and most miserable of men. Standing at the 
end of any of the galleries that traversed the four sides 
of the extensive building, one looked along a deep 
perspective, a long-diminishing vista of woe. Ranged 
in two rows lay the patients, feet to feet ; the tenant of 
each bed saw his pains reflected in the face of his 
comrade opposite ; fronting each was another victim of 
war or cold, starvation or pestilence. Or, frequently, 
the sick man read in the face before him not the pro- 
gress of fever, nor the leaden weight of exhaustion, but 
the tokens of the final rest to which he was himself 
hastening. With each round of the sun nearly a 
hundred gallant soldiers raved or languished out their 
lives; as the jaws of the grave closed on the prey of 
to-day, they opened as widely for that of to-morrow. 
It might be thought that, at this rate, the grave, so 
greedy, so improvident, would exhaust its victims — that 
some day it would gape in vain. But no — the sick 
flocked in faster than the dead were carried out, and 
still the dismal stream augmented, till the hospitals 
overflowed, while still faster poured the misery-laden 



174 Indignation in England. 

ships down the Black Sea, feeding as they went the 
fishes with their dead. 

Had Dante witnessed these scenes, he might have 
deepened the horrors of his Inferno. Told with more 
or less exactness, but with a skill that suffered none of 
their pathos to be lost, they shook the nation with a 
universal tremor of anger and grief. It could not bear 
to think that the men of whom it had suddenly grown 
so proud should be perishing of want, while wealth and 
plenty reigned at home. The feeling found expression 
in two ways, very different, but both very natural as 
impulses of a community. The one was an absorbing- 
desire to afford immediate relief; the other a fretful 
craving to find scapegoats, and make them atone for all 
this suffering. Inspired by the first of these, the country 
became a vast workshop for the manufacture of warm 
clothing, and great quantities of this, as well as of 
luxurious food and drink, were despatched in steamers, 
with agents to distribute them. But before these came, 
early in December, and all through the month, clothing 
was reaching Balaklava from Constantinople, whither 
Lord Raglan had despatched an officer to remedy, so 
far as might be, the loss of the cargo of the Prince, so 
that at the end of that month 17,000 blankets and 
19,000 new great-coats had been issued to the troops 
(mostly at Balaklava, whither they went to fetch them) ; 
and on the 13th January Lord Raglan was able to write : 
" I believe I may assert that every man in this army has 
received a second blanket, a jersey frock, flannel drawers 
and socks, and some kind of winter coat in addition to 



The French take Part of Our Duties. 175 

the ordinary great-coat." These defences did not, how- 
ever, at once check the progress of sickness ; during 
January and February the numbers in our hospital con- 
tinued to swell till they reached to nearly 14,000. 

But before the aid from England arrived, we had re- 
ceived important relief in another form. The French 
had been so largely reinforced that General Canrobert 
at length consented to relieve our troops from the task 
of guarding the ground beyond our Right Attack. That 
they should have been able to do so by no means implies 
that they had not their share of winter troubles. Their 
greater proximity to their home ports, their organised 
transport, the convenience of their harbours, the road 
they had paved from thence along the rear of their 
camps, rendered their supplies comparatively regular 
and certain. But there were two circumstances which 
told heavily on them. Their tentes d'abri, small roofs of 
canvas, only very imperfectly fulfilling the idea of a tent, 
were so diminutive that a third part of one was carried 
by the soldier in addition to the rest of his burdens. 
Propped on short sticks at each end, the tent admitted 
the three occupants, crawling like ferrets into a rabbit 
hole, to a space where they could all lie down. But 
this was obviously a meagre defence against mud and 
snow ; it afforded no shelter at all except for lying down ; 
and a bell tent like ours would have seemed a vast boon 
to the French troops. Also, their ration of food and drink 
was inferior to ours, was calculated on a scale suited to 
different conditions, and did not suffice to maintain in 
health men undergoing hardships so severe. Therefore, 



176 Relief begins. 

although the French had comparatively easy work in 
the trenches, although, at the worst, one of each two 
nights was a night of rest, and their men, never over- 
tasked, were available for fatigues and camp duties, 
road making, and other labours, yet their means of 
meeting exposure to wet and cold were so defective 
that their losses in sick, especially from frost-bite, 
were very great. The French horses, too, perished by 
hundreds, and much of the carrying of supplies to the 
camps had to be performed by the men. But their 
great resources in numbers not only made good all 
losses, but went on rapidly raising the strength of their 
army. Numbering 45,000 in October, it grew to 56,000 
in November, 65,000 in December, and 78,000 in January. 
In this last month Lord Raglan reckoned the strength 
of the French Army to be at least four times that of the 
British. We had then on the Upland, to meet all the 
exigencies of our siege works, and any enterprises of 
the enemy, only 11.000 men fit to bear arms. It was 
these three months, then, November, December, and 
January, which formed " the winter of our discontent." 
In February a brighter time set in. It was about the 
23d January that the French troops were put in charge 
of the ground on the right of our siege works. Lord 
Raglan's proposal had been that the French troops 
should relieve ours in the trenches one night in three. 
Canrobert substituted for it the measure which was now 
effected. It released more than 1500 English troops 
daily from the duty of guarding our front. Lord 
Raglan says of it : " The position of our troops is greatly 



Why a Road was not made at first. 177 

improved by being relieved of part of the harassing 
duties they have had imposed on them ; but, speaking 
confidentially, I am of opinion, notwithstanding what 
General Canrobert says, that more might have been 
done, considering that the French Army consists of from 
60,000 to 70,000 men." 

The spectacle of men and horses floundering be- 
tween Balaklava and the camp, through a sea of 
mud, was of a sort to suggest to the least inventive 
mind that to make a road was the proper remedy. 
In England, accordingly, the numerous class which 
becomes clamorously wise after the event brought the 
omission to make a road as one of the heaviest charges 
against the staff of the Army, insisting, too, that it should 
have been one of the first things thought of. But can 
anyone who now looks dispassionately back to that 
time point to any period as that in which the step was 
feasible ? When we first took position on the Upland 
no want of a road was felt, and when every man in both 
armies was needed to prepare for the bombardment 
which was to precede the assault, it would have been 
a strange exercise of foresight to withdraw them from 
their urgent duties in order to make a road which might 
never be wanted. Even after the loss of the WoronzofT 
road, the extent of that misfortune was not felt, for men, 
horses, and vehicles freely traversed the plains, and the 
speedy capture of the place was still expected. Later, 
when the battle of Inkerman had shown how scanty was 
our line of defence, how fatal would be the consequence 
of a breach in it, not a man could be withdrawn from 



178 Roads now made. 

the position. Sir John Burgoyne computed that to make 
a road would occupy more than 1000 men two or three 
months. A body of Turks had been hired to attempt it 
as soon as it was accepted as a necessity that we must 
winter on the heights, but they died so fast that the sur- 
vivors could scarcely do more than bury the dead. The 
official commissioners subsequently affirmed that " hired 
labour could not be obtained." Neither, assuredly, could 
military labour ; and the absence of a road was therefore 
one of those misfortunes which become inevitable amid 
the uncertainties of war. 

But when the pressure on the troops grew lighter, 
means were found to make the part of the road between 
Balaklava and Kadikoi ; and the French troops stationed 
there carried it on to the Col. By the time it got 
so far, a railway, undertaken by private contractors at 
the instance of the Secretary for War, was in course 
of construction, and before the end of March had 
not only reached the same point, but was conveying 
thither ammunition and stores. Some weeks earlier, 
lavish supplies had begun to arrive from the deeply- 
moved community at home, not only of things necessary, 
like warm clothing, but of luxuries ; meat, ale, and wine, 
and even books were poured profusely into the camps. 
The first agency of this kind to arrive was the Crimean 
Army Fund, administered by two gentlemen, who also 
brought, or procured, the men and horses necessary for 
the distribution. But besides such organised modes of 
relief, the quantities of similar stores received for distri- 
bution by officers from friends at home were uncounted. 



Improvement in the Hospitals. 179 

While the distress of the troops before Sebastopol 
was thus being daily alleviated, effective influence for 
good had begun to pervade our hospitals on the Bos- 
phorus. Even before the great stress was laid on them 
which ensued from the battles and the coming of 
winter, they were already teeming with confusion and 
misery. The Army had not contained enough surgeons 
other than regimental to meet the unexampled needs of 
the time ; the service had been recruited from the 
civilians of the profession ; and by universal testimony 
both classes grappled with their formidable duties in the 
best spirit. Had there been a system of organisation 
suited to the exigency, had the sanitary conditions been 
good, the attendants numerous, the supplies ample, 
then the efforts of the surgeons, dealing as they did with 
the cases as they presented themselves, would have 
found a fair field. But none of these conditions existed, 
and all they could do was to struggle on, not so much 
like swimmers making some way, as like those con- 
tending in vain with a torrent. 

In those days there were two chiefs at the War Office. 
The Duke of Newcastle was Secretary for War, and Mr 
Sidney Herbert bore the mysterious title of Secretary at 
War. The medical department of the War Office lay in 
Mr Herbert's province, and his inquiries into the methods 
of dealing with sickness on an extensive scale had led 
him to expect the best results from the co-operation of 
women, in controlling and administering large hospitals. 
Therefore, when it became apparent that the establish- 
ments on the Bosphorus were daily growing less able to 



180 Miss Nightingale arrives. 

contend with their difficulties, he invited the aid of ladies 
already possessed of large experience, and who, thus 
encouraged, formed themselves into staffs, and accom- 
panied by paid nurses, and bearing strong recommenda- 
tions to the medical as well as to other authorities on 
the spot, proceeded to Constantinople. " It was seen," 
says Kinglake, " that the humble soldiers were likely to 
be the men most in want of care, and the ladies were 
instructed to abstain from attending upon any of the 
officers." Thus began to enter into the history of the 
contest an element which strongly moved the imagina- 
tion of the commuuity, both from the extraordinary 
alleviation of suffering and establishment of order 
which it effected, and from the contrast which its gentle 
and beneficent character offered to the gloomy tenor of 
the war. 

It was on the 4th of November that Miss Nightin- 
gale and her immediate companions arrived at Constan- 
tinople. She was accompanied by Protestant sisters 
and Catholic nuns, eighteen in all, with twenty trained 
nurses, and to all were assigned quarters in one of the 
towers that form the angles of the great barrack at 
Scutari, which the Turkish Government had given over 
to us for a hospital. Another band, numbering in all 
forty-six. under Miss Stanley, bestowed themselves at 
first in a neighbouring hospital for sailors, and after- 
wards at the military hospital at Kulali, on the Bos- 
phorus. 

The ladies and their attendants at first took an 
altogether subordinate part in the care of the sick, 



The Influence She acquires. 181 

replacing the orderlies withdrawn from their regiments, 
ensuring obedience to the doctors' orders, administering 
food and medicine, and making the patients comfortable 
But it was not long before they began to take part in 
the management. At first Miss Nightingale's share in 
this was confined to keeping Sidney Herbert informed 
of what was noteworthy, and enabling him to act ac- 
cordingly. But the departmental authorities soon got to 
understand that her views and suggestions were to be 
specially considered. A regular correspondence on the 
subject was also established between her and Lord 
Raglan. Receiving such support, as well as that de- 
rived from the strong interest which the public evinced 
for her mission, she gradually acquired a powerful con- 
trolling influence ; and to this the extraordinary improve- 
ment in the condition of the hospital which ensued was 
then, and has continued to be, chiefly ascribed. The 
excellent medical staff cheerfully accepted her sway, 
and the skill and energy which they had always given 
without stint, no longer expended in struggling amidst 
chaos, were directed to the best ends. She received, too, 
from an unexpected source, a large accession of power. 
The conductors of the Times had consented to receive 
and administer, for the benefit of our sick and wounded, 
a fund formed by the contributions of their readers. Mr 
Macdonald ; who had come out in charge of it, learning 
from Miss Nightingale what needs of the sick were most 
urgent, supplied them, and thus added immeasurably 
to the benefits attending her presence. Not the least 

among these was an extensive kitchen which she 

M 



1 82 The Ratio of Deaths. 

established close to her quarters, where all that part 
of the patients' diet that called for special care in pre- 
paration was excellently cooked on an enormous 
scale. 

But all these ameliorations took time, In the period 
of worst distress in the camp, that is to say, in December 
and part of January, the influence of the ladies had 
hardly begun to take effect in any way, and not at all 
in diminishing the sick-list or the death-rate. Even 
when their care and skill had made patients feel them- 
selves in good hands, and had banished a vast propor- 
tion of the misery, the ratio of deaths for some time 
continued to increase. It kept steadily and largely 
augmenting all through December, November, January, 
and February. In these four months nearly 9000 soldiers 
died in our hospitals, and at the end of February 13,600 
men were lying sick there. The causes lay too deep to 
be touched even by improved method and administra- 
tion. But early in March a sanitary commission had 
arrived to examine into the condition of the hospitals, 
with power to act on the conclusions they might 
come to. Works of ventilation, of drainage, and 
of water supply, had in the second week of March 
already made some progress ; the death-rate went 
down with extraordinary rapidity week by week, till 
in June it had come to the level of our military hos- 
pitals at home. 

In the result the evils suffered met some compensa- 
tion in the form of permanent benefit. At the close of 
the campaign Mr Herbert presided over a sanitary com- 



Resignation of the Ministry, 183 

mission at home, and to its recommendations are due 
many of the improvements which so greatly distinguish 
our present military hospital system from that which 
existed at the time of the war. 

It has been said that one form taken by the ex- 
citement at home was the desire to punish those to 
whom delinquency was imputed. Strongly pressed 
by this manifestation of public feeling, and by the 
calamitous accounts from the East, the Duke of New- 
castle began, in the latter half of December, to write 
letters to Lord Raglan implying censure on him and 
his staff. Following this up was a letter, on the 6th 
of January, condemning the staff generally, and the 
Quartermaster-General in particular, as the member of 
it in whose department it lay to provide for many of 
the privations which had proved so calamitous. And it 
is not easy to avoid the inference that the Ministry was 
seeking to shelter itself against the indignation of the com- 
munity by giving it vent against those who had already 
begun to be the objects of it. Lord Raglan found no diffi- 
culty in defending, in a manly spirit, his subordinates. 
He was soon relieved from the necessity of maintaining a 
contest with their accusers, for, on the 26th January, Mr 
Roebuck moved for a committee " To inquire into the 
condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the 
conduct of those departments of the Government whose 
duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army." 
The motion was carried by a majority of 157, and the 
Ministry thereupon resigned. Lord Aberdeen was suc- 
ceeded by Lord Palmerston, the Duke of Newcastle by 



184 The Crimean Commission. 

Lord Pan mure. The new Ministers were naturally bent 
upon inquiry. They resolved to send a commission to 
the Crimea to seek a clue to the causes of the sufferings 
of the army, and Sir John M'Neill, for many years 
Envoy to Persia, and Colonel Tulloch were selected for 
the purpose. On the 12th March they arrived in the 
Crimea, and taking up their residence on board a 
steamer, at once began to take evidence. In June they 
issued a first report, dealing with food and transport. 
It contained a remarkable tribute to the army. " It is 
doubtful," says the report, "whether the whole range 
of military history furnishes an example of an army 
exhibiting, throughout a long campaign, qualities as 
high as have distinguished the forces under Lord 
Raglan's command." Their labours, their privations, 
their spirit, and their discipline, form the subjects of 
admiring comments. "The Army," says the report, 
"never descended from its acknowledged military pre- 
eminence." Again, " Both men and officers, when so 
reduced that they were hardly fit for the lighter duties 
of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and 
perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an 
undue amount of duty upon their comrades ; yet they 
maintained every foot of ground against all the efforts 
of the enemy, and with numbers so small that perhaps 
no other troops would even have made the attempt. . . . 
The officers have not only shared all the danger and 
exposure, and most of the privations which the men had 
to undergo, but we everywhere found indications of 
their solicitude for the welfare of those under their 



The Commissary -General blamed. 185 

command, and of their constant readiness to employ 
their private means in promoting the comfort of their 
men." 

Yet to more than nine-tenths of the officers and men 
this was a first campaign. When they came in sight of 
the Russian masses arrayed on the Alma, they for the 
first time saw an enemy ; when the shot from the 
Russian guns dashed past, they were for the first time 
under fire. Yet, under that fire, and against that enemy, 
they advanced with all the confidence, discipline, and 
determination which can attend the onset of troops 
long accustomed to victory. That the same discipline 
and spirit distinguished them under circumstances still 
more trying to young troops, the commissioners bear 
witness. Not in some peaceful, happy community, the 
realisation of a Utopian dream, could temperance, obedi- 
ence, diligence, cheerfulness, be more conspicuous than 
in that camp in the wintry desert, where various and 
incessant horror and distress might have been ex- 
pected to dissolve the ties of order, to cast submis- 
sion to the winds, and to leave despair, in the form 
either of apathy or recklessness, sole master of the 
suffering host. 

The only person to whom blame was imputed, in the 
first report of the commissioners, was the Commissary- 
General. Failure to issue articles of diet, such as lime 
juice and tea, which were in store at Balaklava, deficien- 
cies of fresh meat, vegetables, and fuel, and defective ar- 
rangements respecting forage, were all laid at his door, and 
he was charged with not being a man of comprehensive 



1 86 Defends Himself. 

views, with not having sufficiently turned to account the 
resources of surrounding provinces, and with being defi- 
cient in inventive resource and administrative capacity. 
In reply, Mr Filder laid before the House a counter 
statement. In the first place, he set forth the extra- 
ordinary difficulties which the commissariat laboured 
under ; its extensive duties, the total inexperience of its 
officers, the absence of necessary establishments, the 
ignorance as to where winter quarters would be, — and 
then dealt with the charges in detail. The lime juice 
and tea had been sent for the sick, and were not 
more than was needful for them ; when demanded, 
these articles were at once issued to the troops. 
As to the fresh meat, many of his cattle-vessels had 
been disabled by the storm ; nevertheless, the supply 
both of fresh meat and vegetables had been kept up in 
a degree which, under the circumstances, might be called 
surprising. There had always been sufficient fuel at 
Balaklava ; the only difficulty was to find means of con- 
veying it to the camps, owing to want of transport, 
and that, as we have seen, was owing to want of forage. 
Now the Commissary-General showed that he had made 
ample provision for forage had the army remained in 
Turkey. When it was ordered to the Crimea, he made 
contracts at Constantinople for having it pressed (very 
necessary for transport by sea) and despatched to him. 
Finding that the contractors were likely to fail in their 
agreement, he wrote to England for 2000 tons. Of this 
he only received one-tenth in six months. " Had my 
requisitions for hay been complied with, the deficiency 



General Airey refutes Charges, 187 

which was felt throughout the winter would have been 
prevented, and I should have been able to maintain 
a sufficient transport establishment." This demand he 
made before the armies landed in the Crimea ; he 
frequently reiterated it, and it was many times enforced 
by Lord Raglan, but without effect, till near the close 
of the winter. Finally, a committee of inquiry appointed 
later declared that the insufficiency was owing to the 
omission of the Treasury to send a proper supply of 
forage from England. 

This report was followed by a second, in which 
several officers, notably the Quartermaster-General and 
the two cavalry generals, conceived themselves to be 
made objects of censure. And, finally, a Board of General 
Officers sat at Chelsea, in April 1856, "to take into con- 
sideration so much of the reports as animadverts upon 
the conduct of certain officers." The blame, if any, im- 
puted to Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan was so slight 
and vague that they had no difficulty in justifying them- 
selves. General Airey's reply may be briefly summed 
up. Its essence consisted in showing that, while the 
commissioners had imputed blame to his department 
for not issuing supplies in store, it was its province to 
provide, not for the issue, but the apportionment of 
these supplies. He showed that to the oft-quoted want 
of transport alone was due the fact that stores of cloth- 
ing and other necessaries remained unissued ; that no 
official barrier was raised between the men and the 
supplies ; on the contrary, the issues of clothing were 
authorised very much faster than the men could draw 



1 88 Departments have Their Proper Limits. 

it. He rightly observed that, in the altered state of 
affairs existing in the middle of March, it was impos- 
sible for any two persons, such as the commissioners 
fully to appreciate the position of the army, in the 
midst of the unheard-of difficulties of the winter, and 
concluded with a picture of the condition of the troops, 
and the causes of distress and perplexity by which they 
were surrounded. 

The reader who may have followed this narrative 
will perhaps be of opinion that, the army once before 
Sebastopol, and dependent on a military system so defi- 
cient in much that is essential, no arrangement or fore- 
sight within the scope of human intelligence could have 
averted the disasters which followed. The inference 
drawn from the reports, that blame might justly be 
affixed in specified quarters, could not be sustained 
The fact that the different departments of the Army 
have their proper limits seemed in some measure to 
be lost sight of by the commissioners, as well as by 
the public, whose complaints were largely based on the 
error that everybody ought to understand and take part 
in the business of everybody else as well as his own. 
No commander-in-chief would wish to see such an 
interchange of duties substituted for the restricted and 
specific sphere of operations and responsibility allotted 
to each department. To perform the duties of his own 
branch (including, of course, its co-operation with others 
when necessary) is all that can be expected from an 
officer ; and it is the province of the superintending 
intellect, which knows the instruments it works with, 



The Fault lay in the System. 189 

to combine all in harmonious action. The search for 
delinquents pointed to this result, that all the suffering 
and calamity, not absolutely inevitable, which befell 
our troops, were the natural consequences of the un- 
practical and unworkable system, at once improvident 
and ineffective, which the nation permitted to exist for 
the conduct of its military business. 



CHAPTER IX 

EXTENSION OF THE SIEGE WORKS AND DEFENCES. 

Burgoyne's Proposal for our Relief — The French prefer another Mode — 
Want of Fuel in the Camps — Fortress increasing in Strength — New 
System of Rifle-pits — Underground Warfare — New Russian Works 
— Failure of the French Attack — Great Sortie against the French 
and English Trenches — The Burial Truce — Charles Gordon's Ex- 
periences — Russians recross the Tchernaya — Arrival of Pelissier and 
Niel — The Russians attack Eupatoria — The Attack repulsed — 
Burgoyne goes Home — Improved Condition of the Allies — Effect of 
Soil on Trenchwork — Another Cannonade — Severity of Fire upon 
the Fortress — Two Well-fought Batteries — Carnage in Sebastopol — 
Impatience for Assault. 

It has been said that the plan of attack, on the 17th 
October, was that the French should assault the Flag- 
staff Bastion, and the English the Redan. The first 
was the chief object, the second subsidiary. To establish 
French troops and batteries on the Flagstaff Bastion, 
and maintain them there, would have gone far to assure 
the surrender or evacuation of the place ; but in order to 
effect this, it would be indispensable to hold the Redan 
also, the close fire from which would otherwise render 
the French operations very costly, or impossible. But 
a great master of engineering science had been labour- 
ing on these works with unceasing energy, and with 
formidable effect. During the first winter months 
Todleben had greatly extended and strengthened both 
of these works, and also the Malakoff ; and the Redan 



Burgoynes Proposal for our Relief. 1 9 1 

was so completely dominated by the Malakoff that 
the capture of this great work also had become an 
essential part of the plan of attack. This had always 
been Burgoyne's opinion, and he now supported it by 
arguing that the Malakoff was more easy of approach 
than the other works ; that the possession of it, even if 
it should not, of itself, cause the surrender of the place, 
would render the assault of the others far less desperate, 
while guns placed on it would at once rid us of the fire 
of the Russian ships. He represented, moreover, that 
the Allies would thus best attain their real object, which 
was not so much the capture of the town, as the destruc- 
tion of the docks, arsenal, and fleet. Since the battle of 
Inkerman had given us possession of the heights over- 
looking the harbour and the Careenage ravine, this plan 
had obviously become more feasible, and Burgoyne had, 
in November and December, urged officially his reasons 
for desiring that the English should undertake the busi- 
ness, and that, as their numbers were manifestly unequal 
to such an extension of duty and work, the French 
should relieve them of the charge of pushing forward 
and guarding the British Left Attack, the batteries of 
which, however, would be held and fought by our men 
as before. This would set free the Third Division to 
perform the operations on Mount Inkerman. Immedi- 
ately after the battle of Inkerman the Allies had begun 
to strengthen the ground there with works, one made by 
the French on the end of the Fore Ridge, three by the 
English (one of them on Shell Hill), to command the 
approaches, and to overlook the bridge and causeway 



192 The French pi'efer another Mode. 

over which Pauloff had advanced ; and we had further 
made in front of these a first parallel, and begun a 
second, as approaches to the works between the Mala- 
koff and the harbour. When this proposal was finally 
considered at a conference of chiefs at the beginning of 
February, the French preferred to leave our Right and 
Left Attacks to us as before, and themselves to take 
charge of Mount Inkerman, except that the British 
artillerymen and sailors already occupying our works 
there, should so remain. It was so settled : Mount 
Inkerman and the Victoria Ridge were given into the 
charge of Bosquet's Corps ; and at the same time the 
plan of advancing on the Russian works from the' Mala- 
koff to the harbour, by approaches from Mount Inker- 
man, and of pressing the attack, not there especially, but 
.along the whole Russian front, was definitely adopted. 

Meanwhile the Allies had not been idle in the 
trenches, even in the time of their direst trials. The 
first parallel of the British Right Attack was completed, 
as well as another in advance of it. A second parallel 
was carried across the front of the Left Attack, and 
down the ravine on its right, barring the WoronzofT 
road there. The French had sapped up to within 
180 yards of the Flagstaff Bastion, and now, seeing the 
relations of mutual defence between it and the Central 
Bastion, deemed it necessary to include the latter 
also in their front of attack. Yet withal the business 
of the siege proceeded of necessity very slowly. What 
transport the Allies could muster was taken up with 
bringing food, clothing, and shelter. In the trenches the 



Want of Fuel in the Camps. 193 

men stood generally ankle deep, sometimes knee deep, in 

snow and liquid mud ; except near the cliffs, and at a 

great distance from the camps, the supply of fuel, in the 

form of brushwood, which the plains afforded, had long 

since been exhausted, and even the roots of the vines had 

been grubbed up for cooking. And this want had become 

a hindrance to the siege in another way. " It is very 

unusual," says the Engineer Journal, " to see smoke from 

fires in trenches, yet this took place daily." The cause 

of this was the want of fuel in the camps. The coffee 

issued to the men was in the berry, which is the best 

form of it when means for roasting are at hand, for wet 

does not injure it, and it has, of course, far more flavour 

when freshly ground. But when there was no fuel in 

camp, the men took the green coffee with them to 

the trenches, ground it with fragments of the enemy's 

shells, roasted it on their mess tins, and boiled it in 

them, with fuel taken from the gabions and fascines 

forming part of the works, and the parapets, of course, 

suffered seriously from these depredations. The troops, 

driven to these shifts, had become so few that the French 

could only afford about 400 by day and 200 by night for 

employment on the works, and the English a much 

smaller number, while, according to the Engineer Journal, 

the trenches of our three attacks, the Right, the Left, and 

that on Mount Inkerman, were at this time guarded only 

by 350 men, and on one day in January by only 290 

men, being about one-twentieth of the number of the 

part of the garrison opposed to them, and which might 

have attacked them. 



194 Fortress increasing in Strength. 

On the other hand, the Russians having after Inker- 
man abandoned the idea of using the field army for 
attacking the Allied position, had begun to withdraw 
troops from it to strengthen the garrison, and readjusted 
the supply between them. They poured reinforcements 
into the place, till they had not only made good the 
losses of the first weeks of winter, but enabled its com- 
mander to employ on the works a force varying, accord- 
ing to need, from 6000 to 10,000 men. The guns, lying 
in the arsenal in thousands, and the ammunition were 
easily brought to the batteries along the paved streets. 
Thus the fortress was immensely augmenting its power 
of resistance just when we found the greatest difficulty 
in holding our ground. Therefore, readers who have 
been accustomed to hear the chiefs in Sebastopol and 
their troops lauded as maintaining a struggle against 
unheard-of difficulties, and as exhibiting extraordinary 
energy and powers of resistance, may ask themselves 
how it was that an enemy who possessed such enor- 
mously superior forces in men and material, and who 
could at any time, during a period of months, have 
directed on some selected point of the siege works 
thousands of troops, that would have found only hun- 
dreds to meet them, did not muster the courage for 
such an enterprise when it promised deliverance to the 
fortress, and ruin to their foes. Yet they might perhaps 
have given the reason which Canrobert had already 
pleaded for restraining enterprise, that they were un- 
willing to set the great stake on a single cast, and 
preferred to let delay and all its evils fight for them. 



New System of Rifle-pits. 195 

With this important exception, however, the 'Russians 
showed great energy, even beyond the limits of a mere 
passive defence, and every kind of work demanding skill 
and labour they did well. Thus, Todleben developed 
a new feature in trench warfare, which the range and 
accuracy of the rifle had rendered possible. At night, 
parties issuing from the place dug, on selected parts of 
the ground between the opposing lines, rows of pits 
each fitted to hold a man, and having in front a few 
sandbags, or sometimes a screen of stones, so disposed 
as to protect his head, and to leave a small opening 
through which to fire. At daybreak they began to 
harass the guards of the trenches opposite, within easy 
range of them. The French especially suffered by being 
thus overlooked, and their proximity caused the enemy 
to adopt this form of warfare chiefly in opposing them. 
To direct guns on objects so small as these pits, and 
frequently at a great distance from the batteries, seemed 
but a doubtful policy, and they were therefore opposed 
by men, similarly covered by sandbags, from the parapets. 
After a time, Todleben, finding his idea so successful, 
expanded it ; the rows of rifle pits were connected, 
by trenches, in parts of which shelter was given to con- 
tinuous ranks of riflemen, and the defence being thus 
pushed out in advance of the general line, wore the 
aspect of besieging the beseigers. He had begun these 
enterprises in November, greatly aggravating the cares 
of the scanty defenders of the trenches. Beyond the 
advanced trench of our Left Attack some of these pits 
had been placed, screened by small stone walls, causing 



196 Underground Warfare. 

great annoyance both to our people opposite and to the 
French across the ravine, whose advanced works they 
partly looked into. It was on the night of the 20th 
November that a party of the rifles was ordered to clear 
these pits, which were supported by another row in rear. 
The occupants were driven out after a sharp struggle, 
with losses on both sides, and a working party made 
the spot tenable by our people — a service so highly 
appreciated by our Allies that Canrobert passed a warm 
encomium on it in general orders. 

In November there also began, in the French attack 
from Mount Rodolph, a war of mines and countermines. 
A gallery was being driven towards the Flagstaff Bastion, 
when it was detected and blown in by the enemy. A 
mine was, however, placed in the gallery, far short of the 
position at first destined for it, in order to break up the 
ground before the bastion, and thus enable the French 
to effect a lodgment there. But this plan did not turn 
out happily ; the watchful engineer opposed to them 
proved himself a master also of this subterranean war- 
fare, and when the mine was exploded, it was the 
Russians who succeeded in establishing themselves on 
the crater. 

It was on the 22d of February that the Rus- 
sians undertook an enterprise which marked an epoch 
in the siege, and which was caused by another, the 
intention of which had become apparent on the part 
of the Allies. In front of the Malakoff, at about 
500 yards from it, and on the same strip of the 
plain, was a conical hill, of rather greater height, 



New Riissiaii Works, 197 

and of such importance to either side which should 
seize it that it would doubtless have been a main 
object with us from the first but for our deficiency in 
numbers. This was the hill which afterwards became 
famous as the Mamelon. To place it, as well as the 
Malakoff and the intervening ground, under such a 
cross fire as might assure its capture, two batteries 
were prepared, one by the French, on a near spur 
of Mount Inkerman, and one in the English Right 
Attack. But their wary antagonist had not failed to 
note and appreciate the design, and was now ready 
with his counterstroke. On the morning of the day 
named, the French, who the day before had seen the 
Russian works end with the mouth of the Careenage 
ravine, now beheld new works begun on, and in exten- 
sion of, a hill in front of them, being part of Mount 
Inkerman itself, which the enemy had seized in the 
course of the night, thus extending the front of the 
fortress to new ground, and flanking the approaches 
to the Malakoff and Mamelon ; while the new work 
was itself protected by so powerful a fire that the 
French might well hesitate to attack it. All the 
23d the enemy were again at work on it That 
night, however, five French battalions, under General 
Monet, issued from the trenches, and while two remained 
halted in support, three advanced to the assault. This 
step had been anticipated and provided for by the 
Russians. Besides three battalions assigned to work 
on and to defend the hill, four others, being an entire 

regiment, were disposed for its defence, and now met 

N 



198 Failure of the French At lack. 

the attack. They were supported by guns both from 
the fortress and the ships, which were brought to bear 
on the ground between the hill and the French trenches 
The combat lasted an hour ; the French succeeded at 
one time in entering the work, but were driven out by 
the strong supports, and forced to retreat, bearing with 
them General Monet, desperately wounded, and sustain- 
ing a loss of 270 men, with nineteen officers, while the 
Russians lost 400. Todleben credits the French troops 
on this occasion with " a remarkable valour." This defeat 
was so far acknowledged and accepted by the French 
that the enemy was thenceforth left almost undisturbed 
to complete and arm his new work, and a few nights later 
he began another on a hill to his own left of it. These 
were in future known to the Allies as the White Works 
from the chalky soil they stood in. Thus, having com- 
pletely abandoned Mount Inkerman after the battle, the 
enemy had now returned to it in a fashion which showed 
that he intended his occupation of it to be permanent. 
By this rare display of sagacity and daring, Todleben 
immensely increased the difficulty of the problem before 
the Allies. At a conference of chiefs, on 6th March, 
Burgoyne urged the French to attack these works 
as the indispensable preliminary to progress on this 
part of the field ; but the proposal was put aside 
on the ground that, if captured, they could not be 
held under the guns which the enemy could bring to 
bear. 

The two batteries, French and English, looking 
towards the Mamelon were pushed steadily towards 



Great Sortie agai?ist the French 199 

completion, and on the 10th March the commanding 
French engineer, Bizot, advised Canrobert to seize the 
hill that night. Canrobert declined the enterprise, but 
Todleben settled the question. On this same night 
the Russians seized it, and morning saw the outline 
of a work crowning it. The question of attacking it 
was now more urgent than before. But Canrobert 
still found reasons against so decided a course, and pre- 
ferred to besiege it. Consequently, the French opened 
a parallel against it on the Victoria Ridge, and the 
new batteries were also directed on it. On the other 
hand, the enemy held his ground, and not only com- 
pleted and armed his new work, but spread rifle pits, 
connected with trenches, along its front and flanks. 

Thus a very formidable element entered into the 
problem of the siege. It has been already pointed out 
how embarrassing to the Allies were the outposts the 
enemy had placed, in October, in advance of their works. 
Here was a tremendous aggravation of the infliction, 
for not only did the Mamelon cover what had hitherto 
been the objects of attack in that quarter, but it looked 
into trenches of our Right Attack hitherto secure from 
fire, and forbade, under heavy penalties, its further ap- 
proach towards the Redan. 

The French had pushed their approaches so close to 
the small works covering the Mamelon that they might 
be expected presently to seize them, when, in the night 
of the 22d March, the enemy cast large bodies of troops 
on the opposing lines. Between 5000 and 6000 men 
attacked the French trenches before the Mamelon, and at 



200 And English Trc n ches. 

first penetrated into them, driving in the guards and 
working parties. But their success ended there ; the 
French showed so firm a front that the attack collapsed, 
and the enemy fell back and re-entered the fortress, after 
inflicting on their opponents a loss of 600 men. 

Simultaneously with the entry of the French works, 
800 Russians moved out for an advance upon our Right 
Attack, but were easily repulsed for the time. This 
attack had been made on the part of the trenches next 
the Docks ravine. An hour later another assault (which 
apparently ought to have been in concert with the first) 
was made on the left portion of the same trenches by 
Greek and other volunteers. Led by an Albanian, in the 
dress of his country, they broke into the parallel, where 
the leader, first shooting one of our officers, discharged a 
pistol ineffectually at the magazine, and was then killed 
himself. The assailants moved along the trench from left 
to right till the guards and working parties, having been 
got together, met and drove them back upon the Redan. 

At the same time with this last, another assault had 
been directed, with 500 men, on the advanced trench of 
our Left Attack, close to where the ridge was cut short 
by the ravine, and penetrated to the third parallel, where 
they were attacked by the nearest bodies of those 
guarding the trenches, and driven back like the rest. 
In these fights the officer commanding the guards of 
the Right Attack was wounded and captured, as was the 
engineer of the Left Attack, with about fifteen men, and 
a quantity of intrenching tools, dropped by the working 
parties when they took up their arms. In all, we lost 



The B ti rial Truce. 201 

seventy men. The enemy left about forty dead in front 
of our Right Attack, ten killed and two wounded in the 
trenches of the Left ; and his losses, in all, that night 
were 1300 men. 

If the Russians aimed, in this sortie, at establishing 
themselves in the French lines, it was so far a failure. 
But the object of such an enterprise is mostly to inflict 
hasty damage and discouragement on the enemy, and 
to gain a temporary facility for executing some of the 
defensive operations ; and on this ground the Russians 
might claim a certain success, for in the following night 
they connected the pits in front of the Mamelon by a 
trench, which their engineer extended to the verge of 
the ravine. Thus he had succeeded in forming and 
occupying, within eighty yards of the French, an 
intrenched line, supported by, while it covered, the 
Mamelon. 

A truce was agreed on for burying the slain, to begin 
half-an-hour after noon on the 24th. White flags were 
then raised over the Mamelon and the French and 
English works, and many spectators streamed down the 
hillsides to the scene of contest. The French burial 
parties advanced from their trenches, and hundreds of 
Russians, some of them bearing stretchers, came out 
from behind the Mamelon. The soldiers of both armies 
intermingled on friendly terms. The Russians looked 
dirty and shabby, but healthy and well fed. Between 
these groups moved the burial parties, collecting the 
bodies and conveying them within the lines on both 
sides. At 450 yards from the scene rose the Mamelon, 



202 Charles Gordons Experiences. 

its parapet lined with spectators. Five hundred yards 
beyond it, separated by a level space, stood the Mala- 
koff, its ruined tower surrounded by earthen batteries ; 
and through the space between it and the Redan ap- 
peared the best built portion of the city, jutting out 
into the harbour, and near enough for the streets, with 
people walking in them, the marks of ruin from shot, 
the arrangement of the gardens, and the line of sunken 
ships, to be plainly visible. About forty bodies were 
removed from the front of the English Right Attack, 
among them that of the Albanian leader, partially 
stripped, and covered again with his white kilt and 
other drapery. In two hours the business was over, 
the soldiers on both sides had withdrawn within their 
lines, the flags were lowered, and the fire went on as 
before. 

This was the only considerable attempt as yet made 
on the trenches, but small losses from fire occurred in 
them almost daily and nightly. At one time the men 
killed had been taken at night to the front of the works, 
and there buried, and a strange experience fell in conse- 
quence on a young engineer, destined to a place in the 
esteem of his country far beyond that of any other 
soldier of these latter generations, Charles Gordon. In 
carrying a new approach to the front, these graves lay 
directly across it, and he described how the working 
party had to cut their way straight through graves and 
occupants, and how great was the difficulty he found in 
keeping the men to their horrible task, which, however, 
w r as duly completed. He had a brother, Enderby 



Russians recross the Tchernaya. 203 

Gordon, on the staff of the artillery, to whom he used 
to relate his experiences ; among others, of strolls he 
was in the habit of taking at night far beyond our 
trenches, one of which led him up close to the outside 
of the Russian works, so that he could hear the voices 
of the men on the parapet. A singularly ghastly in- 
cident of these burials took place about this time. One 
night two men had carried the body of a comrade, just 
slain, on to the open ground for interment, and had 
finished digging the grave, and placing the body in it, 
when, as they were about to fill it in, a shot from the 
enemy, who had perhaps heard them at work, killed 
one of them. The survivor laid his comrade's body 
beside the other, buried both, and returned to the 
trench. 

In the period to which this chapter relates several 
events of military importance had occurred, to have 
chronicled which, at their respective dates, would have 
broken the narrative of the siege. On the 6th December 
the troops which Liprandi had established in the valley 
of Balaklava were withdrawn across the Tchernaya, 
leaving only detachments of the three arms in the 
villages of Kamara and Tchorgoun, and a field work 
with guns to guard the bridge at Traktir. On the 
30th December a considerable French force advanced 
up the valley, while the 42d Highlanders moved by the 
hills above, swept the residue of the enemy over the 
stream, and shelled the guns out of the bridge head, and 
the troops out of Tchorgoun. After destroying the 
Russian huts and forage, and capturing their cattle and 



204 Arrival of P 4 Ussier and NieL 

sheep, the troops returned to their camps. Access was 
thus once more gained to the Woronzoff road, and 
in time a good road was made connecting it with 
Balaklava. 

In January two French officers arrived in the 
Crimea, both destined, though in entirely opposite ways, 
to exercise an important influence on the course of the 
war. The Emperor Napoleon, regarding the appoint- 
ments already made to the command of Corps and Divi- 
sions by Canrobert, under the pressure of circumstances, 
as provisional merely, had summoned General Pelissier 
from his Government of Oran, and placed him in charge 
of the ist Corps, that besieging the lines before the town ; 
and it will be seen how powerful was the impelling 
element introduced with the presence of this masterful 
spirit into the attack on the fortress. And, on the 27th 
of January, General Niel, the engineer who had just con- 
ducted operations against Bomarsund, and who was re- 
garded as the military counsellor of the Emperor, arrived 
in the Crimea on a special mission. The nature of this, 
kept secret at the time, will appear in the next chapter ; 
but he at once expressed his ideas of the military situa- 
tion. Regarding it, from the engineer's point of view, 
as a siege, and what should consequently follow the 
rules of a siege, one of which was that a necessary 
step towards the capture of a fortress is its investment, 
so he believed that all the efforts of the Allies must 
be vain until they should have intercepted all commu- 
nication between Sebastopol and MenschikofFs army. 
"Believe, Monsieur le Marechal," he wrote to the 



The Russians attack Eupatoria. 205 

Minister for War, " that nothing can be done without 
investing," and with this opinion his language at the 
conference was in unison. And, no doubt, to have 
severed all communication with the city must have 
been effectual in the end, if practicable ; but the event 
showed that the measure was not indispensable. That 
the Russians feared such a step was shown about this 
time. Omar Pasha had been for some time assembling, 
at Eupatoria, bodies of his Turks from the Danube. The 
town had been surrounded with works of earth and 
loose stones by the French officer at first left in charge 
of the place. These, thrown forward to a salient in the 
centre, bent round on both flanks to the sea. About 
23,000 Turks and thirty-four heavy guns were within 
these works, when the Russians, alarmed for their com- 
munications with Perekop, delivered an attack upon 
the place with a large force drawn from Menschikoffs 
army, and said by Todleben to number 19,000 infantry, 
with a strong cavalry and numerous artillery. Both 
flanks of the works of the place were defended by a 
French steamer, a Turkish, and four English steamers 
lying in the bay. 

On the 1 6th February the Russians appeared before 
the place. They spent the night in throwing up cover 
for their batteries, and by morning had seventy-six guns, 
twenty-four of them of heavy calibre, ready to open at 
from 600 to 800 yards from the works. At daybreak 
the cannonade began, and when the fire of the place 
seemed to be overcome, three columns of attack, sup- 
ported by field batteries, advanced on the centre and 



206 The Attack repulsed. 

flanks of the defensive line. Two of these were stopped 
by the fire of the steamers and of the place ; the third, 
on the right front of the Turkish line, finding cover in 
the walls of the cemeteries there, assembled under their 
shelter, and advanced more than once almost to the 
ditch, but were easily repulsed ; and with the last at- 
tempt in this quarter the enterprise came to an end, 
and the Russians drew off at once towards the interior. 
They lost 769 killed and wounded ; the garrison, 387. 

Even had they carried the works, it is difficult to per- 
ceive how they could have proposed to maintain them- 
selves in the place, under the fire of the ships. It was 
probably his experience of what this fire could effect, 
and against which no return could be made, that so con- 
vinced the Russian commander of the hopelessness of 
the enterprise, as to render the assault weak and 
futile in comparison with his forces. No further 
attempt was made on Eupatoria during the war. 
This failure, following on the others, was visited on 
Menschikofif by withdrawing him from the command 
of the Forces in the Crimea, in which he was succeeded 
by Gortschakoff. 

In February the Russians, finding that the line of 
sunken vessels across the harbour had been much 
broken up by the waves, sank six more, in a line inside 
the other ; and on the 6th March an English battery on 
Mount Inkerman brought some guns, with hot shot, to 
bear on two warships in Careening Creek which had 
greatly annoyed the French, and drove them, one much 
damaged, round a sheltering point. 



Burgoyne goes Home. 207 

An important figure also disappeared from the 
councils of the Allies. In February the new Govern- 
ment, in order to appease a vague desire (part of the 
general discontent and impatience agitating the country) 
for any change which might quicken the siege opera- 
tions, had decided on the recall of Sir John Burgoyne, 
and General Harry Jones had in that month arrived in 
the Crimea as his successor. But Lord Raglan desired 
to keep his old counsellor by his side at a time when so 
many important engineering questions were pending ; 
he continued to be present at the conferences, and to 
issue plans and suggestions, till the third week in March, 
when he departed for England. 

The defence of the place lost a redoubted champion, 
on the 19th March, when Admiral Istomine was killed 
in the Mamelon. He was buried by the side of Korniloff, 
in a tomb made by Admiral Nakimoff with the inten- 
tion of lying there himself, but he now ceded the place 
to his illustrious comrade. 

With the advance of spring the situation of the 
Allies (though the siege seemed as far as ever from its 
end) had become greatly more favourable. Not only 
had the climate grown mild, not only were the plains, 
clad in renewed verdure, once more easy to traverse, but 
the time of privations was long past, and almost seemed 
a bad dream ; the men were well fed, well clothed, and 
well housed ; the horses had been restored to condition 
and duly recruited in numbers ; a city of huts, like those 
to be seen at Aldershot, spread over the Upland ; the 
railway brought vast stores from Balaklava to the plateau. 



208 Improved Condition of the Allies. 

from whence they were forwarded to the depots of the 
camps by a growing land transport Colonel MacMurdo, 
armed with independent purchasing powers, had come 
out to superintend the formation of that transport corps, 
manned both by old soldiers and recruits specially 
raised, and had so used his opportunities that horses, 
trained drivers, escorts, and vehicles, were being rapidly 
assembled and organised. All this demanded a great 
outlay, insomuch that on one of the Colonel's many 
large requisitions the Secretary to the Treasury, Sir 
Charles Trevelyan, had written : " Colonel MacMurdo 
must limit his expenditure." When the paper returned 
to the Colonel with these words, he wrote below them : 
"When Sir Charles Trevelyan limits the war, I will 
limit my expenditure." Equal improvement marked the 
condition of the French, and vast stores of guns had 
been brought up and mounted in the batteries early 
in April, with, for the English ordnance, a supply of 
500 rounds for each gun, and 300 for each mortar. We 
had thus accumulated the means of a sustained and 
tremendous cannonade, in which 378 French guns would 
take part, and 123 English, proportionate to the extent 
of trenches and batteries occupied by each; but the 
English guns were for the most part so much more 
powerful that the difference in weight of metal was not 
great. On these, 466 Russian guns (out of nearly 1000 
on the works) could be brought to bear. And it was 
certainly expected, as before, on both sides that, as soon 
as the cannonade should have produced its effect, the 
Allies would be prepared to assault. So all three armies 



Effect of Soil on Trenckwork. 209 

believed ; so Lord Raglan believed. But, as has been 
said, General Niel, the counsellor of the Emperor, had 
no faith in any measures which did not include an in- 
vestment. It had been evident that some influence had 
been at work which had held back the French troops 
from assaulting many parts of the defences which seemed 
to offer fair chances of capture ; and circumstances, after- 
wards found to have existed, seem to show that the 
French commander did not at this time intend to push 
matters beyond a cannonade. 

On Easter Sunday, the 8th April, orders were given 
for opening fire next morning. The mortars, absent on 
the former occasion, were now a prominent feature in 
the attacking batteries, placed behind lofty and solid 
parapets, and hurling their great missiles high into the 
air, to drop thence into an enemy's work, and there 
explode. The various character of the soil of the plains 
must now once more be noted, as it very seriously 
affected the siege operations carried on in it. On the 
slopes of Mount Inkerman, and in our Right and Left 
attacks, especially the right, the soil was thin, the rock 
lay immediately below, and the workmen painfully 
scooped an often insufficient cover, frequently by dint of 
blasting; and the want of earth for parapets was in many 
cases supplied by sandbags filled elsewhere. But on 
Mount Rodolph, and to its left, the soil was favourable, 
easily trenched, and supplying earth in quantity sufficient 
to rear the parapets high, and thicken them to solidity ; 
and thus the French had been able on that side to sap 
up and push their trenches to within 160 yards of the 



2 to Another Cannonade. 

Flagstaff Bastion, while our fire was still mainly de- 
livered (though some mortar batteries had been formed 
in advance), as in October, from the batteries first con- 
structed, Gordon's and Chapman's. 

When the sun should have appeared next morning, 
a dense mist covered the plains. It lifted a little, and 
at half-past six our guns, as they caught sight of the 
opposing batteries, opened fire, and the French soon 
followed. The Russians were so completely unpre- 
pared that it was twenty minutes before they began 
to reply. A strong wind swept volumes of the smoke 
from the Allied trenches over the Russian works, 
and must have added greatly to the difficulties of the 
men who worked the guns there. They were slack in 
replying; the guns in the redoubted Mamelon fired 
slowly, so did those of the Malakoff, as if insufficiently 
manned, though really owing to dearth of powder ; and 
a face of the Redan was silenced. On the other hand, 
the French breached the salient of the Central Bastion, 
and inflicted immense damage and loss of men on the 
Flagstaff Bastion. When the sun went down, the fire of 
the Allied guns ceased. Not so those of their mortars, 
which did not depend on keeping sight of their object, 
and all night the great shells climbed the sky, and de- 
scended on their prey. Nevertheless, the works were 
again in a condition of defence next morning. On this 
second day the White Works were reduced to silence and 
ruin. On the nth the English and French batteries 
directed on the Mamelon extinguished its fire, and the 
Malakoff scarcely fired at all, while the Flagstaff Bastion 



Severity of Fire upon the Fortress. 2 1 1 

had been again and again reduced to the direst extremity. 
Therefore, in momentary expectation of an assault, the 
Russian troops were kept at hand in, or close to, the 
lines of defence, and as a consequence suffered heavily. 
They were subjected to terrible trials, from which the 
Allies were exempt, for the hurricane of iron which, 
besides ruining works, dismounting guns, and explod- 
ing magazines, swept without intermission through the 
whole interior space of the fortress, where it had 
already razed the barracks and public buildings of the 
suburb to the ground, and choked the streets of the 
city with destroyed masonry, could not but tell heavily 
on uncovered troops. 

A remarkable incident occurred at this time. In the 
trenches on the furthest point of our Left Attack, on the 
verge of the ravine, two batteries had been constructed, 
but not armed. On the night of the nth guns were 
conveyed to one of them, across the open ground, and 
these on the following day were placed on their plat- 
forms. These batteries were on much lower ground 
than the Redan and the Barrack Battery on the one 
side, and the Garden Batteries and Flagstaff Bastion on 
the other. Nevertheless, this battery of four guns opened 
fire on the 13th on its formidable opponents. From 
their commanding heights, they very soon concentrated 
on it the overwhelming fire of about twenty heavy guns. 
The contest was hopeless, but it was maintained. For 
five hours the English guns, gradually reduced to one 
that remained in a condition to fire, replied, not with- 
out effect. Then, this last gun disabled, nearly all 



2 1 2 Tivo well-fought Batteries. 

the gunners struck down, the parapets swept away, 
the remnant of men were at length withdrawn. Out 
of forty-seven men, forty-four had been killed or 
wounded. 

In the night the damage was repaired, and the four 
guns were put once more in fighting condition. And the 
battery no longer fought singly in the front line ; its 
neighbour was armed with six guns. On the 14th they 
opened and brought on themselves a terrible stress of 
fire. All day (with one relief), and even into the night, 
they maintained the fight, when, with many guns dis- 
abled, many men killed and wounded, and the para- 
pets once more knocked into shapeless heaps, they were 
withdrawn from the works, which were not again manned. 
This episode, while it did little (that little, perhaps, in 
the way of attracting shot from the enemy which would 
otherwise have been directed on other points) towards a 
general result, enabled Todleben to score a substantial 
and indisputable success in the midst of his calamities 
elsewhere. Yet these English gunners had not fought 
quite in vain ; they are still remembered as having set 
a rare example of valorous devotion. 

Ten days did the terrific storm of iron hail endure; 
ten days did the Russian reliefs, holding themselves 
ready to repel attack, meet wounds and death with 
a constancy which was of necessity altogether passive. 
On the 19th they saw the fire of the Allies decline, and 
settle into its more ordinary rate ; they saw, too, that the 
sappers were again at work with their approaches, and 
reading in this the signs of a resumption of the siege, 



Carnage in Sebastopol. 213 

and the abandonment of the policy of assault, they 
once more withdrew their sorely harassed infantry to 
places of shelter and repose. Then they began to 
reckon their losses, which amounted for the ten days, 
in killed and wounded, to more than 6000 men. The 
French lost, in killed and disabled, 1585 men; the 
English, 265. 

During these days and nights the great ballroom 
of the assembly rooms in Sebastopol was crowded with 
the wounded incessantly arriving on stretchers. The 
floor was half-an-inch deep in coagulated blood. In an 
adjoining room, set apart for operations, the blood ran 
from three tables where the wounded were laid, and the 
severed limbs lay heaped in tubs. Outside, fresh arrivals 
thronged the square, on their blood-steeped stretchers, 
their cries and lamentations mingling with the roar of 
shells bursting close by. Many more were borne to the 
cellars of the sea-forts ; and those capable of removal to 
the north side were conveyed thither to permanent 
hospitals. In a church near the harbour the mournful 
chaunt of the office for the dead resounded continually 
through the open doors of the building. It was there 
that the funeral service was celebrated of officers dead 
on the field of honour. Such is the picture drawn by 
eye-witnesses of what was seen of the results of the con- 
flict in the more remote parts of the city. Nor was the 
change to the country outside the fortress much for the 
better. A Russian, passing from thence to St Peters- 
burgh, there testified that the route from Sebastopol 
to Simpheropol was so encumbered with dead bodies, 

O 



214 Impatience for an Assault. 

dead horses, and dead cattle, that the whole line 
was infected with pestilential vapours, and, being 
impassable for vehicles, could only be traversed on 
horseback. 

All these days great impatience had prevailed in the 
English camp. It was asked why the cannonade had 
been begun if not to be followed to its legitimate con- 
clusion. The key to the mystery is to be found in 
the following chapter. 



CHAPTER X. 

IMPORTANT EVENTS ELSEWHERE. 

Death of the Czar— The Vienna Conference — Louis Napoleon's Plan — He 
intends to go to the Crimea — Lord Clarendon sent to dissuade Him 
— The Emperor visits the Queen — Terms proposed at Vienna — 
Austria frames a Proposal — The Emperor abandons His Intention — 
English Advocates of Russian Interests — First Embarkation for 
Kertch — The Expedition recalled — Conference of Commanders — 
Canrobert resigns the command. 

The bearing of the Czar Nicholas, so haughty and 
arrogant at the outset of the war, had undergone a 
notable alteration. Following on the defeats on the 
Danube, that of the Alma wrung from him, in his com- 
munications with Menschikoff, utterances almost of 
despair, mingled, however, with expressions of deter- 
mination to oppose his evil fortune to the bitter end. 
Then came the terrible slaughter of Inkerman, almost 
pressing hope out of him. But some new comfort 
dawned with the news of the sufferings of the Allies in 
the beginning of winter, and it was then he uttered a 
saying, famous at the time, that there were two generals 
who were about to fight for him, " Janvier et Fevrier." 
But, as we have seen, in this last month came the defeat 
at Eupatoria. It is generally believed that this blow, 
aggravated to his proud spirit because inflicted by the 



216 Death of the Czar. 

despised Turks, was fatal. A very few days after re- 
ceiving the news, while he was still engaged in issuing 
orders to his generals, and reviewing his troops, his 
splendidly powerful frame suddenly collapsed. On his 
return from the parade ground on the 27th of February, 
a difficulty of breathing was manifest, paralysis of the 
lungs ensued, and on the 2d March he died. Survivors 
of that time may remember a terrible cartoon in Punch 
of the Czar dead upon his camp bed, while a skeleton, in 
Russian garb and helmet, pressed its hand on his breast, 
Avith the inscription, " General Fevrier turned traitor." 
The French sent the news to the general commanding 
in Sebastopol by a flag of truce ; but he kept it secret, 
until it should be confirmed from St Petersburgh. It 
came, accompanied by a message from the new Czar, 
to tell the defenders that, " passed away into life eternal, 
the supreme chief of the orthodox warriors blessed from 
on high their unequalled constancy and valour." 

It was soon seen that Alexander II. was under the 
influence of the war party, for a manifesto issued on the 
day of his accession was not merely warlike, but menac- 
ing, and though his prudent minister, Nesselrode, sought 
in a circular to diminish its effect, the friends of peace 
found nothing in the change of sovereigns to encourage 
them. 

In the meantime the conference of the Powers, 
broken off months before by Russia's rejection of the 
four points which formed its basis, was revived. Prince 
Gortschakoff, cousin of the general, had been sent as 
Minister to Vienna, and had managed so to represent 




z 



■_J4u- Qz/L/tseSu?^ ^A'^cJh<rtou) 7 „ 



The Vienna Conference. 217 

the refusal as to afford ground for again assembling the 
delegates. Since the withdrawal of Russia from the 
Danube, Austria had no longer an interest in joining in 
the war ; nevertheless, she had in December come to a 
fresh agreement with France and England for putting 
pressure on the Czar. But, up to the end of his life, 
Nicholas had declared that he would consent to no 
limitation of his naval power in the Black Sea. When, 
therefore, Nesselrode announced, on the 10th March, that 
the new Czar would join in the Vienna Conference " in 
a sincere spirit of concord," this assurance, receiving no 
confirmation from what else was known of Alexander's 
views, did not inspire much hope of success for negotia- 
tions in which the Allies were determined to insist on 
that condition. But they were quite willing to give the 
cause of peace another chance, and the conference began 
on the 15th March, Lord John Russell being the repre- 
sentative of England. 

Meanwhile, other influences had been at work which 
seriously affected the conduct of the war. It has been 
said that General Niel was regarded as the military 
counsellor of Louis Napoleon, and also that he consi- 
dered the interception of communications between 
Sebastopol and the interior as indispensable to the 
capture of the place. This view was so natural to an 
engineer, that he must be considered to have arrived 
at it of himself; and when we find the Emperor also 
holding that opinion, it is more likely that he derived 
it from Niel, than that Niel derived it from him. How- 
ever that may be, it had fixed itself in Napoleon's mind, 



2i 8 Louis Napoleon s Plan* 

which was much given to patient and persistent brood- 
ing and cogitation over ideas ; and when, under this 
process, they had so far taken shape as to inspire in 
him a paternal interest, he also acquired in them a pro- 
found belief. Turning over in this way the idea of 
investing Sebastopol, he had probably at first sent Niel 
to the Crimea to test it on the spot, with instructions, 
in case he should adhere to it, to take steps to prevent 
such operations of the siege as would involve serious 
risk and loss, which would, of course, from their point 
of view, be incurred in vain, and would needlessly 
diminish the forces to be employed in the field. As 
has been seen, some restraining influence had become 
apparent in the course of the following operations. 
But the Emperor's meditations on the subject did not 
stop here. Possessed with the necessity of driving the 
Russian field army off the lines of communication 
between Russia and Sebastopol, and bestriding them 
with what would then become an army of investment, 
he combined with it this other idea, that if, when these 
operations should be approaching completion, he could 
place himself in person at the head of the Allied 
Forces in the field, and deal the finishing stroke, such 
a military achievement would tend greatly to assure 
his hold on France. After this, passing out of the 
regions of theory, he began secretly, as if for another 
purpose, to assemble a large army of reserve at Con- 
stantinople, and also to construct the plan of the 
intended campaign, although he had no acquaintance 
of any kind with war. 



He intends to go to the Crimea. 2 1 9 

The plan was this : the Allies were to form three 
armies. One was to continue to guard the trenches and 
push the siege. Another, under Lord Raglan, was to 
assemble in the valley of Baidar (east of Balaklava), and 
to push its advanced posts towards Bakshisarai. The 
third, under Louis Napoleon himself, or a general ap- 
pointed by him, composed of troops taken from before 
Sebastopol, and the reserves from Constantinople, was 
to be landed at Aloushta, on the south-eastern face of 
the peninsula, nearly in point of latitude abreast of 
Bakshisarai. This last army was to march, over a 
pass of the Tchatir-dagh Mountain, upon Simpheropol. 
Should the Russians concentrate on that point for the 
defence of their central depot of supply, Lord Raglan, 
moving on Bakshisarai, was to combine his action with 
that of the other army by threatening the Russian right 
or rear. But should the enemy, abandoning Simphero- 
pol, concentrate in the neighbourhood of Sebastopol, the 
French Army from Simpheropol would advance upon it 
by Bakshisarai, while Lord Raglan, in concert, would 
attack the heights of Mackenzie's Farm. The Russian 
army, if defeated, w r ould be driven off the line of com- 
munication, the Allies would sever it, and Sebastopol, 
deprived of supplies and of reinforcements, must speedily 
surrender* 

The Emperor's determination to proceed himself to 
the Crimea, and undertake the conduct of a plan of 
this kind, was announced, in a letter he wrote to Lord 
Palmerston, on the 26th February. The reason he put 
forward for desiring to go himself was the necessity 



220 Lord Clarendon sent to dissuade Him. 

of placing over all the Allied Forces a chief whose in- 
fluence would secure unity of command. " You will 
tell me, perhaps/' the letter said, " that I might entrust 
some general with this mission. Now, not only would 
such a general not have the same moral influence, but 
time would be wasted, as it always has been, in memo- 
randums between Canrobert and Lord Raglan, between 
Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha." If England would 
find ships for the necessary transport animals, he would 
find the additional men required for the enterprise. 

This proposal not only startled our Government, but 
filled it with dismay. But it was felt to be a difficult 
matter to argue against a scheme which had taken 
such strong possession of his mind. It happened that 
he was about to visit the camp at Boulogne ; and the 
opportunity was taken to send Lord Clarendon thither 
to discuss the matter with the Emperor in person. It 
was a momentous crisis in the alliance ; for in the 
absence of the chief of the State, the gravest attempts 
to subvert his authority were to be feared in Paris, 
where, moreover, the spirit which supported the war, 
always feeble, might die out without him ; while, on 
the other hand, a failure, or even a check, in his opera- 
tions in the field might be fatal to power resting on 
such foundations as supported his. Moreover, it was 
strongly impressed on Lord Clarendon that the 
Emperor was (as the Prince Consort's diary records) 
" entirely mistaken in the belief that his going to Sebas- 
topol would be popular with the Army generally, or 
that he would even be well received by the troops in the 



The Emperor visits the Queen, 221 

Crimea. They adhered to him as Emperor, but did not 
like to be commanded by anyone but a professional 
man, and they looked upon him as a civilian." 

Louis Napoleon received Lord Clarendon very cor- 
dially, and explained his plan of operations, to which, 
as a problem of strategy, the trained diplomatist made 
no brusque opposition, but at once assured him that 
everyone to whom it had been made known was im- 
pressed with its sagacity. Where it was open to question, 
he said, was in the means for executing it. These were 
then discussed at large ; delays were inevitable ; if the 
Emperor were to go at once, he might be detained 
there much longer than he expected ; and it was sug- 
gested, as a fresh difficulty, that the English and Turks 
would view his assumption of the supreme command as 
promising to confer on the French the chief share of 
credit in the new campaign. Lord Clarendon was so 
far successful as to induce him at least to postpone his 
departure. 

A fortnight later came a proposal from the Emperor 
that he and the Empress should pay a visit to the Queen. 
The notice was short, because he still intended to go to 
the Crimea at the end of April Fresh opportunities of 
inspiring him with doubts of the expediency of that step 
were foreseen in this visit, and on other grounds also 
it was cordially welcomed. On the 16th April the Im- 
perial guests entered London, on their way to Windsor. 
All classes in the capital greeted them with extra- 
ordinary enthusiasm. There was a background in the 
recent past well fitted to bring his present position into 



222 Terms proposed at Vienna. 

striking relief. He had lived here a powerless exile, 
unregarded except by the great world, where he was, 
indeed, well liked, but nevertheless looked on as a 
dreamy adventurer. His wildest dreams were now 
realised, and when the master of France, the ally of 
England, the most powerful antagonist of Russia, after 
passing through cheering crowds in Pall Mall, entered 
King Street, he there emphasised the contrast between 
now and then, by pointing out to the Empress the 
modest lodging (now bearing on its front the record of 
the fact) where he had lived in the days of his exile. 
At Windsor a reception no less gratifying, in a quieter 
and deeper form of welcome, awaited them, and their 
whole visit was an unbroken triumph. 

Meanwhile the conference was holding its sittings at 
Vienna. Its proceedings were not of a kind to confer 
credit on any of those who took part in it. On the side 
of the Allies, the terms offered were absurdly easy in com- 
parison with the vast efforts they were making, and if 
accepted, would have left neither to France nor England 
anything to be proud of. On the other hand, the part 
played by Russia was hardly consistent with common 
sense, or even with sanity. Russia always has a breed 
of negotiators who, without making themselves con- 
spicuous for exalted views, are quick to perceive ad- 
vantages, and the use to which they can be turned, and 
who are nothing short of audacious in their mode of 
conducting the contests of diplomacy. Too much alive 
to the triumphs of mere cleverness, they often seem to 
make some empty victory at the conference board an 



Austria frames a Proposal. 22 







all important object. The article on which her Envoy 
now rejected all compromise was that which would limit 
the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. On this point he took 
ground that might have been maintained had the naval 
power of Russia proved in any degree successful against 
that of the Allies. Judging by his pretensions, it might 
have been thought that her fleet was still holding the 
Euxine ; but in view of the actual condition of that fleet, 
great part of it at the bottom of the sea, the rest penned 
up hopelessly in the harbour of Sebastopol, his language 
was preposterous. Again, by seeming to accept the terms 
offered, he might have procured an armistice, and with 
it an apparent triumph — Russia would have had time to 
rally from some of her disasters, to recruit in many ways, 
while a period of inglorious delay might well have tended 
to disgust the Allies with a war never popular in France. 
But he preferred, with the haughty, even insolent, air 
absurd in any but the victorious, to cast away the oppor- 
tunity that stood between his country and a continuance 
of ruinous disaster. The conference broke up without 
any result but this, that Austria made a last effort at 
compromise, in the form of a proposal that Russia should 
maintain in the Black Sea a naval force not greater than 
that which she possessed there before the war, and that 
the Allies, including Austria, should enforce the condi- 
tion by war against her if she were to evade it. To 
which an observation in the Prince Consort's memo- 
randum is the best reply : " The proposal of Austria to 
engage to make war when the Russian armaments 
should appear to have become excessive is of no kind 



224 The Emperor abandons His Intention. 

of value to the belligerents, who do not wish to establish 
a case for which to make zvar hereafter, but to obtain 
a security upon which they can conclude peace now." 

On the 1 8th April a Council of War met in the Emper- 
or's rooms at Windsor, at which were present the Prince, 
Lord Palmerston, Lord Panmure, Lord Hardinge (Com- 
mander-in-Chief), Lord Cowley (Ambassador to France), 
Sir Charles Wood, Sir John Burgoyne, Count Walewski, 
and the French War Minister, Marshal Vaillant " All 
present," says the Prince's report of it, " declared them- 
selves unanimously against the Emperor's scheme of 
going himself to the Crimea, but without obtaining from 
him the admission that he was shaken in his resolution." 

But on his return to Paris the Emperor found that, 
while the visit to his ally had greatly increased his popu- 
larity at home, the failure of the negotiations at Vienna 
had gravely added to the difficulties of the situation, 
and, on the 25th April, in a letter to the Queen, he 
announced that his intention to go to the Crimea must 
be abandoned. But his scheme for the conduct of the 
war was all the same persisted in. 

The Austrian proposal, though of course completely 
unacceptable to our Government, had been sufficiently 
plausible to gain the approval both of the French pleni- 
potentiary and of Lord John Russell, a circumstance 
which proved very embarrassing to Lord Palmerston and 
his colleagues. For the leading members of the late 
Government, which had sanctioned the expedition to the 
Crimea, were about to support a motion for an unsatis- 
factory peace. The Government had to meet, on one 



English Advocates of Russian Interests. 225 

hand, the attacks of those represented by Mr Disraeli, 
who, desiring the prosecution of the war, denounced the 
conduct of our plenipotentiary ; and on the other, of those 
who always embarrass a Government in war by insisting 
on the necessity of making peace. " Mr Gladstone/' says 
Sir Theodore Martin, in his life of the Prince Consort, 
" developed the views of the members of the Aberdeen 
Cabinet who had seceded from Lord Palmerston's 
Government The burden of his speech was to urge 
peace on the terms offered by Russia. . . . He acknow- 
ledged that he had approved the demand by his 
colleagues, under Lord Aberdeen, for a limitation of the 
Russian Fleet ; but contended that Russia, having aban- 
doned the pretensions which originally led to the war, to 
continue it was no longer justifiable. What we now 
asked for in the way of limitation was, he argued, an 
indignity to Russia. All the terms which we had 
originally demanded had been substantially conceded, 
and if we fought, not for terms, but for military success, 
let the House look at this sentiment with the eye of 
reason, and it would appear immoral, inhuman, un- 
christian." But the people held fast to the facts ; they 
recognised that Russia could have no other reason for 
maintaining a fleet in the Black Sea than to employ it 
against Turkey, and that the Russian pretension must 
not be tolerated ; and they upheld Palmerston. 

The design of the Emperor may perhaps be con- 
sidered to have borne only its natural fruit in the 
irresolution of Canrobert, notably when he refused to 
attempt the gain of a substantial result from the late 



226 First Embarkation for Kertch. 

tremendous bombardment. The dissatisfaction thereby 
excited in both armies was now aggravated by another 
event bearing the same character. On the 23d April 
the Allied generals once more agreed on delivering an 
assault, which was to take place on the 28th, after two 
days' preparative cannonade. All was being got ready 
when, on the 25 th, the French Admiral Bruat received 
instructions from the Minister of Marine to assemble all 
available steamers at Constantinople for the embarka- 
tion of the Army of Reserve for the Crimea. With the 
prospect of immediately receiving this large reinforce- 
ment, it seemed to Canrobert that a hazardous attempt 
to assault in the interval would be to incur an unwarrant- 
able risk. Lord Raglan reluctantly concurred ; but, as 
some compensation, another enterprise was now agreed 
on. It had long been recognised that the route on which 
the Russians in the Crimea principally relied for supplies 
was that conducting to the eastern shore of the Sea of 
Azof; when landed at Kertch, they were conveyed by 
a good and direct road to Simpheropol. An expedition 
against Kertch had, therefore, long been contemplated 
by the Allied generals, and it was now to be executed 
forthwith. On the 3d May the troops, French and 
English, were embarked, and went to sea. But here a 
new element entered into the conduct of the war. On 
the 25th April the Crimea was placed in telegraphic 
communication with London and Paris. In the night 
after the expedition sailed, Canrobert received a tele- 
gram, sent the day before by the Emperor, saying that 
the moment was come for the expedition against the 



The Expedition recalled. 227 

Russian field army, and that as soon as the reserve from 
Constantinople should reach him he was not to lose 
a day in beginning the enterprise. Therefore, to the 
extreme dissatisfaction of Lord Raglan, Canrobert, by 
a fast steamer, recalled the French part of the Kertch 
expedition, the whole of which was consequently again 
put on shore in the Crimea on the 6th. It was also by 
telegraph that General Niel, hitherto without a place in 
Canrobert's army, was appointed its chief engineer, in 
place of General Bizot, killed in the late cannonade. 

These events had pressed hardly on Canrobert. He 
felt that the English must regard him as weak and 
vacillating and unreliable. Much of this apparent defect 
of character may have been due to the cold shadow of 
General Niel. But there is no doubt that inherent 
indecision was generally imputed to him, among others, 
by General Niel himself, who wrote to the Minister of 
War that Canrobert's nature had exactly the appearance 
of decision when a resolution had to be taken a long 
time beforehand, but always drew back when the 
moment for execution came. " Who," writes the Prince 
Consort to a friend, " who will rekindle the spirit of the 
French Army which has been dashed by Canrobert's 
irresolution and want of firmness ? " The sense of a 
natural defect, terribly aggravated by circumstances, 
and of his consequent unfitness to bear the heavy bur- 
thens which the command and the alliance laid on 
him, grievously tormented the French general ; and 
his troubles were further increased when, in the middle 
of May, the Emperor's plan, in full detail, was brought 



228 Conference of Commanders. 

to him by an officer from Paris. According to it, 
Pelissier was to be left in charge of the siege, Canrobert 
was to command the field army, and a joint force of 
French and Turks, taking up the whole business of the 
siege, was to set free the British Divisions for the opera- 
tions in the field. When the three commanders-in-chief 
came together to confer on this plan, Lord Raglan, 
objecting to the separation of the two field armies by 
the distance, and the difficulties of country between 
Aloushta and Baidar, proposed that both should 
assemble at Baidar, and to this Canrobert was in- 
duced to agree. But on another point an insuperable 
difficulty arose. Both Canrobert and Omar Pasha 
declared that they could not take charge of the 
English trenches. On the other hand, Lord Raglan 
could not leave the task of guarding his siege material 
and his port of supply to a part only of his own troops, 
and therefore, though he had looked forward with great 
satisfaction to exchanging the monotony and perplexity 
of the siege operations for the proposed command in 
the field, he could see no course possible except to 
remain where he was. Neither could Canrobert see a 
way out of the dilemma, and he wrote to tell the 
Minister of War of the new difficulty. But he did more 
than this : the countermand of the Kertch expedition, 
and his failure to give effect to the Emperor's plan, 
broke down what of strength still rested in his over- 
wrought spirit, and on the 16th May he sent his resigna- 
tion to the War Minister by telegraph, requesting to be 
again placed in command of the Division that had been 



Canrobert resigns the Command. 229 

his at the beginning of the campaign, and strongly- 
urging that Pelissier should replace him, as fitter than 
himself to deal with the difficulties of the situation. 
Though this step was quite unexpected, his resignation 
was accepted by the Emperor, and with the appoint- 
ment of Pelissier to the chief command (for which he 
had already been designated in case of need), a new 
epoch in the war began. 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE NEW GENERAL. 

Errors in the Emperor's Theory — Pelissier's View of the Problem — His 
Previous Action in May — He declares His Determination — Niel re- 
monstrates in vain — Displeasure of the Emperor — Course taken by 
Vaillant — New Russian Work — The French attack It — And capture 
It — Expedition to Kertch — Its complete Success — The Extended 
Position — Ancient Remains — Valley of Baidar. 

The officer who now took command of the French Army 
was of a singularly strong and marked character. Its 
distinguishing element was hardihood : hardihood in 
thought, in dealing with others, and in the execution of 
his projects. His comrades had formed an extraordinary 
estimate of his determination. Marshal Vaillant, com- 
paring him with Canrobert, said, " Pe'lissier will lose 
14,000 men for a great result at once, while Canrobert 
would lose the same number by driblets, without obtain- 
ing any advantage." General Changarnier bore stronger 
testimony : " If there was an insurrection, I should not 
hesitate to burn one of the quarters of Paris. Pelissier 
would not shrink from burning the whole." But it 
would do him great injustice to imagine that he was 
merely a man of dogged resolution. He was not only a 
soldier of great experience and distinction in Algerian 
warfare, but took strong, clear views of strategical 
problems, and expressed them in a correspondingly 
strong, clear style, indicative of great sagacity. And 



Errors in the Emperor s Theory. 231 

there lay before him, when he assumed the command, 
a problem not easy to solve, yet demanding immediate 
solution, and of vast importance. It was whether to put 
in execution the project of the Emperor and Niel, or to 
devote all his forces to pushing the siege. 

Now there is no doubt that the design of defeating 
the Russian field army, and severing the communication 
between the interior of Russia and Sebastopol, would, 
if successful, have speedily caused the surrender of the 
place. So far the view was sound. But its two advo- 
cates erred in insisting on treating it as if it were the 
only project which rendered success possible, and in 
denying that the siege operations contained any promise 
of victory. For there were several circumstances which 
clearly pointed to the probability, nay certainty, of the 
capture of the south side of Sebastopol on the plan 
hitherto pursued. The enemy had never taken from 
the Allies an inch of ground on which they had once 
established themselves. If the Russians had not aban- 
doned all intention of attempting to raise the siege 
by an attack with their field army, the Allies were con- 
fident of defeating any such enterprise. There were 
signs that if the material of war in Sebastopol showed 
no token of exhaustion, yet the trained seamen who 
worked the guns were greatly reduced in numbers. The 
besiegers' fire could always establish a superiority, con- 
stantly increasing, over that of the place. And, finally, 
the enemy's losses must, from the nature of the case, 
continue to be immensely greater than those of the 
Allies. In the preceding month the garrison of Sebas- 



232 Pelissiers View of the Problem, 

topol had lost more than 10,000 men, and there were 
good grounds for believing that the whole of the Russian 
Forces now in the Crimea scarcely numbered more 
than 100,000 men. It was certain, therefore, that should 
the Allies persevere with the siege, the day, though 
not yet near, would come when the enemy's fire would 
be overpowered, his works stormed, and the south side 
rendered untenable. 

Pelissier's mode of grasping this problem is first 
shown in a letter which he wrote to Canrobert while 
that general was still Commander-in-Chief. He first 
expressed his belief that the Allies, by pressing the 
attack on the works, could certainly render themselves 
masters of Sebastopol ; " difficult," he says, "but possible." 
Therefore he proposes, before all things, to push the 
siege to extremity, without regard to what was outside 
of it. Nevertheless, in case an exterior operation should 
be " inexorably commanded by the Emperor," he has his 
plan for that. But he presently shows that this was 
merely a concession to the weakness of another, by 
explaining that, before anything of that kind can take 
place, the Russians must be shut up so completely in 
their works that no sortie need be feared, and that the 
first operations must therefore be the capture of the 
Mamelon and the White Works at any price. " If there 
are to be operations in the field, they must only take 
place after we have restricted the Russians absolutely 
to their defences, and have thus achieved security for 
our base of operations." He meant by this to insist 
on the necessity of driving the Russians from all those 



His Previous Action in May. 233 

works which, to the great annoyance and injury of 
the Allies, they had pushed out beyond the general 
line of intrenchment. He had given a practical illus- 
tration of this view, on the 1st May, when he was still 
only the commander of the 1st Corps in front of the 
town. Todleben had, on the 23d April, effected some 
large lodgments of rifle-pits between the town ravine 
and the next one on his right of it, and in the ensuing 
week, employing a great number of labourers, and 
a strong force to protect them, had formed these 
into an important work, closed and partially armed, 
and so close to the French trenches and so menac- 
ing to them, by stretching towards their flanks, that 
it would have immediately become a most serious 
addition to the difficulties of the siege. Pelissier so 
strongly represented to Canrobert the necessity of 
driving the Russians out of it at all hazards that he 
was allowed to have his way. In two hand-to-hand 
encounters of considerable forces on both sides, on 
the 1st and 2d May, the French were so completely 
successful that they not only took the counterguard, 
but converted it into part of their own siege works, 
within 1 50 yards of the main line in front of it, with a 
loss to them of 600, to the Russians of 900 men. 

In a letter to Bosquet, written immediately after he 
took command of the army, Pelissier discusses the alter- 
native plans. The difficulties offered by the ground which 
the enemy's field army occupied, the want of informa- 
tion respecting its strength and positions, the danger 
of operating through long defiles with large forces, 



234 H e declares His Determination. 

the perils of a retreat in case of failure, these and 
other reasons caused him to reject, or at least to 
postpone, the Emperor's scheme — "without regret," as 
he phrased it. " I am very determined," said this 
clear-seeing man, "not to fling myself into the un- 
known, to shun adventures, and to act only on sound 
knowledge, with all the enlightenment needful for the 
rational conduct of an army." He then announces his 
intention of extending the part of the army not engaged 
in the siege along the valley of the Tchernaya, so as to 
get air, water, elbow-room, and consequently health, and 
from thence to study the country for future operations, 
by reconnaissances, and force the enemy to spread them- 
selves. " But," he adds, " all this is only the prelude to 
an operation much more important and more decisive in 
my eyes, the storming and occupation of the Mameion 
and White Works. I do not disguise from myself that 
the conquest of these counter-approaches will cost us 
certain sacrifices ; but whatever they cost, I mean to have 
them." Then, after detailing the features of his plan, 
he observes, " All this may be thorny, but it is possible, 
and I have irrevocably made up my mind to undertake 
it." Here, then, was a general who had occupied the 
firm ground of knowing what he meant to do, and setting 
about it with an unchangeable purpose. But he did not 
keep his opinions for his generals only. Niel noted the 
new commander's course with great disquietude, and 
even felt justified, in the strength of being the Emperor's 
emissary, to offer to his chief, in a note written in reply 
to a request for his view of affairs, a strong remonstrance. 



Niel remonstrates in vain. 235 

He said his views remained the same as always ; that to 
attack without first investing the place would lead to 
nothing except after bloody struggles ; that he could 
not understand why the Emperor's plan was to be 
abandoned ; and that the persistence of Pelissier in his 
projects would entail every kind of disaster. Scarcely 
had Pelissier received this when he telegraphed thus to 
the Minister of War, for the Emperor's information : 
" The project of marching two armies, from Aloushta* on 
Simpheropol, and from Baidar on Bakshisarai, is full of 
difficulties and risk. Direct investment, by attacking 
the Mackenzie heights, would cost as dear as the assault 
of the place, and the result would be very uncertain. I 
have arranged with Lord Raglan for the storming of the 
advanced works, the occupation of the Tchernaya, and 
finally, for an operation on Kertch. . . . All these move- 
ments are in train." This he explained fully in a letter 
to Vaillant next day, and asked for complete latitude of 
action. When we remember that Louis Napoleon was 
an absolute sovereign, that he had just raised Pelissier 
to the chief command, that he was the fountain of 
honours and advancement, and that, if he had set this 
self-willed general up with one hand, he could pull him 
down with the other, it must be admitted that, in thus 
opposing the cherished scheme of his master, Pelissier 
showed himself an uncommonly strong man. 

To the Emperor and his Minister, absorbed in 
contemplation of the excellences of their plan, and 
hoping to hear that it was in process of accomplishment, 

* See inner map on Map 3 for Aloushta. 



236 Displeasure of the Emperor, 

this uncivil treatment of it caused something like con- 
sternation. The stout warrior at one end of the wire 
was arousing great perturbation and resentment in the 
Imperial theorist at the other. At first some angry- 
messages were flashed to the Crimea — one from Vaillant 
to Niel, relating to the expedition to Kertch : " This 
news to-day is a great trouble. What ! generals and 
admirals, not one of them thought it his duty to consult 
the Government on an affair of this importance ! " Then 
the Emperor sent a rebuke to his unappreciative sub- 
ordinate : " I have confidence in you," he said, " and I 
don't pretend to command the army from here " (" But 
you do ! " was probably Pelissier's comment) ; " however, 
I must tell you my opinion, and you ought to pay regard 
to it. A great effort must be made to beat the Russian 
army, in order to invest the place. To gain space and 
grass is not sufficient just now " (this in sarcastic refer- 
ence to Pelissier's reasons for extending the army). 
"If you scatter your forces, instead of concentrating 
them, you will do nothing decisive, and will lose 
precious time. The Allies have 180,000 men in the 
Crimea. Anything may be attempted with such a 
force, but to manoeuvre is the right course, not to take 
the bull by the horns ; and the way to manoeuvre is to 
threaten the weak sides of the enemy. The weak side 
of the Russians seems to me to be their left wing. If 
you send 14,000 men to Kertch, you weaken yourself 
uselessly ; it is to avow that there is nothing serious to 
attempt, for one does not willingly weaken one's self 
on the eve of battle. Weigh all this carefully." But, 



Course taken by Vaiilant. 237 

whether weighed or not, these arguments had not the 
slightest effect on the mind of this resolute, even 
refractory, man. It might be all very well for an 
Emperor to amuse himself with making plans ; it was 
for a general to conduct operations. Seeing all this, and 
knowing how indispensable was Pelissier, Vaiilant took 
a very judicious course. He desired Niel to aim at 
moderating Pelissier's too strong style of expression 
The General was to be made to understand that the 
most complete confidence was reposed in him, and 
to be adjured to assume that as a basis in every- 
thing he might write. Whether Niel ever found an 
opportunity of discharging this mission seems doubtful, 
for he is shortly afterwards found uttering a lamentable 
wail, in a letter to the Minister. "At yesterday's meet- 
ing," he says, " General Pelissier imposed silence on me 
with indescribable harshness, because I spoke of the 
dangers which characterise vigorous actions with large 
masses at great distances apart. We were in presence of 
English officers; I saw he was irritated, and I wished at 
any price to avoid a scene which would have rendered 
my relations with him impossible." No matter whose 
emissary he was, Niel must know his place. There was 
no doing anything with so intractable a chief ; he had 
his own way, and the French Army had a commander. 

Pelissier's two first steps towards the execution of 
his projects, namely, an attack on an important outwork 
and the expedition to Kertch, took place at the same 
date, the 22d May, when he had been six days in com- 
mand. The first of these was caused by a new enter- 



238 New Russian Work. 

prise of the indomitable Todleben. Between the Central 
Bastion and the bastion near the Quarantine Bay the 
line of defence was a loop-holed wall, strengthened 
behind with earth, but much battered by the heavy fire 
directed on it. Seeing its precarious state, Todleben 
resolved to cover it with a salient earthwork on a ridge 
in front, where he had already placed rows of rifle pits. 
Between these pits and the French trenches was a 
cemetery, lying in a green hollow, having in its midst 
a small church, surrounded by crosses and headstones. 
Once peaceful as any country churchyard in England, 
it had now for months been an arena of conflict, where 
riflemen had crouched in the grass of the graves, or 
lurked in the shadow of the tombstones. The French 
trenches were already close to its southern wall, when 
Todleben, on the night of the 21st, began his outwork 
with characteristic vigour. Two thousand four hundred 
workmen were busy with spade and pickaxe, while 
6000 infantry, and many guns bearing on the ground in 
front, guarded them. But the French also were 
making a trench that night, therefore both parties had an 
interest in keeping their batteries quiet. But morning 
showed that while the French, with their working party 
of ordinary strength, had made about 150 yards of trench, 
the Russians had made more than 1000 yards, besides 
a supplementary work close to the head of Quarantine 
Bay. And these works were not to play a defensive 
part merely ; when armed, they would rake the French 
trenches, and form a new and serious obstacle to the 
progress of the siege. Therefore Pelissier ordered that 



The French attack It, 239 

the new works should be attacked that night ; the 
enemy was equally resolved to defend them ; and it so 
happened that about 6000 men were devoted to the pur- 
pose on each side. All the guns, Russian and French, 
that could aid the infantry were laid on their objects, 
ready to open. At nine on the night of the 22d the fight 
began, and continued without intermission till three in 
the morning. There was a glimmering moon, and 
against a low bank of clouds the flashes of the guns 
marked the hostile lines ; the rattle of small-arms re- 
sounded through the night, and at times a cheer, rising 
out of the gloom, showed where a charge had been led, 
or some advantage won. Many times had each side 
gained a temporary success ; but as the French could 
not remain in the work by day, under the fire of the 
place, the Russians still held it in the morning, though 
it had cost them dear. They had lost 2650 men ; the 
French, 1800. 

It so happened that the neighbouring bay of 
Kamiesch had presented, on this same 22d, an unusually 
busy scene, for the troops destined for the expedition 
to Kertch were embarking there. From the ships 
they heard the conflict raging at no great distance. In 
the morning they sailed on their enterprise. Unluckily 
for the Russians, one of their posts, from a tower of 
observation, saw and signalled that large forces were in 
movement from the harbour. Gortschakoff imagined 
that they were about to be landed on the coast for an 
attack on his forces in the field. He concluded he could 
spare no troops for another fight in the trenches from 



240 And capture It. 

his army, which lay between Mackenzie's Farm and 
the heights of the Belbek. Therefore, only two bat- 
talions were to hold the new work. If the French 
should prove to have had enough of fighting the night 
before, these would suffice to protect the completion of 
the work ; but if attacked by superior numbers, they 
must withdraw. The French did come on again that 
night in great force, drove out the guard, and converted 
the line of trench into a parallel of their own. This 
night the losses were about 400 on each side. 

The much-talked-of expedition to Kertch* had a very 
practical object. The eastern point of the lozenge which 
the outline of the Crimea forms runs in a long, narrow 
isthmus towards the Circassian coast of the Black Sea, 
from which it is separated by the narrow straits of Kertch, 
and these give access, from the waters of the Euxine, to 
those of the inland Sea of Azof. Into this sea the River 
Don empties itself, and thus the resources of large dis- 
tricts on its banks, and of Circassia, can be swept into the 
isthmus ; and the superiority of this route, compared 
with that along the wretched roads of Southern Russia, 
and through the barren country by Perekop to Sim- 
pheropol, had made it the great line of supply to Gort- 
schakoffs army. The Sea of Azof was thronged with 
craft, occupied in transporting stores to great depots 
on the shores of the isthmus. Taganrog, on the shore 
of the Sea of Azof, near the mouth of the Don, was 
a considerable town, and in former days had even, from 
its pleasant situation, been thought of for the capital of 

* See inner map on Map 3. 



Expedition to Kertch. 241 

Russia. The whole region was at this time specially 
full of business and activity. 

The ships reached the straits of Kertch on the early 
morning of the 24th. They bore, in all, French, Turks, 
and English, 15,000 infantry, and five field batteries. 
There were about 9000 Russians in the isthmus, of 
which 3000 were cavalry. There were batteries guard- 
ing the straits, armed with sixty-two heavy guns, and 
some forty others, unmounted, of large calibre. And 
there had been plenty of time to prepare for an attack, 
since the fiasco of three weeks earlier had warned 
the enemy. It might have been expected that, with 
such means at his disposal, General Wrangel, who 
commanded in the isthmus, would have made at least 
some show of resistance. But seeing how exposed his 
forces were, in their straitened position, to be cut off 
by a landing in their rear, he made haste to withdraw 
them, at the same time destroying his coast batteries, 
while, of fourteen war-vessels, ten were burnt by their 
crews. The Allied Squadrons therefore passed into the 
straits without molestation. The landing of the troops 
was effected the same night, in a bay a few miles from 
the town of Kertch, which they entered early next 
morning, while a flotilla of vessels of light draught 
passed into the Sea of Azof. There they captured or 
destroyed all the great number of vessels engaged in 
transporting supplies for Gortschakoff's army, as well 
as vast quantities of corn, flour, and stores. At one 
point they came on the wrecks of the remaining four 
steamers of the Russian Naval Squadron, destroyed by 



242 Its Complete Sticcess. 

order of its commander. A complete clearance of every- 
thing that could aid the Forces in the Crimea was made 
throughout the shores of the Sea of Azof. At Taganrog, 
the depot of the immense supplies brought down the 
River Don, where some semblance of opposition was 
made by the garrison, the destruction of the stores on 
the beach was accomplished under cover of a fire from 
the boats of the flotilla. The fort of Arabat was bom- 
barded and taken. Meanwhile the large men-of-war 
of the Allied Squadrons, outside the straits, made for 
Soujouk-kale and Anapa, strong places on the Circassian 
coast, which at their approach were abandoned by their 
garrisons. These operations were concluded by the 
second weeK in June, and the result was thus summed 
up by Pelissier, in a letter to the War Minister : " We 
have struck deep into the Russian resources ; their chief 
line of supply is cut I did well to concur in this 
expedition, so fertile in results. Confidence is general, 
and I view with calm assurance the approach of the 
final act." In fact, the expedition had fulfilled, in no 
slight degree, the Emperor's policy of investment. 

Meanwhile the clearance of the crowded Upland had 
been effected. At daylight, on the 25th May, Canrobert, 
with two Divisions, and cavalry and artillery, passed 
the Traktir Bridge, drove the Russians from Tchorgoun, 
and destroyed their camp and their barracks. The 
force then recrossed the stream, and took position on 
its left bank, holding an armed work at the bridge. Italy, 
having some time before joined the alliance against 
Russia, had despatched General La Marmora, with a 



The Extended Position. 243 

small army of 15,000 men, including some cavalry and 
artillery, to the Crimea. These troops now occupied 
ground on the French right, across the road from 
Baidar. In rear of all a large force of Turks from 
Eupatoria took up the same line of heights across the 
valley of Balaklava which they had occupied on the 
25th of October. The land on which the Army was 
encamped had at this time resumed its smiling aspect, 
except, indeed, the ground between the Turks and 
Balaklava, where the small paradise which had greeted 
us on our first arrival had been completely destroyed. 
It had then been one large and well-stored garden. 
Plums and apples grew overhead, the clustering vines 
were thick with green and purple grapes, and between 
the vineyards was a rich jungle of melons, pumpkins, 
tomatoes, and cabbages. All this had given place to 
the grim features of war. But elsewhere the grass had 
sprung up, mixed with flowers in extraordinary variety 
and profusion ; the willows again drooped their leaves 
over the Tchernaya ; even the field of Inkerman resumed 
its green carpet, all the richer, perhaps, for the battle, and 
turf like that of our south downs once more covered the 
Upland. A most remarkable feature of the southern coast 
of the Crimea is the rare beauty of the colouring of its 
iron-bound coast. Those cliffs, so implacable in the 
storms of winter, are dyed with the loveliest rose-colours, 
pearly greys, yellows, dark reds, and rich browns, with 
purple shadows, in the most effective combinations. On 
a summit of these, in full view of the Black Sea, stands 
the Monastery of St George, with its long low ranges of 



244 Ancient Remains, 

building, its green domes and turrets, reared on solid 
basements of masonry, white like the rest of the edifice. 
Here the brotherhood, clad in black gowns, with tall 
cylindrical caps, from which black veils descended be- 
hind, continued to pray and chaunt ; here, too, lived in 
peace some Russian families, including that of the late 
commandant of Balaklava; and here was established our 
telegraph station. Near this was the site of an ancient 
temple of Diana ; Cyclopean remains exist there, the 
palace and gardens which contained the famous Golden 
Fleece had looked from hence over the sea ; and it must 
have been in the valley below that " Medea gathered the 
enchanted herbs, which did renew old ^Eson." There 
were tokens, too, of inhabitants compared with whom 
Medea and iEson are moderns. Across a gully, which 
led to a cove used by our troops as a bathing-place, lay 
a ridge which might have been the roof of a tunnel. 
But the many footsteps at length wore away the soil of 
ages, and it was apparent that a huge Saurian had been 
in some way swept across the gully, and become fixed 
there ; and it was his skeleton, hidden even in Jason's 
time, that was now laid bare to the view of British 
riflemen. 

Crossing the valley of the Tchernaya, in grass and 
flowers to the horses' knees, and ascending the green 
hillsides of Kamara, beyond the Sardinian outposts, the 
explorer came on expanses of tall coppice, with trees of 
larger growth, which enclosed glades like those of a park. 
Here were some British marines, whose lines had fallen 
in a place pleasant as the meadows of Devon, in front of 



Valley of Baidar. 245 

which rose a wooded mountain, its craggy peaks break- 
ing through the verdure. A wood path, winding amid 
tall trees, led to the next summit, which disclosed 
a magnificent landscape. Below lay the valley of 
Baidar, stretching from the edge of the sea-cliffs to the 
distant mountain range — a tract of flowery meadows 
sprinkled with trees and groves. In the midst of the 
valley stood, at some distance apart, two villages, their 
r6ofs gleaming red through the surrounding trees ; but 
no labourers, nor waggoners, nor cattle gave life to the 
scene, nor had any corn been sown for this year's 
harvest. The villages were not only deserted but, as 
some visitors had ascertained, quite bare of all 
tokens of domestic life. Turning back along the sea- 
cliffs, the silent, deserted, beautiful region came to an 
end on reaching the fortified ridge above Balaklava ; 
here were the troops busied with their camp duties, 
mules and buffaloes toiling with their loads ; and up 
the hills beyond Kadukoi, above the Turkish camp, 
the bearded pashas, sitting in open, green tents, 
smoked their long-stemmed pipes in that blissful calm 
which such matters as wars and the peril of empires 
could not disturb. 



CHAPTER XII. 

A SUCCESSION OF CONFLICTS. 

The Emperor persists in His Plan — Pelissier opposes It— The Objects of 
the Attack — Assault of the White Works — Assault of the Mamelon 
— The Struggle for It— Assault of the Quarries — The Emperor still 
persists — Error of Pelissier — His Second Error — His Insufficient 
Reason — Failure at the Malakoff — Failure at the Redan — A Partial 
Success — Todleben wounded — Pelissier's Persistency in prosecuting 
the Siege — Vaillant sides with Pelissier — Death of Lord Raglan — 
His Funeral — Sufferings of the Defenders — Russian Plans of Battle 
— Russian Advance for Battle — Battle of the Tchernaya — Retreat of 
the Russians — Russian Losses in the War. 

Meanwhile the energy of the French General was 
impelling him, in complete accord with his British 
colleague, towards one of his main objects. This was 
to storm the White Works, the Mamelon, and the work 
between the English trenches and the Redan known as 
the Quarries. Todleben many times asserts that the 
Flagstaff Bastion, and other works in front of the town, 
had frequently been reduced to so desperate a condition 
from the artillery fire that an assault on them must have 
been successful, and that the loss of any of these would 
have entailed the surrender of the place. That the 
matter did not so present itself to Pelissier's mind is 
evident from the fact that, with all the means of forming 
a judgment which the proximity of his siege works to 
the town defences, and his frequent attacks on the 
enemy's outworks gave him, he deliberately adopted 



The Emperor persists in His Plan. 247 

the course of attacking the proper left half of the 
Russian line of defence, that covering the suburb ; and 
a necessary preliminary was to wrest the outworks just 
mentioned from the enemy. With this view, the arming 
of fresh batteries, and the storing of the great quantities 
of ammunition necessary for a sustained cannonade, once 
more went on in the trenches. 

But if P&issier was constant to his own ideas, so 
was Louis Napoleon. Unable to condemn the previous 
operations after they had proved so successful, he had, 
nevertheless, given them but a cold approval, regarding 
them indeed as false fires leading his General astray. 
And now he despatched a telegram to Pelissier in these 
terms : " For the well-being of France, and for the glory 
of our arms, you are at the head of the finest army 
which perhaps has ever existed. You are certain of 
a deathless fame, but great things must be done for it. 
The conduct of the siege is even more the business of 
the chief engineer than of the general-in-chicf ; but the 
chief engineer has addressed to you these observations : 
'If you push the siege without investing the place, you 
will only obtain, after bloody conflicts costing you your 
best troops, what would have come of itself after the 
investment' In conformity with the British Govern- 
ment, which writes in the same sense to Lord Raglan, 
I give you a positive order not to devote yourself to the 
siege before having invested the place. Concert with 
Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha measures for the offen- 
sive, whether by the Tchernaya or against Simpheropol." 

But before receiving this, Pelissier had sent a telegram 



248 Pe * Ussier opposes It. 

to the Emperor to a very different purpose : " To-day 
I am going to see Lord Raglan, who shares my ideas, 
in order to settle the last dispositions for the attack by 
storm, which ought to place in our power the White 
Works, the Mamelon, and the Quarry before the Redan. 
I calculate on beginning this operation on the 7th, and 
on carrying it right through with the utmost vigour." 
And the telegram he proceeded to act on was his own. 

At three in the afternoon of the 6th June the siege 
batteries opened. Our own guns, as before, were mainly 
directed on the Redan and Malakofif and their depend- 
encies ; but our battery of heavy guns, increased now 
to twenty, on the right of the Right Attack, and some of 
the mortar batteries more in advance, were brought to 
bear on the Mamelon, crossing their fire with that of the 
French batteries on Mount Inkerman. 

The work known as the Quarries was situated at 
about 400 yards in front of the Redan, at a point 
where the gradual downward slope was broken by an 
abrupter dip, and it thus stood on what was com- 
paratively a small eminence. The ground there had 
lately been occupied with heaps of stones and rubbish, 
but these had been replaced by a regular work, though 
retaining the old name. This work, thus covering the 
Redan, had been itself covered by rows of rifle screens. 
But, on the night of the 19th April, Colonel Egerton,* 
with a detachment of the 77th, without firing a shot, 
drove out, or killed with the bayonet, the occupants of 
these pits, and repulsed the troops supporting them, so 

* Killed the same night, later. 




^/<>rr/ - Sure/fa// , ( Jma /'-Vftc/ur , Sjr/um/y zS< : /('>->/f /', 

t 



The Objects of the Attack. 249 

that now our advanced line of trench in the Right Attack 
was face to face with the Quarries. As soon as the 
French should have secured the Mamelon we were to 
attack this work, and there establish ourselves. 

All the works about to be attacked contained only a 
small proportion of the troops that were to be employed 
in their defence. The number sufficient to line their 
parapets, with a reserve within to make good losses, 
having been provided, the supports, in much greater force, 
were drawn up at some convenient spot near by, ready 
to reinforce the defenders, and to meet the auxiliary 
attacks which would approach the work from its flanks. 
The White Works, backed on the harbour, were sup- 
ported by a battery at the end of the Careenage ravine, 
and the reserves were placed some in a small ravine 
in rear, some on the other side of the Careenage ravine. 

The fire of the siege batteries was tremendous be- 
yond all precedent. Five hundred and forty-four great 
guns bore on the Russian works, and were opposed by 
a nearly equal number. The effect of the fire of the 
Allies was soon manifest. The work on the Mamelon 
was terribly crushed, chiefly, says Todleben, "by the 
English guns, which made up for some slowness of fire 
by remarkable precision of aim." The White Works 
were less considerably damaged, and could keep up a fire 
till evening. The works of the main line of defence also 
maintained the struggle, except the Malakoff itself, the 
right face of which, says Todleben, had been so knocked 
about by the English guns as to be reduced almost to 
silence. With dusk the Allied batteries ceased firing, 



250 Assault of the White Works. 

but their mortars continued to throw their huge shells 
throughout the night. Nevertheless, the Russians, 
under the inspiration and the eye of Todleben, had 
made good their damages by morning. 

On the 7th the cannonade was resumed with the 
same terrible effects as before. The Mamelon was re- 
duced to absolute silence, the parapet of its right face 
was almost levelled, and after two hours the Malakoff 
was no longer in a condition to support it. By six in 
the evening the White Works and their auxiliary battery 
were ruined, and the parapets thrown into the ditch. 

Half-past six was the hour fixed for the assault — 
a time which would allow daylight enough to secure 
possession of the works, while darkness would come 
soon enough to cover the working parties against the 
fire of the supporting batteries. The Russians could 
perceive the troops for the assault crowding into the 
trenches, and prepared to meet them. But the French 
had approached so near to the defences before the town 
that the part of the garrison on that side was still main- 
tained in greater strength than that which defended 
the suburb. At the appointed hour Bosquet sent two 
brigades at the White Works, which, encountering only 
half a battalion in each, captured both so speedily that 
a reserve battalion, hurrying up from the ravine behind, 
was too late, and was swept away in its turn. Then two 
other Russian battalions, crossing the Careenage ravine, 
ascended to the scene of contest ; but Bosquet, in antici- 
pation, had sent two battalions down the ravine, which, 
ascending its bank on their right, took these Russian 



Assault of the Mamelon. 251 

reserves in rear, and captured a great part of them. No 
further attempt was made to retake the works ; though 
three other battalions of reserve were despatched by the 
Russians, they reached no further than to the battery on 
the point. During the night the French connected 
these works with their own trenches. 

At half-past five the French columns for the attack 
of the Mamelon were formed at the entrance of the Docks 
ravine. To each battalion General Bosquet addressed a 
few words of encouragement. Preceded by their vivan- 
diere, who was well mounted, and wore a white hat and 
feather, the Algerine Zouaves headed the march, next 
came the French Zouaves, then the Green Chasseurs, 
attended by their vivandiere, and several regiments of 
the line followed, the whole moving down to the point 
where the trenches in which they were to await the signal 
to attack were entered from the ravine. 

Crowds of spectators from the camps were assembled 
at points commanding a good view. The Mamelon, 
always conspicuous, was the cynosure of all eyes. 
Admiral Nakimofif rode up the rear slope of the 
hill about six, and leaving his horse at the entrance, 
passed into the work. Suddenly loud shouts caused 
him to look over the parapet, when he beheld three 
French columns advancing to the assault, and driving 
before them the sharpshooters who had lined the cover- 
ing trench. The Turcos formed the right column, the 
50th regiment of the line the centre, the 3d (French) 
Zouaves the left. Led by one man, Colonel Brancion, 
who kept throughout in advance, the centre column 



252 The Struggle for the Mamelon. 

went straight up the slope, passed the line of intrench- 
ment which crossed it, and in a few minutes was crowd- 
ing the edge of the ditch. Presently the leading troops 
were seen on the parapet, still led by Colonel Brancion, 
who leaped into the work, where he was instantly slain. 
At the same moment the Turcos, passing the intrench- 
ments which extended to the left of the work, ascended 
the slopes towards its rear, when the defenders, with the 
Admiral, abandoned it almost without a struggle, and 
hurried off towards the Malakoff, while the tricolour was 
presently seen fluttering over the Mamelon. 

The captured work was of the kind called a lunette 
(though a very irregular one), two sides meeting in a 
salient, and open in the rear, so that not only could 
reinforcements be poured quickly in, but the batteries 
of the main line could sweep the interior if occupied by 
the enemy. To cover their working parties, who would 
now close and fortify the open rear, the foremost assail- 
ants pressed out in pursuit, even up to the verge of the 
Malakoff, the guns of which at once opened on them, 
while the rifles of the garrison blazed along the parapets. 
For a quarter of an hour the scene was wrapt in smoke ; 
then the Russian reinforcements, arriving in strength, 
drove the French back upon the Mamelon. The Rus- 
sians, in their turn, followed up their success, pressing 
into the Mamelon, and after a short struggle the French 
gave way, and ran down the hill to their own trenches. 
Ample provision of reserves had been made for this 
contingency, and reinforced by these the French again 
went up the hill and into the work, which they captured 



Assmilt of the Quarries. 253 

and held, and round which their musketry continued 
to sparkle in the darkness, while their comrades con- 
structed the necessary trench across the rear of the 
lunette, converting it into what was henceforth called, 
in obedience to a general order, " the Brancion 
Redoubt." 

The entry of the French into the Mamelon was to 
be the signal for the English to attack the Quarries. 
Troops of the Light and Second Divisions were assigned 
to this purpose, in number 700, for the immediate assault, 
with 600 in close support, and the 626. regiment in 
reserve, with strong working parties, the whole under 
Colonel Shirley. The stormers, operating by the flanks 
of the work, easily drove out the defenders, not only 
from it, but from the collateral trench extending thence 
across the ridge. But the work, unenclosed, afforded no 
protection from the fire of the Russian batteries behind 
it, which came into play, till their infantry, sallying from 
the Redan, engaged the assailants on the ridge outside. 
The combat swayed to and fro at intervals, as often as 
the Russians made a fresh sally, throughout the night, 
but all the trenches fought for remained in possession of 
the British. 

Morning disclosed not only that Pelissier had accom- 
plished the object of driving the enemy everywhere from 
their outworks, and restricting them to the main line of 
defence (for they had abandoned the auxiliary battery 
on the edge of Careening Bay), but that the advanced 
positions they had occupied had been converted into the 
front line of the siege works, connected by trenches with 



254 The Emperor still persists. 

those in rear. In accomplishing this the French had 
lost in all, killed, wounded, and prisoners, 5440 men ; 
the English, 693 ; the Russians, 5000. But, besides 
these losses, in the six days' cannonade, from the 6th 
to the 10th June inclusive, the Allies lost 750 men ; the 
Russians, 3500. The French had taken in the works 
seventy-three guns. 

The Emperor, clinging as was his wont persistently 
to his idea, did not on account of this success cease to 
harp on the one string of his plan for operating against 
the field army. It was not till seven days after the action 
that he telegraphed to Pelissier saying that, before con- 
gratulating him on his success, he had wished to know the 
cost. " I admire the courage of the troops," he continued, 
" but I wish you to observe that a general action, which 
would have decided the fate of the Crimea, would have cost 
no more. I persist, then, in ordering you to make every 
effort to take the field." In reply, Pelissier reaffirmed 
his conviction that his course was the right one. " In 
this situation the complete execution of your orders is 
impossible. It is to place me, Sire, between insubordi- 
nation and discredit. . . . The army is full of confidence 
and ardour ; mine equals my devotion ; but I pray your 
Majesty either to free me from the straitened limits 
imposed on me, or to permit me to resign a command 
impossible to exercise, in concert with my loyal allies, 
at the end, sometimes paralysing, of an electric wire." 
And to Marshal Vaillant he wrote : " The silence of the 
Government and the Emperor respecting me, and, above 
all, respecting my troops, and their brilliant feat of arms 



Error of Pdlissie r. 255 

of the 7th, has surprised and afflicted me. The tele- 
graphic despatches received since have still more pain- 
fully impressed me." And, finally, on the night of the 
17th: "I have waited all day for an answer to my im- 
portant despatch of yesterday, but have received none, 
and the combinations settled with our allies are taking 
their course. To-morrow, at daybreak, in concert with 
the English, I attack the Redan, the Malakoff, and their 
dependent batteries. I have firm hope." 

Up to this time Pelissier has appeared as a com- 
mander not only singularly resolute, but singularly 
clear of view. But now, with the great attack of the 
1 8th pending, he committed two acts, not of resolution, 
but of waywardness, and in which his accustomed clear- 
ness of view showed itself to be suddenly obscured. He 
was already displeased by a difference of opinion between 
himself and Bosquet (who wished to postpone the assault 
until the progress of the works should leave less of open 
ground to be traversed under fire by the assailants), when 
that general gave new cause of offence. A plan of the 
Malakoff had been found on the body of a Russian 
officer, and brought to Bosquet, who had omitted to 
forward it to the General-in-Chief. Hearing of this, 
Pelissier, not content with demanding it with violent 
reproaches, removed Bosquet from the command of the 
forces with which the fresh attack was to be made, send- 
ing him to the corps on the Tchernaya, and replaced 
this experienced commander, so well acquainted with 
the ground, by another just come from France, and 
knowing nothing of the local features and circumstances. 



256 His Second Error. 

This was a very grave error, impossible to justify. Niel 
wrote to Vaillant about it : " Canrobert says it is not an 
eagle, but a vulture which he has put in his place, and 
that he regrets what he did. It is impossible to describe 
the wrath of Bosquet ; the proceedings of which he is 
the object are incredible." The general who replaced 
him, Regnaud de St Jean d'Angely, Commander of the 
Imperial Guard, had just thirty-six hours in which to 
study the very difficult ground and the siege works, and 
to place himself in relations with troops who did not 
know him, and who regretted their old chief. 

The other error was even worse. Pelissier had ar- 
ranged with Lord Raglan that the cannonade of the 17th 
should be renewed at dawn on the 18th, and should last 
for two hours, in which time it was calculated the enemy's 
guns might be silenced, and their works, after the repairs 
of the night, once more ruined. The attack was there- 
fore to take place at five, or half-past. On the 17th, the 
batteries opening over the entire front from Quarantine 
Bay to Careening Bay, produced their effect as before. 
Evening saw the Barrack Batteries, the Redan, and 
MalakorT, with their dependencies, and the works thence 
to the harbour, all disabled, with vast losses within them 
of killed and wounded. But suddenly, without a word 
to Lord Raglan, Pelissier changed the plan. He resolved 
to dispense with the preliminary cannonade next morn- 
ing, and to assault at daybreak. He communicated this 
change to his colleague in a despatch as definitive, and 
resting on grounds that could not be disputed. Lord 
Raglan heard of it with deep concern, but concluded 



His Insufficient Reason. 257 

that it was better silently to accept and conform to the 
change than to protest. Nevertheless, considering the 
issues involved, it is a question whether he would not 
have done well in declining to co-operate, except on the 
jointly arranged plan. The change was lamented by 
the English artillery officers, who had been very con- 
fident of rendering the Russian batteries nearly harmless 
in a very few hours. 

These aberrations of Pelissier have never been quite 
accounted for. Kinglake suggests that they were due 
to the extreme anguish of mind inflicted by the Em- 
peror's telegrams, and even states the time during which 
the perturbation lasted as eight days. In his despatch 
to Lord Raglan, Pelissier gave as his reason for hasten- 
ing the hour of attack that the assembly of his troops 
in the trenches, as had been found on trial, could not 
after daylight be concealed from the enemy, who would 
therefore be prepared to meet them. But the cannonade 
would have already prepared them ; moreover, the hour 
before dawn is that in which all menaced garrisons speci- 
ally expect attack. Therefore nothing was so essential 
to success as to stop the fire which would bear on his 
troops in the open ground, and Pelissier's reason was not 
such as ought for a moment to have swayed him. 

Before dawn, on the 18th, Lord Raglan and his 
staff assembled in an advanced trench which seemed 
suitable for observation, and would have been so, had 
it not been the focus of fire from the Redan and 
Malakoff. From thence could be seen our troops, de- 
tailed for the assault, and their supports, crowding the 



258 Failure at the Malakoff, 

advanced trenches ; and the movements around the 
Malakoff were, with daylight, also discernible. The 
day had been chosen as one on which the memory 
of Waterloo might happily give place to a joint victory 
of French and English. Instead of this, it was marked 
from the outset by a series of blunders and mis- 
fortunes. 

First, the French troops, destined to form the right 
column against the Malakoff, found, on reaching the 
trenches in the night, that the post they were to take 
up was still occupied by another part of the attacking 
force. Much delay and confusion was thus caused, and 
under the brilliant starlight, the enemy, already roused 
to more than common vigilance, perceived the prepara- 
tions for attack. At two in the morning his bugles 
sounded the alarm ; the reserves closed up to their 
posts, the embrasures were opened for action, and field- 
guns were placed in the Malakoff and elsewhere to fire 
on the columns of assault. Next, the French general who 
was to direct the assault against the left of the Russian 
line mistook a casual shell for the signal of attack, and 
advanced prematurely. But it is not likely that these 
mischances greatly affected the result. The repairs and 
renewals, which by the extraordinary energy of the 
garrison and its leaders had been accomplished in the 
few hours of darkness, enabled them to pour such a 
storm of shot from every part assailed that no serious 
impression was made anywhere. Under the over- 
whelming fire from the ramparts, the spaces of open 
ground to be traversed by the assailants were thickly 



Failure at the Redan. 259 

strewed with the fallen. For the most part the attacks, 
made on the part of the French with, in all, 25,000 men, 
resolved themselves into an exchange of rifle fire be- 
tween the assailants spread out around the works, and 
the defenders aiming from the parapets, and aided by 
the field-guns as well as by the regular armament. 

Lord Raglan, though it was seen that the attacks 
were thus far failures, felt bound to take his part in the 
enterprise. He was himself under a very hot cross-fire, 
especially of that now obsolete projectile called grape. 
It was formed of bullets the size of small apples, piled 
symmetrically, and tied round an iron spindle rising 
from the centre of a wooden disc of a size to fit the 
bore of the gun. With the discharge the tie was broken, 
the bullets flew together with a noise like that of a covey 
of partridges, while in rear the spindle, retarded by the 
pressure of air on the disc, came on separately with 
a whistling sound of its own. But round shot also 
dashed plentifully in, and one, after killing a sapper, left 
a gunner lying headless, as if guillotined, in the trench, 
and knocked off the arm of an officer. The grape, 
besides other damage, prostrated the commanding 
engineer with a wound on the forehead, and many 
officers, arriving with intelligence or seeking orders, 
were killed or wounded. It was from this place that 
the order had been given to our troops to attack. 
Upon them, as on the French, a tremendous fire of all 
kinds was poured. The several columns that moved 
out were almost annihilated, and the parts of them that 
still went on were held fast by a belt of abattis in front 



260 A Partial Success. 

of the ditch. General Campbell and Colonel Yea, who 
each led a column, were killed ; the ladder party of 
twenty volunteers lost eleven ; of 120 sailors, fifty-two 
fell ; and the stormers generally in equal proportion. 
Nothing that could be called an assault, of a kind that 
even faintly promised success, took place anywhere ; 
and after a conference between Pelissier and Lord 
Raglan in the Victoria Redoubt, they considered what 
they had seen and learned to be so discouraging that, 
between seven and eight o'clock, all the attacking troops 
were recalled to the trenches. 

Meanwhile a partial success had been achieved on 
our left. General Eyre, with a brigade of 2000 men, 
descending the Picket House ravine, had driven the 
Russians out of buildings and a cemetery at the foot of 
Green Hill. Here they were immediately under the 
Garden Batteries, which all day poured on them a de- 
structive fire ; and an infantry force descending from 
thence, and lining a breastwork in the valley, exchanged 
volleys with our troops, who forced them to regain the 
shelter of their works. Eyre, himself wounded, and his 
troops held their ground till nightfall, with the loss of 
600 men and officers, and the cemetery was then fortified 
by our engineers, who afterwards handed it over to the 
French. 

The losses in the actual assault, during which the 
besieging batteries ceased firing, were heavily against 
the Allies ; but, taken in conjunction with those caused 
by the cannonade of the 17th and 18th, the French lost 
35oomen; the English, 1500; the Russians, 5400. Ofthe 



Todleben wounded. 261 

six generals and commanders, French and English, who 
led the six attacks, four were killed and one disabled. 

The spirit of resistance shown by the Russians was 
such as their nation may well be proud to recall. But it 
was only rendered possible by the reliefs of fresh un- 
harassed troops always available from the army outside. 
When, however, at the moment which the Russians were 
giving to exultation and thanksgiving, the cannonade 
recommenced in all its terrors, the spirit of the soldiery 
gave way, and many of them made for the harbour, 
fighting with their own people there for the boats and 
rafts with which to escape the iron storm that searched 
the crannies of the south side. And they soon had other 
cause for discouragement. Slightly wounded on the 
1 8th, their sagacious, unresting, resourceful, and in- 
domitable engineer, Todleben, was disabled on the 20th 
by a shot through the leg, and was carried from the 
fortress, not to return during the siege. 

Considering his own share in causing the disaster, 
Pelissier showed at least his characteristic hardihood in 
reporting the issue of the attack. The same day he 
telegraphed to Vaillant thus : " From causes which 
cannot now be discussed, our attack of to-day has not 
succeeded, although part of our troops set foot in the 
Malakoff. Our allies not having attained, in spite of 
their vigour, a footing in the Redan, I ordered a with- 
drawal to the trenches." 

The " causes " alluded to in this telegram were set 
forth, in a letter, as the mistakes made by General 
Mayran, in attacking too soon, and by General Brunet, 

R 



262 Pdlissiers Persistency 

for remissness in his preliminary arrangements for the 
assault. When told that both these generals had fallen 
in leading their troops, he uttered what the French 
chronicler Rousset calls truly "a cruel word," and which, 
he says, shocked the staff: "If they were not dead, I 
would send them before a council of war." To Vaillant 
he utters no words which would admit that he was him- 
self to blame. He points out that mistakes made on an 
open field of battle would entail consequences much 
more serious than in an assault from the trenches, where 
the defeated troops were at once sheltered and rallied. 
Not only a defeat, but even a drawn battle in the field, 
would paralyse the Allies, far from their ports and 
resources, and encumbered with sick and wounded. 
Therefore, he is still for prosecuting the siege. " I can- 
not console myself for the failure at the Malakoff other- 
wise than in repairing it by energy, and, above all, by 
method." Niel also wrote to Vaillant, in a tone much 
more moderate and hopeful than was his wont. But 
nothing, apparently, could remove Pelissier's natural 
prejudice against one who criticised and opposed his 
measures, and who had the ear of their master. On the 
26th there was a conference of French generals, when 
Niel, in endeavouring to argue in favour of a certain 
direction of the siege works, was thus met, according to 
his own report of the scene : " The General-in-Chief said 
to me, ' I forbid you, in the most formal manner, to add 
anything to the reading of your note, and if you infringe 
my orders, I warn you I shall resort to rigorous means.' ' : 
The check Pelissier had met with had not softened his 



In prosecuting the Siege. 263 

spirit, or rendered him more conciliatory ; and when, in 
compliance with a hint from Vaillant that the Emperor 
complained of the small attention paid to the Imperial 
views and messages, Pelissier wrote to Louis Napoleon, 
he set forth his conception of the situation no less 
clearly and decisively than before, and weighed the 
Emperor's plan against his own without any sign of 
giving way. "We must look even more carefully to 
the chances of a reverse than to those of a victory. 
Before the fortress our failures do not change the situa- 
tion ; they leave us to-day where we were yesterday ; 
but in a battle in the field the losses and disorders 
will be multiplied in proportion to the distance from our 
base." He then discusses the problem in a very masterly 
way, and winds up thus : " I am too devoted to my 
country, too anxious to serve the Emperor according 
to his views, to be suspected of being governed by 
obstinacy ; it is simply sincerity and devotion which 
actuate me .... Believe that if I do not enter into the 
projects which have your sympathies, Sire, it is because 
I should risk the fortunes of your Majesty, which are the 
fortunes of France." Probably it will be thought that 
Pelissier gave no greater proof of the firmness of his 
character than when he thus adhered to the much-ques- 
tioned plan, in executing which he had just sustained a 
heavy defeat. The letter made a strong impression on 
the Emperor. He had been with difficulty dissuaded 
from displacing Pelissier and giving Niel the command. 
But he now showed this letter to Vaillant as no less 
remarkable for its substance than its form. And 



264 Vaillant sides with Pdlissier. 

Marshal Vaillant himself plays a very fine part in the 
correspondence. He gives excellent counsels, admir- 
ably and often wittily expressed, to the Emperor, to 
Pelissier, and to Niel. He admonishes Niel to conciliate 
Pelissier ; he advises Pelissier to trust Niel. And now 
he declared for Pelissier's plan. "There can be no 
question of field operations now," he writes to Pelissier; 
" that would be to abandon the certain, which, I allow, 
is not brilliant, for the uncertain, which may be disas- 
trous. It is the fortune of France which is played for 
before Sebastopol. At least, let it be well played for, 
.... I have often told the Emperor that the time for 
diversions is past ; that we grasp the fortress too closely 
to distract ourselves with exterior operations, in which 
a check might have terrible consequences." And to Niel 
he says : " To undertake a campaign with the cholera for 
company, and a great siege at our back, would terrify 
me ; I could understand it in May ; in July it is no 
longer possible." So the siege went on ; only Pelissier 
practically confessed his mistake by now resolving to 
push his approaches (as he had phrased it in his letter 
to the Emperor), " as methodically, as prudently, and as 
closely as possible." 

There can be little doubt that the event of the 18th 
June pressed heavily on Lord Raglan. He had never 
appeared to be a commander who took his responsibilities 
anxiously ; indeed, to some observers, it seemed that 
they scarcely impressed him in due proportion to their 
gravity. But the suppression of feeling may itself have 
been costly. Five days after the failure of the assault, 



Death of Lord Raglan. 265 

an officer of his staff wrote : " I fear it has affected Lord 
Raglan's health, he looks far from well, and has grown 
very much aged latterly." He wrote to tell Pelissier he 
was unwell, "but nothing serious." On the 26th he 
spent the morning in his correspondence, which he 
always conducted most industriously ; but when he con- 
cluded it that day, he had written his last letter. 
Cholera, not in its cruel or violent form, declared itself ; 
he sank gradually away, and, on the 28th, died peace- 
fully in the presence of his military household. Next 
day his colleagues came to take a farewell look of him, 
when the stern Pelissier, who had always evinced a great 
regard and even affection for his English colleague, 
showed a new side of his character. " General Pelissier," 
says an officer who was present, " stood by the bedside 
for upwards of an hour, crying like a child." And the 
tribute he paid him in a general order was highly 
appreciated in all the camps, and is so evidently genuine 
in expression, that it may well serve to show in what 
estimation the deceased commander was held by his 
colleagues. 



"Army of the East, No. 15, General Order. 

" Death has suddenly taken away, while in full exercise 
of his command, the Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, and 
has plunged the British in mourning. 

"We all share the sorrow of our brave allies. Those 
who knew Lord Raglan, who know the history of his 



266 His Funeral. 

life, so pure, so noble, so replete with service rendered 
to his country, those who witnessed his fearless demean- 
our at the Alma and Inkerman, who recall the calm and 
stoic greatness of his character throughout this rude and 
memorable campaign, every generous heart, indeed, will 
deplore the loss of such a man. The sentiments here 
expressed by the General-in-Chief are those of the 
whole Army. He has himself been cruelly struck by 
this unlooked-for blow. 

" The public grief only increases his sorrow at being 
for ever separated from a companion-in-arms whose 
genial spirit he loved, whose virtues he admired, and 
from whom he has always received the most loyal and 

hearty co-operation. 

"A. P£LISSIER, 

Commander-in- Chief. 
" Headquarters, 
Before Sebastopol, 
i^thjune 1855." 

The funeral was a very striking spectacle. Covered 
with a white flag, showing the red cross of St George, 
and borne on a gun carriage, the coffin journeyed 
slowly, from the farmhouse which had been the Eng- 
lish headquarters, across the plains. The generals and 
staffs of the four Armies, English, French, Turkish, and 
Sardinian accompanied it, as it moved between saluting 
batteries and lines of troops extending to Kazatch Bay, 
the place of embarkation. Crowds of boats, with naval 
officers, there awaited its transfer to the Caradoc, the 
steamer in which Lord Raglan had come from England, 



Sufferings of the Defenders. 267 

and which was now to take home his remains. His 
destined successsor, General Simpson, was already on 
the spot, and at once assumed the command of the 
army. 

On the 10th July Admiral Nakimoff, who had com- 
manded the Russian Squadron at Sinope, and had been 
one of the foremost chiefs of the defence, was mortally 
wounded in the Malakoff. He was buried, with im- 
posing ceremonies, on the City heights, near the tombs 
of his colleagues, Admirals Lazareff, Korniloff, and 
Istomine, all slain in defending the fortress. 

All through July the defenders of Sebastopol beheld 
the works of the besiegers creeping steadily on ; and 
while the ordinary fire caused them a daily loss of 
250 men, they knew that the interval must be short 
before they would again have to pass through the terrific 
ordeal of another cannonade, with the now ascertained 
result of seeing their artillery silenced, and dreadful 
losses inflicted on the garrison. At the burial truce, 
which followed the 18th June, a young Russian officer 
said to one of our staff,* who had been speaking of the 
losses of the Allies, " with great bitterness of manner and 
voice choked with emotion : ' Losses ! you don't know 
what the word means ; you should see our batteries ; the 
dead lie there in heaps and heaps. Troops cannot live 
under such a fire of hell as you poured upon us.'" In 
that bombardment the Russians had lost from 1000 to 
1 500 a day, and a renewal of the terrible time was now 
approaching. Supposing, then, that the thought of 
* The author of Letters from Headquarters, also quoted on p. 265. 



268 Russian Plans of Battle. 

retreat to the north side could not yet be entertained, 
the question was urgent whether to persevere in the 
passive defence or to bring up their field army for a 
general attack upon the enemy. It seemed that the 
chief officers on the spot were alone competent to settle 
this, and Prince Gortschakoff was ordered, with the 
approval of the Czar, to convene them in a council of 
war, which met on the 9th of August. The majority 
pronounced in favour of taking the offensive, but as to 
the time and mode there was such a diversity of opinion 
as showed how little hopeful was the situation. Whether 
to fling the field army against the positions on the 
Tchernaya ; or to combine with an attack there a great 
sortie from Sebastopol ; or, as one or two desired, to 
evacuate the south side, and combine garrison and field 
army for a great battle ; or whether (as Todleben held) 
the field army should be brought to reinforce the 
garrison, and both hurled against the besiegers' lines ; 
also, whether certain reinforcements of militia should be 
waited for — all these found their advocates. What was 
decided on was to attack the Allies on the upper 
Tchernaya, that is to say, the French on the Fedioukine 
heights,* numbering 18,000 men, with forty-eight guns, 
and the Sardinians, who continued the line up the stream, 
also on a line of heights bordering it, and held a hill on 
the Russian side of the river near Tchorgoun as an out- 
post, and who numbered 9000, with thirty-six guns; while 
close enough to act as a reserve were 10.000 Turks, in 
the valley behind. In addition to these, the French 

* Map 3. See also page 116. 



Russian Advance for Battle. 269 

could readily bring down from the Upland a disposable 
force which would raise the whole Allied Army in this 
locality to 60,000. Besides the obstacle of the Tchernaya, 
there was a watercourse along the front of the Allies, 
who had further protected their lines and batteries by 
intrenchments. 

On the afternoon of the 15th August the Russians 
brought their troops from the Belbek to join those on 
the Mackenzie Farm heights. During the following 
night, the right wing, 13,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 
sixty-two guns, under General Read, moved down the 
high road of the Traktir Bridge, and halted opposite the 
French. The left wing, 16,000 infantry, seventy guns, 
under General Liprandi, moved in two columns ; the 
right one, under that general, followed the march of 
Read ; the left, under General Bellegarde, descending 
the heights by another path, was to halt on the road to 
Tchorgoun. The reserve of infantry, 19,000, with thirty- 
six guns, was to descend by both roads, and draw up 
behind Read ; the great body of cavalry, 8000, with 
twenty-eight guns, was to follow Bellegarde ; the reserve 
artillery, seventy-six guns, to draw up behind the 
infantry reserve. 

Gortschakoff's plan was this : at daybreak, Liprandi 
was to drive in the Sardinian outposts on the right bank 
of the stream, while the whole Army formed to attack. 
Gortschakoff would then determine whether to use his 
whole force for the attack of the Sardinian position, or 
for that of the French, and, till he had determined, all 
were to await orders. The first step in the programme 



270 Battle of the Tchernaya. 

was accomplished by driving the Sardinian outposts as 
far as the last height on the right bank, which they 
continued to hold. But here a terrible disappointment, 
according to his own report, awaited Gortschakoff. 
General Read, apparently interpreting an order sent to 
him " to commence " as meaning " to attack," launched 
both his Divisions, prematurely and without a prelimi- 
nary cannonade, at the heights held by the French. He 
carried the tete de pont with the Division on his left, the 
Twelfth, and ascending by the road, it reached the French 
lines. But it got no farther. Crushed by a tremendous 
fire, it was driven down the hill, and across the stream, 
with immense slaughter. Read's other Division, the 
Seventh, crossing by fords, endeavoured to move along 
between the front of the French and the river, in order to 
attack their left flank, but was soon compelled, after a 
feeble attempt, to regain its own bank in disorder, and 
though suffering a comparatively slight loss, was not again 
brought into action. The Twelfth Division, reformed 
after its repulse, was now used as a support to the Fifth 
of the Reserve in again attacking the French right ; they 
again took the tete de pont, and advanced by the road and 
neighbouring fords across the stream and up the heights, 
but only to be again driven back to their own bank 
ravaged as before, and with the loss of General Read, 
who was killed. Thereupon the Twelfth and Fifth 
Divisions, reduced to half their numbers, were with- 
drawn to ground near the bases of the Mackenzie 
heights, and Liprandi was ordered to send a brigade 
of the Seventeenth Division to the assault. It ascended 



Retreat of the Russians. 271 

at the same points as its predecessors, and like them, 
after reaching the French lines, and undergoing heavy 
loss, was driven back to the other bank, its retreat being 
covered by another of Liprandi's regiments. 

Gortschakoff, seeing that the French were being 
strongly reinforced (a French Division having reached 
the ground, and two others being on the march for it, 
while six battalions of Turks had come up), withdrew 
his troops. His cavalry and guns formed line across 
the valley, the infantry in rear ; and thus for many 
hours he waited, beyond cannon shot, in case the Allies 
should quit their positions to attack him. But this 
formed no part of Pelissier's design. The Russians, 
whose disaster was aggravated by want of water, with- 
drew, and about two P.M. were seen ascending the road 
to the Mackenzie heights, while other columns followed 
the route thither from Tchorgoun, till the whole had 
quitted the field. The slaughter among them had been 
very great. Three generals, sixty-six other officers, and 
2300 men were killed ; 160 officers and 4000 men 
wounded, and thirty-one officers and 1700 men had 
disappeared. The French lost 1 500 killed and wounded ; 
the Sardinians, 200. 

With this defeat vanished whatever faint hope the 
Russian chiefs might have had of retrieving, in any im- 
portant degree, their failing fortunes. The employment 
of militia in this battle showed the approaching exhaus- 
tion of their resources. In May 1855 Lord Lansdowne 
stated in the House of Lords, as derived from authentic 
sources, that a return was made up a few days before 



272 Russian Losses in the War. 

the death of the Emperor Nicholas showing a total loss 
to the Russians of 240,000 men. It seems almost in- 
credible, but the march through the muddy flats, and 
bad, unmetalled roads of Southern Russia, the severity 
of the winter there, the traversing of the wind-swept 
steppes of the Crimea, supplies and shelter being 
throughout the route difficult to obtain, and the trans- 
port of the country destroyed, had put such a strain on 
the troops that, out of every three men who were de- 
spatched to the army, it may be said two fell by the 
way. Besides losses of this kind, in the six months 
from March to August inclusive, 81,000 men had 
been killed or wounded in and around Sebastopol. 
There was a cemetery on the north side, called " The 
grave of the Hundred Thousand," whither the dead were 
conveyed from the works and the hospitals. The 
Armies of the Great Military Powers had not at that time 
approached to their present magnitude, and it was 
evident that even the comparatively huge resources of 
Russia must be drawing towards their end. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE DESTRUCTION OF SEBASTOPOL. 

What Gortschakoff saw in Sebastopol — Yet He resolves to sustain an 
Assault — French Plan of Assault — The Final Bombardment — The 
French Attacking Forces — The English — The Assault — Cost of 
taking the Malakoff — Failure of the French elsewhere — Failure 
at the Redan — Predominance of the Malakoff — Incidents on 
following Days — Constancy of the Garrison — Final Destruction 
of the Fleet. 

Seeing how desperate was the condition of the fortress, 
Prince Gortschakoff had resolved, after the battle of the 
Tchernaya, to abandon the place. In letters to the 
Minister for War, of the 18th and 24th August, he 
expressed this intention, saying there was not a man in 
the Army who would not call it folly to continue the 
defence longer. It was with a view to operating a re- 
treat that he pressed forward the construction of the 
bridge across the harbour, which was to have a roadway 
of sixteen feet, and to bear heavy vehicles. He also 
conferred with Todleben on other measures to protect 
the withdrawal, and, accordingly, barricades were built 
across the streets, and formed into armed and defensible 
works, in which, as a last resort, to hold in check the 
assailants. Preparations were also made for blowing up 
the principal forts and magazines. 



274 What Gortschakoff sazu in Sebastopol. 

Another great cannonade had begun on the 17th 
August. The French lines had now approached so 
close to the place that new additions to them were 
immediately destroyed or rendered untenable by the 
fire from the Malakoff and Little Redan ; and the shower 
of small shells, easily cast into the trenches from the 
ramparts, and called by the French bouquets, greatly 
increased the losses of men. It was for the silencing 
of the artillery which thus hindered the French, that 
the Allied batteries opened in full force against the 
part of the enemy's lines from the Redan to the great 
harbour. But the town front was not included, and the 
English batteries suffered greatly from want of support 
by the works on their left. 

On the 20th August Gortschakoff entered the fortress, 
and went round the lines of defence, upon which the fire 
of the Allies was just then at its height. What he saw 
might well confirm him in his resolution to retreat. 
There was no longer either a city or a suburb to defend, 
for both were heaps of rubbish and cinders. The para- 
pets of the works, dried in the heats of summer, and split 
in huge fragments by the shot, were crumbling into the 
ditches. The interior space was honey-combed with holes 
made by the shells. Gabions and sandbags could not be 
procured to repair the embrasures, which remained in 
ruins. Many of the dismounted guns could no longer be 
replaced, not because there were not plenty in the arsenals, 
but because to mount them by night, under the deadly fire 
of the mortars, entailed such frightful sacrifices of men. 
The defenders of the works were packed in caves under 



Yet He resolves to sustain an Assault. 275 

the parapets ; the gunners lay dead in heaps on the bat- 
teries ; the wounded could not be removed by day, because 
the communications with the rear were now searched 
throughout by the fire of the Allies, and so lay where 
they fell, in torment, in the sun, beside the more fortunate 
slain. On landing, the Prince had passed the hospitals, 
full to overflowing, and the ambulances with the wounded, 
crowding what had been the squares. There was 
nothing to relieve the horrible monotony of destruction 
and devastation, except the bridge, which promised re- 
treat from this misery, and which was approaching 
completion. 

Yet it was after this visit that the Russian General 
changed his mind in the direction of what he had before 
termed folly. " I am resolved," he wrote to the Minister 
for War, on the 1st September, " to defend the south side 
to the last extremity, for it is the only honourable course 
which remains to us." Calculating that the daily loss of 
the garrison was from 800 to 900, and that he could 
bring 25,000 men from the Army outside to reinforce it, 
by leaving only 20,000 to guard the Mackenzie heights, 
he considered he might still prolong the defence for a 
month. Everything was against such a cruel determina- 
tion ; but he proceeded to execute it so far as in him lay. 
It did not, however, rest with him to determine the end. 

The cannonade once more reduced the Malakoff, its 
dependencies and neighbours, to absolute silence, and 
enabled the French to push their works yet closer. The 
soil between the Mamelon and Malakoff could be cut 
into like a cheese, and the trenches were more easily 



276 French Plan of Assault. 

made and better constructed here than elsewhere. The 
English trenches before the Redan had been stopped by- 
solid rock ; the French approaches to the Little Redan, 
now only forty yards from it, had also got into soil so 
stony as would no longer afford cover. The most ad- 
vanced approach to the Malakoff was only separated 
from it by twenty-five yards ; in the soft soil the trenches 
might have been pushed to the very edge of the ditch, 
but only with great loss, and, besides, the facility of 
mining below them would increase as the distance 
lessened. It was therefore deemed that the time for 
assault had come, and it only remained to determine 
the details. Accordingly, a council of war considered 
the matter. After the members had delivered their 
opinions, Pelissier expressed himself thus : " I, too, 
have my plan, but I will not breathe it to my pillow." 
There is, however, no need to be so reticent with the 
reader. The French commander had learned that the 
relief of the troops in the works before him took place 
at noon, and that in order to avoid the great additional 
loss which would be caused by introducing the new 
garrisons before the old ones moved out, the contrary 
course was followed of marching out most of the occu- 
pants before replacing them. Thus noon was the time 
when the Malakoff would be found most destitute of 
defenders, and noon was to be the hour of the assault. 
Also another advantage was offered to the French. The 
salient of the Malakoff had been adapted to the form of 
the tower which it covered, and was therefore circular, 
consequently there was a space in it which could not be 



The Final Bombardment. 277 

seen or fired on from the flanks ; that was the space 
upon which the troops were to be directed. Roadways, 
twenty yards wide, were made through the trenches, and 
then masked by gabions, easily thrown down, by which 
the reserves could be brought up in the shortest time. 
The MalakofT, the Curtain, and the Little Redan were 
each to be attacked by a Division, supported by a 
brigade ; and four Divisions, with other troops, were 
destined to attack the Central Bastion and works near 
it, and break from thence, by the rear, into the Flagstaff 
Bastion. But, first, the cannonade was to be renewed. 
It began on the 5th September, and this time it encircled 
the whole fortress, the French batteries before the town 
opening no less vigorously than the rest. At night a 
frigate in the harbour was set on fire by a shell, and the con- 
flagration for hours lighted up the surrounding scenery. 
On the 6th and 7th the feu d'enfer went on, the Russians 
replying but feebly ; on the night of the 7th a line-of- 
battle ship was set on fire by a mortar, and burnt nearly 
all night ; it contained a large supply of spirits, the blue 
flames from which cast a lugubrious light on the ram- 
parts from the harbour to the Malakoff, producing, says 
Todleben, " a painful impression on the souls of the 
defenders of Sebastopol." 

Daylight, on the 8th, found the Russian defences com- 
pletely manned, the guns loaded with grape, and the 
reserves brought close up. But, as the reader knows, 
the assault was not yet, and the result of these prepara- 
tions to receive it was increased havoc in the exposed 

ranks of the defenders. 

S 



278 The French Attacking Forces. 

Many names which acquired fresh distinction in 
future wars are found among the French commanders 
on this occasion. The Division to attack the Malakoff 
was that of MacMahon, one of whose brigades was com- 
manded by Decaen, the other by Vinoy ; and in reserve 
to it was De Wimpffen's brigade of Camou's Division, 
and two battalions of Zouaves of the Guard, under 
Colonel Jannin. 

Dulac's Division, composed of the brigades of St Pol 
and Bisson, was to attack the Little Redan. In reserve 
were Marolles' brigade of Camou's Division, and a bat- 
talion of chasseurs of the Guard. 

Between these two was posted, opposite the Curtain, 
between the two bastions, La Motterouge's Division, 
formed of the brigades of Bourbaki and Picard ; in 
reserve two regiments of voltigeurs, two of grenadiers 
of the Guard, the whole under General Mellinet, with 
De Failly and Ponteves for brigadiers. Pelissier's head- 
quarters were in the Mamelon. To avoid giving warning 
to the enemy by signalling, the Generals set their watches 
by his, and on the stroke of noon, Bosquet, commanding 
the whole attack on this side, was to launch his troops 
against the lines where the defence was conducted by 
General Khrouleff, to aid whom, with their guns, four 
steamers were held ready in the waters below. 

The attack on the Redan was to be directed by 
General Codrington. His Division (the Light) and the 
Second, under General Markham, were to supply the 
column of attack, of which the covering party, the ladder 
party, the working party (to fill up the ditch, and convert 



The English. 279 

what works we might gain to our own purposes), and 
the main body, were to number 1700, and the supports 
1500. The remainder of these two Divisions, numbering 
3000, was to be in reserve in the third parallel. Also, in 
last reserve, were the Third and Fourth Divisions. 

No attack on the Redan would have been undertaken 
by the English as an isolated operation. Our compul- 
sory distance from that work, the want of a place of 
arms (that is to say, a covered space in the advanced 
trenches of sufficient extent to harbour large bodies of 
troops), the construction of which was forbidden by the 
rocky soil, and the still unsubdued fire from the ramparts, 
all condemned an assault. But it was deemed necessary 
as a distraction in aid of the French, and that purpose 
it fulfilled. 

The two French Divisions for the assault of the 
town defences were assembled in "the work of the 
2d of May." In the right portion of it, and in the ad- 
joining ravine, was the Division of D'Autemarre, formed 
of Niol's and Breton's brigades ; in reserve was Bouat's 
Division. In the left of the same work was Levaillant's 
Division, composed of Trochu's and Couston's brigades, 
which was to head the attack on the Central Bastion and 
the adjoining works, with Pate's Division in reserve. 
Cialdini's Sardinian brigade was to attack the Flagstaff 
Bastion as soon as the Central Bastion should be carried ; 
and two French regiments were to cover the left of the 
forces attacking this part of the lines, which were all 
under General de Salles. The town defences opposite 
him were commanded by General Semiakine. The 



280 The Assault. 

English were to await the hoisting of the tricolour 
and the Union Jack together in the Mamelon as the 
signal for their advance; the French before the town 
were to expect further instructions. 

At noon the whole of Bosquet's first line rushed from 
the trenches. Not a shot was fired at MacMahon's lead- 
ing brigade as it crossed with flying steps the short open 
space, pushed the planks over the ditch, and partly by 
means of these, partly by leaping into the ditch and 
mounting the battered escarp, crowded over the parapet. 
And here Pelissier's expectations were exactly fulfilled. 
The few defenders in the salient were completely sur- 
prised, their commanders killed or captured, and the 
Zouaves, who headed the attack, took absolute posses- 
sion of this corner of the work. But, though the redoubt 
covered 350 yards in depth by 150 in width, the open 
space within was very small, for, behind the round tower, 
rows of traverses, each forming a new line of defence, 
partly crossed it from side to side. As soon as the 
Russian garrison issuing from their shelter caves under 
the traverses, and the reliefs swarming in, had manned 
these, the real struggle began, and it was desperately 
bloody. Every traverse was fought for, taken, and 
retaken, and it was not till Vinoy's brigade, directed on 
the eastern face, had broken in there, in rear of the 
traverses, and had from thence combined with the 
Zouaves in front in attacking them, that the enemy was 
at length forced out of them, and MacMahon's troops 
occupied the work throughout its extent. Many times 
the enemy brought up reserves to retake their strong- 



Cost of taking the Malakoff. 281 

hold, but they could do nothing against the closed rear, 
now powerfully manned, and Prince Gortschakoff, who 
had come up to the foot of the slopes surmounted by the 
Malakoff, at length caused his troops to be withdrawn 
from the hopeless struggle. It was four o'clock when 
the conquest of the principal work was thus fully assured. 
Though well worth the price, it had cost very dear. 
MacMahon's Division had issued from the trenches with 
4520 bayonets and 199 officers. Of these twenty-nine 
officers and 292 men lay dead, and eighty-nine officers 
and 1729 men were wounded. The Zouaves of the 
Guard had lost 311 men out of 627; Wimpffen's brigade, 
637 out of 2100 ; in all, 3087. 

St Pol's brigade went against the Little Redan, and 
Bourbaki's against the Curtain. Both broke into those 
works, but there was an interior line of defence stretch- 
ing across the space from the rear of the Malakoff to the 
rear of the Little Redan. This was strongly defended, 
field batteries were brought up by the Russians, and the 
ships, keeping in motion, and bringing their broadsides 
to bear, made havoc amongst the French in the open 
ground. Both the brigades were compelled, with con- 
siderable loss, to re-enter the trenches, which were filled 
with wounded, and along which it was not easy to pass. 
However, Marolles' brigade was at length sent against 
the Little Redan, the voltigeurs and grenadiers against 
the Curtain, where they once more broke in, and were 
once more driven out. It was now that a singular feat 
was performed. Bosquet gave the order for two batteries 
of field-artillery to advance by the prepared road through 



282 Failure of the French elsewhere, 

the trenches, and come into action against the guns 
which were firing on the French from the Curtain. From 
their station behind the Victoria redoubt they advanced 
at speed, losing many horses as they went, formed up in 
the open space before the Curtain, and came into action 
with their twelve-pounders. But the ground was swept 
both by the artillery and musketry from the enemy's 
parapet. The batteries were at once crushed, and what 
was left of them at last withdrew, leaving most of their 
men and horses, and their commandant, Souty, dead on 
the spot. It was a new operation to essay with artillery. 
It was brilliantly attempted, but the heavy sacrifices were 
incurred absolutely in vain. The attack on this side 
made no further progress. 

The portion of Codrington's troops destined to head the 
attack on the Redan moved rapidly and steadily across the 
open space, though suffering much loss from the heavy 
fire of round shot, grape, case, and musketry now directed 
on them from every available point, and those in front 
passed with ease over the battered rampart and entered 
the work. But the rest, with too strong a reminiscence 
of their mode of action in the trenches, lay down at the 
edge of the ditch and began firing alongside of the 
covering troops, who alone should have performed this 
duty. The supports also reached the ditch, and some 
of them entered the work. But the great reserves, in 
moving through the trenches towards the point of issue, 
were obstructed and discouraged by meeting the numbers 
of wounded men and their bearers, who were of neces- 
sity brought back by the same narrow route, a difficulty 



Failure at the Redan, 28 



6 



which also hindered some of the French attacks, Colonei 
Windham, the leader of the attacking troops, finding 
that his messages for support produced no result, took 
the ill-advised step of going back himself to procure 
reinforcements. It was not surprising that, before he re- 
turned, his men also had withdrawn. It is probably in 
reference to this that the Engineer Journal remarks, in 
excusing the troops, " they retired when they found them- 
selves without any officer of rank to command them." 
They had been overwhelmed by the numbers which the 
Russians brought into the open work ; and as they 
hurried back they suffered not less heavily than in their 
advance. It was unfortunate for them that the French 
had spiked the guns in the Malakoff instead of turn- 
ing them on the enemy moving into the Redan, as 
they ought to have done. With the immense increase 
of difficulties in making way through the crowded 
trenches, and renewing the attack against works now 
fully armed and manned, the attempt was postponed 
till next day, when fresh troops, headed by the High- 
landers, were to renew it. In the meantime our bat- 
teries once more opened with full effect on the now 
crowded Redan. 

On the French left the two leading brigades of 
Couston and Trochu attacked the two works which 
flank on each side the Central Bastion. At first 
Couston's troops had some success ; but the Russians, 
reinforced, drove both brigades back upon the trenches. 
A second assault was even more fruitless. Levaillant's 
Division was preparing for a third attempt, when Pelissier, 



284 The Retreat of the Garrison* 

hearing how complete was the failure, ordered the attack 
in this quarter to cease. 

The French General had learned, soon after the 
Russian attempts to recapture the Malakoff had ceased, 
that masses of the enemy were passing by the bridge to 
the north side. Still he could not yet feel assured that 
his victory was decisive. But, in truth, even before dark- 
ness set in, the Russians, withdrawn from all their works, 
were collecting and moving to the harbour, under cover 
of the barricades; those in front of the town towards the 
bridge, those from the works of the suburb towards 
points in the harbour where steamers and boats were 
to transport them to the north side. By daybreak the 
whole of the garrison, carrying most of the wounded 
with them, had made good their retreat. But the 
means adopted to prevent the Allies from pressing into 
the place revealed, during the night, that Sebastopol 
was being abandoned. Measures had been taken by the 
garrison to ensure the explosion of the magazines in the 
works and forts at considerable intervals. Thirty-five 
of these were blown up successively, the first at eleven 
o'clock ; at the same time fires broke out wherever any- 
thing combustible yet remained in the ruined city, and 
the glare of the conflagrations was augmented by the 
burning of two line-of-battle ships in the harbour, where 
most of the rest were at the same time sunk. All night 
sleep was driven from the camps by the roar of the ex- 
plosions, which shook the plains as if with the tremors of 
an earthquake, and combined, with the red light glowing 
murkily against the canopy of smoke, to render the scene 



Predominance of the Malakoff. 285 

terrific. Soon after daybreak an explosion more tremen- 
dous than the rest seemed to blow the city and suburb 
against the sky, a vast cloud rising in earthy volumes and 
darkening the sun. Beneath it the bridge was seen to be 
disconnected from the southern shore, and the last of the 
retiring troops were descried ascending the opposing 
slope. Divided by the harbour, the hostile armies, from 
the heights, looked on the destruction of the city, which 
seemed a fitting conclusion to the hardships and the 
conflicts of the immense hosts that had contended for 
it. Copious libations of blood marked this final sacrifice. 
The French lost, in all, 7567 officers and men ; Generals 
St Pol, Marolles, Ponteves, Rivet, and Breton were 
killed ; Bosquet, Mellinet, Bourbaki, and Trochu were 
wounded. The English lost 2271 officers and men; 
Generals Warren, Straubenzee, and Shirley among the 
wounded. The Russians lost, on this last day, 12,913 
officers and men ; two generals killed, and five wounded. 
Next day access to the Malakoff showed how com- 
pletely it dominated the surrounding works. It looked 
into the interior of the Redan, swept in its view every 
corner of the suburb, was only 1200 yards from the har- 
bour, and commanded, within range, the only anchorage 
of the fleet, as well as the bridge which formed the sole 
line of retreat for the Russians. In consideration of its 
importance, Todleben had lavished on it all possible 
means of defence, making of it a citadel, and in order 
to guard against an attack on its rear by an enemy who 
might have penetrated elsewhere, he had closed the 
gorge, a precaution, however, which had the grave dis- 



286 Incidents on following Days. 

advantage of assuring possession of it to the French 
when they had once succeeded in expelling its garrison. 
On the other hand, the Redan showed an open interior 
space, which, widening from the salient to the rear, en- 
abled the troops assembling in its defence always to 
enter in great force, and to present a front more exten- 
sive than that of the assailants. These different condi- 
tions in some degree account for success on one point, 
failure on the other. 

The explosions still continued on the 9th, when in 
the afternoon Fort Paul was completely blown into the 
air; a failure in the firing arrangement prevented Fort 
Nicholas from following it. On this day the dead were 
brought out for burial. The open space between the 
Curtain and the intrenchment in rear of it, and the 
corner of the Little Redan, were heaped with slain. 
The explosion of a great magazine in this latter work 
had opened a chasm there, which was now made the 
grave of the Russians ; while the French killed in this 
part of the assault were brought out and laid on the 
grass before the Curtain, extending in long rows, accord- 
ing to their regiments, to the number of more than a 
thousand. One part of this space was heaped with the 
wreck of the two field batteries, and the bodies of the 
artillerymen and horses. 

On the 10th the Vladimir crossed the harbour, 
under a flag of truce, to ask for certain of the wounded 
which, in the retreat of the garrison, had been left be- 
hind in a hospital. The building was very spacious, 
and in. it was concentrated an extraordinary amount of 



Constancy of the Garrison, 287 

human misery. It had afforded shelter to 2000 des- 
perately wounded men. They had lain here two days 
and nights, without aid, without nourishment, surrounded 
by the din of explosions, and by flaming buildings, 
which alone dispelled for them the darkness of night. 
In one vast room were 700, many of whom had under- 
gone amputation, and who were all dead of misery, 
lying in blood on their beds, or on the floor as they 
had writhed on to it. Five hundred were still alive, and 
were conveyed to the Vladimir. Three English officers 
wounded and captured in the assault were found here, 
who lived long enough to be conveyed to camp. 

Perhaps even stronger testimony to the unhappy 
condition of the garrison was afforded by the provision 
made for sheltering the troops who occupied the works. 
Huge subterranean barracks had been dug under the 
ramparts, the earth above being supported on the trunks 
of trees. These dismal chambers were entered by 
tunnels, and it was here that the troops destined to 
oppose assaults found all the repose that could be given 
to them when not immediately called on to face the 
unrelenting iron storm which swept across the open 
space of the interior. Phrases can hardly do justice 
to the constancy, the military spirit, of a soldiery that 
could, under such conditions, readily obey the call which 
brought them to the last struggle, and so bear themselves 
in it that their enemies had everywhere recoiled, except 
at one point. The only vulnerable spot of the defences 
had proved to be that on which every resource of war had 
most profusely been brought to bear, and success here 



288 Final Destruction of the Fleet. 

had been achieved almost by accident. Pelissier tersely 
expressed how sharp had been the crisis, how doubtful 
the chance, when he said, " We were four all, and I turned 
the king." Vast consequences were involved in the fate of 
the Malakoff, for the chiefs of engineers and artillery, in 
face of the fact that we were again brought round to the 
time of year at which we had first approached Sebas- 
topol, had come to the conviction that, if the place were 
not taken before winter, it would, as a matter of course, 
be necessary to raise the siege ; and they had gone on 
to the deduction that it was therefore indispensable to 
hasten its conclusion by an immediate assault. 

Next day two eight-inch guns, placed on the espla- 
nade of the town, were brought to bear on the Vladimir, 
hulling her several times. In the night the Russians 
consummated the sacrifice of all that they had fought 
to defend by burning or sinking the remainder of their 
war-vessels. Morning saw of the Black Sea Fleet no 
tokens except protruding stumps of masts, and frag- 
ments floating on the waters — a sight which any Turk 
who may have chanced to survive the massacre of 
Sinope must be thought to have surveyed with peculiar 
pleasure. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. 

A Further Question — Views of the Emperor and His Generals — Operations 
at Eupatoria and Kinburn — Destruction of the Docks — The Govern- 
ment's Wish to push on — Vaillant's Views — Pelissier's Views — Ex- 
cellent State of the British Army — A Diplomatic Difficulty — The 
Emperor and the Queen — New Proposal of Russia — Good Faith of 
Louis Napoleon — The Treaty of Peace — Strength of the British 
Army — The Results of the War — Russia repudiates the Treaty 
later — England retains Interest in the Crimea — The Graves of the 
Crimea — All that remains of the War. 

MASTERS of the smoking ruins, and thus far relieved 
from a huge difficulty, the Allies did not yet see clearly 
the way before them. The Russian army, now become, 
by its close connection with the Inkerman heights, al- 
together a field army, defied them from beyond the 
harbour ; and although the objects with which the war 
had been undertaken were accomplished, yet the fact 
that the enemy still held the field could not be ignored. 
The question, What was to be done next ? was taken 
up and dealt with by Louis Napoleon himself. " The 
Emperor wants to know your projects," Vaillant tele- 
graphed to Pelissier ; " he hopes you will not run your 
head against the fortified Mackenzie position, but will 
manoeuvre like a skilful general." Next day Louis 
Napoleon, in a letter to his Minister in London, set forth 
his views. He wished to turn the month of October to 



290 Views of the Emperor and His Generals - 

account by a forward movement of the army, its right 
wing in advance, so as to force the Russians to abandon 
their positions near Sebastopol by threatening their com- 
munications. He went on to observe, that when the 
Allies should be thus masters of the Crimea, they would 
occupy themselves with filling in the trenches, repairing 
the land defences, taking care of the docks and barracks, 
and re-establishing the harbour as a port. They would 
then abandon the Crimea, keeping Sebastopol only, and 
leaving there a garrison and a fleet. They would thus hold 
an important gage, until Russia, who could not hope to re- 
take the fortress, should consent to treat ; and, instead of 
further destruction, they should repair the establishments 
of the town as much as possible, in order to have some- 
thing of value to offer. He also wrote to Pelissier, 
urging him to use the last of the fine weather in an 
advance upon Simpheropol, which the reinforcement of 
the Russian Army would render impossible next year. 
Niel took the same view. But Pelissier was not to be 
persuaded to abandon his own opinions. " I have been 
using my troops to feel for a way of advancing on my 
right. The Russians keep their positions behind the 
rocky heights, which extend from Inkerman beyond 
Simpheropol ; they have garnished the gaps in them 
with artillery, and made them more difficult to force 
than the ramparts of Sebastopol. In engaging there in 
bloody combats, producing no results, we might throw 
away the good position we have gained. But I will 
attack if you give the order." To appear, however, to 
comply with the desire for action, so far as he deemed 



Operations at Eupatoria and Kinburn. 291 

safe, he left only one French Division with the English on 
the Upland, and spread his army along the Tchernaya, 
and into the valley of Baidar ; and at the same time 
sent a force of cavalry and guns to Eupatoria to operate 
with the Turks from that place against the Russian corps 
observing it, where some success was gained over the 
enemy's cavalry ; and the Allied Generals were encour- 
aged by it to augment the forces there (of which General 
D'Allonville commanded the whole) by a Division of 
French infantry and a brigade of English cavalry. 

Also, a combined operation was undertaken against 
Kinburn, where the rivers Dnieper and Bug flow into 
a wide estuary, after forming highways for transport 
through districts affording abundant supplies. On one 
of these, at Nikolaieff, was a great naval station and 
arsenal. An English brigade, under General Spencer, 
and a French brigade, under General De Wimpffen, 
both commanded by General Bazaine, were disem- 
barked, under cover of a combined naval squadron, 
whereupon the troops and ships together brought an 
attack to bear which in a few hours caused the place 
to surrender. With it the Russian Army in the Crimea 
lost another important source of supply. 

All this time the British Ministers were not entirely 
at one with the Emperor. Sharing his desire for a for- 
ward movement of the armies, they strongly opposed 
his idea of conserving the maritime establishments of 
Sebastopol. In this they had much reason. It had 
always been evident that Russia could have no object 
in maintaining a war fleet in this inland sea, where 



292 Destruction of the Docks. 

her commerce between shore and shore could need no 
protection, except to use it in prosecuting her designs 
on her neighbour's territory. It was quite in accordance 
with logic, therefore, when we had just been rejoicing over 
the destruction of the Russian Fleet, that we should de- 
stroy the means of restoring that fleet now that they 
lay in our power. As to preserving them in order to 
have something to treat with, no provision on paper 
that we could wring from so slippery an antagonist, 
against the undue use of his naval power, could compare 
in efficacy with the step of leaving him no naval power 
to use. Pressed by the British Government, the Emperor 
consented. Between Christmas and February the French 
and British engineers destroyed the great docks, the 
remaining forts and barracks on the south side of the 
harbour, and the aqueducts which supplied the docks. 

The minor successes at Eupatoria and Kinburn by 
no means satisfied the desire either of the Emperor or of 
the British Government for a more complete and sub- 
stantial triumph. The military situation, where the 
Allies on the one side of the Tchernaya, the Russians 
on the other, stood face to face, each defying their enemy 
to attack, presented itself under different aspects. Under 
one of these, it seemed as if the Allies, pent in their 
corner, though they had gained the immediate prize, 
could not claim a victory so long as a Russian army was 
in the field ready to fight them. Under another, it might 
appear that the Allies, having destroyed that standing 
menace to Turkey, the Russian Fleet, with its arsenal 
and docks, thus attaining the grand object for which 



The Government ' s Wish to push on. 293 

they had resorted to arms, might well be content to hold 
what they had gained, and to see the enemy squander his 
remaining strength in maintaining an army under such 
difficulties as he must find in doing so at the extremity 
of the Empire. Louis Napoleon, as was inevitable, viewed 
the case with reference to the effect on his own hold on 
France. It seemed to him that he still had to satisfy the 
Country and the Army. This thought set his imagination 
once more at work in the region of strategy. He had a 
vision of a great army, based on Kinburn, invading Russia 
by the bank of the Dnieper, and thus compelling its army 
to leave the Crimea and move towards the threatened 
territory. This project, laconically disposed of by Vail- 
lant, seems never to have been under general discus- 
sion. The British Government, equally desirous of active 
operations, left the mode of execution to the generals 
on the spot. " It is important," Lord Clarendon wrote 
to Lord Cowley, so late as the 31st October, "to give 
positive orders to the Generals in Chief to drive the 
Russians out of the Crimea before the bad season sets 
in. If this is found impossible, at any rate we might 
harass them daily during the winter, so as to force them 
to retreat before spring. The military honour, and the 
political interests, of France and England require this 
triumph and this guarantee ; we must have it at any 
price. Even during the winter our Fleets can so trans- 
port our troops as to harass and threaten the Russians 
on all sides ; in any case, something may be done to 
increase their difficulties and diminish their prestige." 
On the other hand, Vaillant, whatever his views earlier 

T 



2 94 Vaillanis Viezvs. 

in the autumn, now thought it too late for action. He 
discussed all the projects for active operations. "We 
cannot, from our position at Kinburn, seriously threaten 
the Russian communications. On their right towards 
Eupatoria, on their left on the Mackenzie heights, the 
enemy are covered by obstacles, natural and artificial, 
which defend all the approaches to the vast intrenched 
camp which they occupy north of Sebastopol. Every- 
where they have retired behind their formidable lines, 
without risking an engagement, as soon as the Allies 
have moved forward. The difficulties of the roads, the 
want of water, the absence of resources of all kinds, have 
forced General D'Allonville to fall back on Eupatoria, as 
they forced Marshal Pelissier to retire into the valley 
of Baidar after having pushed forward on the road to 
Bakshisarai. In this situation, the greater part of our 
Forces in the Crimea have become useless, and the 
measure of withdrawing all that can be withdrawn, 
without risk to our position there, appears to us reason- 
able. Should the British Government not think itself 
able to adopt this course, in view of adverse public 
opinion in England, the French Government ought in 
strictness to renounce it ; but in maintaining all their 
present forces in the Crimea, these must be kept in 
their present winter quarters on the Chersonese, without 
exhausting themselves in vain and perhaps perilous at- 
tempts, which the winter must render nearly impractic- 
able." On the original draft of this reply the Emperor 
wrote : " I find this Note perfect." Pelissier, too, renewed 
his objections to any forward movement. He disposed 



Pdlissiers Views. 295 

of the Emperor's project for operating from Kinburn 
by endeavouring to show it to be impracticable. He 
considered it necessary, in the interests of the alliance, 
that the French and English Armies should no longer 
operate together, and set forth a plan for retaining 
a proportion of the French Forces round Sebastopol, 
at Kinburn, and at Constantinople, and sending the 
rest back to France, while the English, with the Turks, 
should occupy Kertch, and operate in Circassia towards 
Tiflis. France would thus be ready to meet a possible 
endeavour of Russia to transfer the war to Germany at a 
time when the Crimea would otherwise still absorb the 
strength of the French Army. A little later he expressed 
himself still more strongly. " Thank God it is not diffi- 
culties which frighten me. The capture of Sebastopol 
— of which the chiefs of this Army, and others greater 
than they, were still doubtful on the 7th September — 
showed that I could face dangers when I saw success 
beyond. But here the situation is not the same. I see 
the obstacles ; I do not perceive the success, nor even 
the hope of it. I should be perplexed to form a plan of 
campaign, still more to carry one out. ... If, then, the 
Allied Governments should decide on operations such as 
I have been discussing, I should be obliged, to my eternal 
regret, to decline the honour of directing them." 

No doubt Pelissier was one of the most resolute 
of commanders ; yet it may nevertheless be doubted 
whether he was not swayed by influences apart from his 
estimate of the military problems before him, and such 
as have weight with less resolute men. He had under- 



296 Excellent State of the British Army. 

gone a tremendous strain, such as might well diminish 
his ardour, while the conflict hung so long in the balance. 
He had at last achieved a triumph, all the more brilliant 
because of the failure of his allies. It might well seem 
to him that such further successes as were to be gained 
in this remote region could hardly exalt the fame of him 
or his Army. His officers, were openly showing their 
desire to receive at home the compensations for all their 
trials which there awaited them — a desire which he may 
have shared more than he was conscious of, for he was 
growing old and heavy of frame. The notion of a cam- 
paign on the Rhine, a much more conspicuous and 
attractive theatre of war, was generally entertained in the 
army. French surgeons had prognosticated a decline 
in the health of the troops under existing conditions, 
and their apprehensions were even now beginning to be 
realised in a visitation of typhus. Above all, the French 
people were tired of the war, and ready to welcome back 
their army. 

On the other hand, those responsible for the condi- 
tion of the British army had turned the sharp lessons 
of the campaign to singularly good account. Our troops 
in the Crimea were now fed, housed, and clothed in the 
best way, and their health was as good as at a home 
station. The strength of the army was increasing every 
month. In November it numbered 5 i,ooo, of which 4000 
cavalry and ninety-six guns, besides a Turkish legion, 
raised by the British Government, of 20,000, and a 
German legion of io ; ooo. Our Land Transport corps 
could speedily be made adequate to the needs of these 



A Diplomatic Difficulty. 297 

large forces in a campaign in the field. Our army 
medical system now so greatly surpassed that of the 
French that a commission was sent from Paris expressly 
to study it. The comparison between the two armies 
had become enormously in our favour. Our fleet, too, 
had been vastly augmented in force and efficiency. In 
these circumstances, it was natural that the British 
people should prefer another campaign to any treaty of 
peace which should fail to fulfil their just expectations. 

It was at this time that a diplomatic difficulty arose 

very threatening to the alliance, and which brought the 

variance in the desires and interests of the two Allied 

nations strongly into view. After the fall of Sebastopol 

Austria had once more come forward with proposals for 

peace. These were, from the British point of view, such 

as we ought not to accept. But Russia had at this time 

so established her influence with high officials in France 

that they had first concerted with Austria, and without 

reference to England, what these terms should be, and 

had then laid them before the British Government as 

what must be accepted without modification. Palmer- 

ston was not the sort of Minister to allow his country to 

be thus dealt with, and intimated that England intended 

to maintain her claims as a principal in the negotiations. 

The communications between the two Governments grew 

sharper in tone, and at length Lord Palmerston signified 

to the French Ambassador that, rather than be forced 

into the acceptance of unsatisfactory terms of peace, 

England would continue the war with no other ally than 

Turkey, and that she felt herself fully in a condition to 



29S The Emperor and the Queen. 

enter on such a course. Never had the alliance, through- 
out the war, been so strained as now. The Emperor 
endeavoured to restore concert by writing a letter to 
the Queen, recommending the Austrian proposals to 
favourable consideration. The Queen's reply, pointing 
out, in the most friendly spirit, the difference of posi- 
tion in the two Governments, and consequently in their 
points of view — the Emperor responsible to nobody 
w r hile in England the advisers of the Sovereign must 
recommend only such steps as can be defended in 
Parliament — contains this passage : " I cannot conceal 
from your Majesty my fears, founded upon information 
on which I can rely, that the language held at Paris by 
men in office, and others who have the honour to ap- 
proach you, in regard to the financial difficulties of 
France, and the absolute necessity of concluding peace, 
has already produced a very mischievous effect at 
Vienna, at Berlin, and at St Petersburgh ; and that it 
is very possible that Austria may by this time be dis- 
posed to draw back from her ultimatum, and to seek to 
obtain more favourable terms for Russia." It appeared, 
from the Emperor's subsequent expressions, that the 
nature of the British objections to the Austrian pro- 
posals had been misrepresented to him by persons about 
him who desired peace on any terms — the source of that 
desire being perhaps explained by a passage in a letter 
of the Prince Consort, where, discussing the aspect of 
affairs in France, he speaks of the " stockbroking pro- 
pensities of its public men." But Louis Napoleon him- 
self was thoroughly loyal to the alliance, and now, says 



New Proposal of Russia. 299 

Martin, " took means to let it be known that, however 
this note might be sounded for purposes of the Bourse, 
he would be no party to a peace of which England did 
not approve. If the war had to be carried on, France 
would not be found backward." " Whatever I think 
right," he said to Lord Cowley, " I will do, and I shall 
not be afraid of making my conduct understood in 
France." 

Nevertheless Russia must have felt great confidence 
in the agencies she had set to work in Paris, for she not 
only conveyed to the French Government her determina- 
tion to accept no proposals that should come in the form 
of an ultimatum (that is to say, accompanied by a threat 
of joining the alliance) from Austria, but put forth a 
proposition of her own, of the most preposterous tenor, 
respecting the limitation of her power in the Black Sea, 
the point in which the British people were most in- 
terested. She caused it to be proposed " that the Dar- 
danelles should be closed, and that no ships of war 
should henceforth enter the Black Sea except those of 
Russia and Turkey, which should be maintained there 
in such numbers as the two neighbours should agree 
between themselves, without a voice on the part of the 
other Powers." That the wolf should thus be left to 
arrange matters with the lamb would have been a very 
singular outcome to the costly efforts by which Russia 
had been reduced to her present condition, and her 
audacity in still maintaining such pretensions shows 
how strong was her reliance on the influences at work 
with the corrupt officials of the French Empire. But 



300 Good Faith of Louis Napoleon. 

her game of brag was nearly at an end. Austria had 
at last laid before the Allied Powers a carefully prepared 
treaty, which, though short in some respects of what 
England had a right to claim, had been found to be 
what the British Ministry could accept, and this had now 
been sent as an Austrian ultimatum to St Petersburgh, 
the period for the Russian reply being limited to the 18th 
of January. The Emperor of the French had made it 
understood that he was prepared either to make peace on 
these terms, or to continue the war with increased vigour, 
and he suggested that a council of war should meet in 
Paris to settle the course of action for the following spring. 
In consequence, British, French, and Italian officers, 
convened for the purpose, held their sittings in his capital, 
while the intention of Russia was still undeclared. 

The alliance, thanks to the good faith of Louis 
Napoleon, having thus proved firm, the hollow preten- 
sions of Russia vanished like a bubble. Her exhaustion 
left her no choice but to accept. Her losses, never 
accurately known, had been stupendous. Up to the end 
of August those in the Crimea alone were estimated at 
153,000 men, while hundreds of thousands, drawn from 
the recesses of the vast Empire, had died of the hardships 
of the march. Altogether it was confidently believed 
that her total loss during the war was not less than half 
a million of men. 

On the 16th of January she accepted the Austrian 
terms as the basis of conference, and on the 25 th February 
the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers met at Paris. Their 
first act was to settle the conditions of an armistice, which 



The Treaty of Peace. 301 

was to last till the 31st March. After that, the first 
point taken was the neutralisation of the Black Sea, 
and the article opening its waters to the commerce of 
all nations, and interdicting it to ships of war, was 
passed with unexpected facility. Another article which 
excluded Russia from the bank of the Danube was 
more strenuously contested by her representatives ; 
but this also was finally agreed to. Also, an article 
was included which admitted Turkey to a participa- 
tion in the public law and concert of Europe, and 
prohibited the other Powers, singly or collectively, 
from interference in questions between the Sultan and 
his subjects, or in the internal administration of his 
Empire. 

The Treaty of Paris was signed on the 30th March. 
It was well known in the congress that, but for Eng- 
land, the conditions imposed on Russia would have been 
far easier. And though they were still too easy, yet 
England might congratulate herself on having obtained 
so much in circumstances so adverse. For the Emperor 
was perhaps the only man in France who held firmly to 
the alliance. The French nation had no strong interest 
in the affairs of Turkey, and was now ready to believe, 
and to proclaim, that it had been made the tool of 
England. And Louis Napoleon himself had already 
obtained from the war all that was necessary for his pur- 
pose, in the victory of the Tchernaya, and the brilliant 
finale of the MalakofT; while the unfortunate condition 
into which his army in the Crimea had fallen during the 
winter supplied an ample reason for desiring peace. 



302 Strength of the British Army. 

Nevertheless he continued to act in thorough unison with 
his ally, and again declared that he was ready to recom- 
mence the war if Russia should refuse her concurrence to 
the treaty. The feeling with which the two nations re- 
garded the close of the war was thus expressed by the 
Prince Consort : " Peace is signed. Here it has been 
received with moderate satisfaction ; in Paris with exulta- 
tion." That they should have cause for even moderate 
satisfaction was by the British people rightly attributed 
to the firm, patriotic spirit of Palmerston, who, amid 
all the clamours of the Peace Party and the Oppo- 
sition, steered right on, winning a popularity which, 
when he appealed to the Country in the following 
year, returned him to power with a largely increased 
majority. 

On the 2d April the Upland was for the last 
time shaken by the thunders of the artillery of the 
Allies. This time it proclaimed in salutes the tidings 
of peace. To those who have noted the difficulty with 
which we put even a small army in the field in these 
days, the dislocation of all our establishments which 
attends the operation, and the paucity of reserves, there 
is something almost marvellous in the strength of our 
Forces in the Crimea at the close of a war in which we 
had lost 22,000 men. At Christmas 1855 we had there 
still greater forces of men than those already enumerated, 
with 120 guns ; and in the middle of April 18,000 fresh 
troops were mustered at a field-day in Aldershot camp. 
The land transport, the commissariat, and the hospital 
system of the Army were all in excellent working order. 



The Results of the War. 303 

But they did not long remain so. Upon the return of 
the Army, the reduction of its establishments was effected 
in the usual reckless fashion. We soon reverted to our 
customary condition of military inefficiency, and during 
the next thirty years nearly all that remained to us as 
the result of the experience which we had gained in the 
war were the present excellent system of our military 
hospitals, the great example of these established at 
Netley, the framework of the Land Transport corps, 
which still survives in the Army Service corps, and 
Aldershot camp. 

For a whole generation the world continued to have 
the benefit of the war in the enforced quiescence of 
Russia. Her wounds were too deep to permit her dur- 
ing that time to attempt measures of aggression, or to 
indulge a desire to disturb the peace of the world. And 
this result proved that the point of attack upon her had 
been rightly and fortunately selected. The small pro- 
portion of coast line she exposes to the descent of an 
invader, the immense distances from the extremities to 
the heart of the Empire, the scarcity of roads, the rigours 
of the climate, all rendered the attack of the Western 
Powers upon Russia a nearly insoluble problem. But 
on the other hand, when she had once resolved to bring 
all her might and all her resources to bear on the defence 
of Sebastopol, these conditions turned against her, and 
rendered her course absolutely ruinous. Her fleets were 
at once imprisoned in their ports, her troops were obliged 
to traverse enormous spaces to reach the point of conflict, 
the length and bad condition of the lines of communica- 



304 Russia repudiates the Treaty later. 

tion rendered the supply of the Army difficult and ex- 
travagantly costly, the winter brought untold losses to 
the columns moving through mud and snow, and exposed 
to piercing winds. The requisitions for supplies and 
transport disorganised Southern Russia, and ruined its 
husbandry. A speedy victory of the Allies, however 
complete, would have left the great resources of the 
enemy untouched, and the victors without an object. 
In such a case, it is difficult to say how or when the war 
would have ended, or how long the Western nations 
would have endured to see it drag on. But, in the 
course of the long siege, every failure on the part 
of the Allies, every gleam of hope which induced 
Russia to send fresh reinforcements to the Crimea, 
only served to prolong the terrible stress which was 
exhausting her. 

Therefore the war was worth all it had cost. Its 
effect was not merely to defeat, but to disarm and dis- 
able the enemy. But to this advantage there was a 
limit. It had always been felt that Russia would not 
submit to the treaty longer than it could be enforced. 
A condition compelling a Power to refrain from certain 
acts on which it is bent will be repudiated at a fitting 
opportunity. It was when the Germans were in Ver- 
sailles that the Minister of the Czar issued a Note 
repudiating the Treaty of Paris. That was a moment 
when the other signatories were in no condition to 
enforce it, and Russia set about, among other things, 
the restoration of Sebastopol as a naval station, with its 
docks and arsenal. A Black Sea Fleet was once more 



England retains Interest in the Crimea. 305 

to ride in its harbour, and was to be again a standing 
menace to Turkey. On the 18th May 1886 the Tchesma 
ironclad was launched by the Czar in person at Sebas- 
topol ; and on the 28th May 1890 it was announced in 
the Times that " the official trials of the Imperial 
Russian ironclad Sinope " (ominous name !) " were com- 
pleted at Sebastopol last week, and the results were 
considered highly satisfactory. This formidable war- 
ship, one of the most powerful in the Russian Navy, has 
been built at Sebastopol, and forms one of the Black 
Sea Fleet." Thus had the great war been rounded off 
into an episode, having no further connection with the 
future. Other great wars have been fought out since, 
with more permanent influence on the destinies of 
nations ; new and pressing interests have arisen ; old 
alliances, with their obligations, have been dissolved ; 
and, amid the shiftings of European policy, Russia once 
more makes ready for her opportunity. 

But the interest of England in that Upland, and 
those valleys, on which her eyes and thoughts were once 
so earnestly bent, has not yet entirely ceased. Their 
soil still holds a multitude of her sons, the memory of 
whom has not altogether died out. In spots outside 
the several camps to which the dead could be most 
readily conveyed, in the precincts of battlefields, in the 
neighbourhood of conflicts in the trenches, a great 
number of burial-grounds had been formed, which were 
afterwards enclosed with some kind of fence, and gar- 
nished with memorials. A commanding point of the 
exterior range of hills, which extended between the 



306 The Graves of the Crimea. 

camps of the British Divisions and their siege batteries, 
was known as Cathcart's Hill, because the general who 
fell at Inkerman was buried there, with many others. 
It had become the chief cemetery; it was enclosed with 
a lofty wall, and the graves, carefully tended by the com- 
rades of those who lay there, were marked with head- 
stones and crosses, and more considerable mementoes. 
Englishmen visiting the plateau in recent times noticed 
that the fences of these grave-yards had become ruin- 
ous, and that many of the bones were scattered. When 
this became known at home, it was resolved that all the 
remains which had not yet mixed with the soil, and 
reappeared in the grass and the flowers, should be trans- 
ported, along with their memorial stones, to Cathcart's 
Hill, the cemetery on which should be placed in repair, 
and provision made for so maintaining it. All this was 
effected a few years ago. The Englishman who may 
still be attracted to the spot reads there names once 
well known in England ; and looking on the neighbour- 
ing hills and hollows, where so protracted a strife was 
waged, and where so many thousands fell, he sees the 
points which mark the Russian lines of defence, with 
the famous Malakoff and Mamelon standing up in all 
their former defiance ; while beyond, against the blue 
of the Euxine, are the streets and domes and churches 
of the city, risen from its ashes. New batteries protect 
the shore, the docks once more resound with the clang 
of labour, the port is filled with the barks of commerce, 
and guarded by the vessels of war. Yet a few years, 
and all those who still remember how passionately the 



All that remains of the War. 307 

thoughts and wishes of the people of England were 
once directed on this spot, will themselves have de- 
parted, and nothing will then survive to remind the 
world of this long and desperate conflict of giants 
except a page in history. 



THE END. 



INDEX. 



A. 

Aberdeen, Lord, 5, 13, 183. 

Adams, Brigadier, 31, 56, 145, 148. 

Aga.7iiemnon, The, 30, 38, 106. 

Airey. General, 75, 187. 

Aldershot, 303. 

Alexander II., Czar, 216. 

Alexander, Fort. 81. 

Allied Armies, Landing of, 40. 

Allied Armies, Losses of, 62, 106, 158, 176, 254, 

260. 271, 281, 285. 
Allied Armies, Strength of, 31, 40, 98, 128. 268. 
Allied Fleets, 10, 14, 22, 30, 68, 98, 106. 
Alma, Battle of, 54. 
Alma, River, 38, 47, 66. 
Alma Tamack, 47. 
Aloushta, 219, 228, 235. 
Anapa, 242. 
Arabat, Fort, 242. 
Argonauts, 24. 
Army Service Corps, 303. 
Artillery Fort, 81 
Austria, 3, 21, 217, 223, 297. 
Austria, Emperor of, 3, 20. 
Austrian Ultimatum, 300. 
Azof, Sea of, 226, 240. 

B. 

Baidar, Valley of, 219, 228, 235, 243, 291, 291. 1 

Bakshisarai, 37, 43, 71, 76, 219, 235, 294. 

Balaklava, 36, 38, 72, 78. 80, 167. 

Balaklava Battle of, no. 

Balchick, Bay of, 29. 

Balkans, The, 19. 

Barrack Battery, 92. 

' Barrier, The,' 142, 145, 147. 

Bastion No. 1, 89. 

Bazaine, General, 29T. 

Belbek River, 38, 76, 269. 

Bellegarde, General, 269. 

Bentinck, General, 31. 

Berlin, 298. 

Bisson. General, 278. 

Bizot, General, 199, 227. 

Black Sea, 17, 22, 36, 223, 240, 288, 299, 301. 

Bladensburg, 32. 

Bomarsund, 204. 

Bombardment, 104, 210, 248, 277, 



Bosphorus, 2, 10, 16, 180. 

Bosquet. General, 50, 54, 82, 124, 139, 153, 250, 

255, 278, 280. 
Bouat, General, 279. 
Bourbaki, General, 153, 27S'. 
Bourliouk, 47, 51, 53, 66. 
Brancion, Colonel, 251. 
Breton, General, 279. 
Bright, Mr, 162. 
Brown, Sir George, 32, 55, 153. 
Bruat, Admiral. 226. 
Brunet, General, 261. 
Bug, River. 291. 
Bulganak. River, 38, 44. 
Bulgaria, 28. 

Buller, General, 32, 56, 139, 143. 
Burgoyne, General, 93. 
Burgoyne, Sir John, 38, 69, 93, 103, 105, 178, 

191, 198, 207, 224. 

C. 

Cambridge, Duke of, 31. 

Camou, General, 278. 

Campbell, Brigadier, 31, 260 

Campbell, Sir Colin, 31, 61, 127. 

Candia, n. 

Canrobert, General, 38, 50, 54, 79, 12.2, 156, 171, 

175, 199, 226, 228, 242. 
Canrobert's Hill, no. 
Caradoc, The, 38, 266. 
Cardigan, Lord, 32, 115, 118, 187. 
Careenage Creek, 81, 83, 89, 256. 
Careenage Ravine, 96, 123, 135, 139, 151, 249. 
Cathcart, Sir George, 31, 77, 89, 130, 147, 149, 

!53- 
Cathcart's Hill Cemetery, 306. 
Catherine, Empress, 8. 
Cemetery, 238, 260. 
Central Bastion, 92, 97, 192, 238, 283. 
Chapman's Battery, 95. 
Changarnier, General, 230. 
Chasseurs d'Afrique, 119. 
Chasseurs Green, 2^1. 
Chersonese, see Upland. 
Cholera, 28. 66, 78, 93, 165. 
Christians in Turkey, 6, 8, 12. 
Cialdini, General, 279. 
Circassia, 240, 295. 



u 



3io 



Index. 



Clarendon, Lord, 8. 14, 17, 220, 293. 

Codrington, General, 32, 56, 139, 278, 282. 

Col, The, 127, 178 

Committee of Inquiry, 183, 187. 

Constantine, Fort, 81, 106. 

Constantinople, 2, 7, 14, 20, 174, 180. 219, 295. 

Couston, General, 279. 

Cowley, Lord, 224, 293, 299. 

Crimea, 24, 36, 109, 131, 163. 219, 236, 242, 290, 

300. 
Crimean Army Fund, 178. 

D. 

D'Allonville, General, 116, 291, 294. 

Dannenberg, General, 137, 147. 

Dante, 174. 

Danube, 19, 21, 25, 301. 

Danubian Principalities, 7, 19, 21. 

Dardanelles, 2, 14, 299. 

D'Autemarre, 279. 

Decaen, General, 278. 

Declaration of War, 9, 19. 

De Failly, General, 278. 

Delane, Mr John. 23. 

De Salles, General, 279. 

De Wimpffen, General, 278, 291. 

Diana. Temple of, 244. 

Disraeli, Mr, 225. 

Dnieper, River, 291. 

Docks Ravine, 96, 200. 

Don, River, 240. 

Dragoon Guards, 4th, 112. 

Dragoon Guards, 5th, 112. 

Dragoons. 4th Light, 32, 120. 

Dragoons, 13th Light, 32, 121. 

Dulac, General, 278. 

Dundas, Admiral, 30, 99. 



Eastern Question, 15. 

Egerton, Colonel, 248. 

Egypt- 11. 

Engineer Journal, 193, 283 

England, 3, 10, 297, 301, 305. 

England, Naval Power of, 4, 28, 297. 

England, Public feeling in, 17, 22, 162, 174, 

l8o, I83, 302-_ 

English Army in the Crimea, 184, 296, 302. 
Eupatoria, 37, 43, 205, 292, 294. 
Evans, Sir De Lacy, 31, 35, 55, 56, 127, 132. 
Eyre, General, 31, 260. 



Fedioukine Heights, 79. 116, 129, 268. 
Filder, Mr (Commissary-General), 165, 167, 

185. 
Flagstaff Bastion, 82, 92, 97, 103, 128. 190, 246. 
Forage, Want of, 169, 186. 
Fore Ridge, 136, 148, 191. 
Fore}', General, 50, 82. 
France, 3, 295. 

France, Public feeling in, 18, 301. 
Francis I.. 6. 
French Empire, 15. 



G. 

Garden Batteries, 260. 

German Legion, 296. 

Germany, 3, 22, 295. 

Giurgevo, 21. 

Gladstone, Mr. 225. 

Gordon, Charles, 202. 

Gordon's Battery, 96. 

Gortschakoff, Prince, 129, 137, 147, 153, 155, 

206, 268, 273. 
Gortschakoff, Prince (Minister at Vienna), 216. 
Grape shot, 259. 
Greek Church, 6. 
Green Hill. 95. 98, 260. 
Guards, Coldstream, 31, 59. 139, 161 
Guards, Grenadier, 31, 59. 139. 
Guards, Scots, 31, 59, 139. 

H. 

Hardinge, Lord, 224. 
Heavy "Brigade, 31. 112, 114. 
Henri IV., Loss of the, 167. 
Herbert. Mr Sidney, 179. 181. 
Highlanders, 42d, 31. 59, 61, 127, 203 
Highlanders, 79th, 31. 59, 61, 127. 
Highlanders, 93d, 31, 59, 61, 83, no, 114, 127. 
Holy Places, Dispute about, 6. 
Hospitals, 66, 166, 172, 182 286. 303 
Hungary, 3. 
Hurricane, 166. 
Hussars, 8th, 120. 
Hussars, nth, 32, 120. 

I. 

Inkerman, Battle of, 72, 125, 131, tqt. 
Inkerman Heights, 70, 83, 123, 290. 
Inkerman, Mount, 135, 140, 191. 
Inniskillings, 112. 
Istomine, Admiral, 207, 267. 
Italy, 3, 242. 

J- 

Jannin, Colonel, 278. 

Jason, 24, 244. 

Jones, General Harry, 207. 

K. 

Kadikoi. hi, 178, 245. 

Kalafat, 19. 

Kalamita Bay, 39. 

Kamara. 83. no, 203, 244. 

Kamiesch, Bay of, 39. 82, 239, 

Katcha. River, 38, 66. 

Kazan Regiment, 56, 58, 61. 

Kazatch, 82, 266. 

Kertch, 226. 235. 240, 295. 

Kherson. Cape, 38, 82. 

Khrouleff, General, 278. 

Kinburn, 291, 293. 295. 

Kinglake. 54, 57, 67, 142. 

Kitspur, The, 136. 

Karabelnaia. 81. 

Korniloff, Admiral, 84. 105. 207, 267. 

Kourgane" Hill, 48; 51, 53, 61. 

Kulali, 180. 



Index. 



3ii 



L. 

La Marmora, General, 242. 
La Motteiouge, General, 278. 
Lancaster Battery, 96. 
Lancers, 17th, 32, 120. 
Lansdowne, Lord, 271. 
Latin Church, 6, 15. 
Lazareff, Admiral, 267. 
Levaillant, General, 279. 
Light Brigade, 29, 32, 112, 116, 118. 
Liprandi. General, 109, 116, 269. 
London, The, 106. 
Lucan, Lord, 112, 115, 171, 187. 
Lyndhurst, Lord, 23. 

Lyons, Admiral, Sir Edmund, 30, 68, 77, 80, 
101, 106. 

M. 

Macdonald, Mr, 181. 

Mackenzie's Farm, 72, 75. 219, 270, 294. 

MacMahon, General, 278. 

MacMurdo, Colonel, 208. 

M-Neill, Sir John, 184. 

Malakoff, 82, 89, 92, 103, 190, 248, 255, 262, 

274. 2S1, 285. 301. 
Malta, 14. 

Mamelon, 197, 232, 246, 251. 
Marines, 83. 103, no, 244. 
Markham. General. 278. 
Marolles, General. 278. 
Mayran, General, 261. 
Medea, 244. 
Mediterranean. 2. 
Mediterranean Squadron. 14. 
Mellinet. General, 278. 
Menschikoff, Prince 7. 13, 49, 51, 63 69 76, 

84. 103, 109, 116, 132. 136, 206. 
Michael, Grand Duke, 130. 
Mines, 196. 
Minie Rifle, 36. 146. 
Minto, Colonel. 79. 
Monastery of St George, 243. 
Monet, General, 197. 
Montenegro. 3. 
Moore, Sir John, 94. 
Morris, General, 119. 

N. 

Nakimoff Admiral. 17, 207, 251. 

Napoleon, Louis, 4, 15. 23, 27, 217, 221, 235, 

254. 263, 289, 298, 301. 
Napoleon, Louis, his Plan of the Campaign, 

219, 231. 236, 247, 293. 
Napoleon, Prince, 50, 54. 
Naval Brigade. 103. 
Nelson. 102. 
Nesselrode. 216. 

Newcastle. Duke of, 25, 179, 183. 
Nicholas, Czar, 3, 5, 11, 18, 20, 57, 131, 215, 217, 

272. 
Nicholas, Fort, 81, 286. 
N : cholas, Grand Duke, 130. 
Niel, General, 204, 209, 217, 227, 234, 237, 262. 
Nightingale, Miss, 180. 



Nikolaieff, 291. 
Niol, General. 279. 
Nolan, Captain, 115, 118, 121. 
Nurses, 180. 

O. 

Odessa, 129. 

Omar Pasha, 19, 205, 228. 

Otarkoi, 76. 

Ouglitz Regiment, 58. 



Paget, Lord George, 120. 

Palmerston, Lord, 183, 219, 224, 297, 302. 

Panmure, Lord, 184. 224. 

Paris, Treaty of, 301, 304. 

Pate, General, 279. 

Paul, Fort, 81, 286. 

Pauloff, General, 129, 137, 144. 

Pelissier, General, 204, 229, 230, 232, .234, 237, 

254, 256, 260, 263, 276, 294. 
Peninsula War, 35, 94. 
Pennefather, Brigadier, 31. 140, 147. 
Pere^.op, Isthmus of, 36, 205. 
Picard, General, 278. 
Picket House Ravine, 260. 
Poland, 8. 

Ponteves, General, 278. 
Prince Consort, 16, 20, 220, 223 2?/, 298. 
Prince, Wreck of the, 166. 
Prussia, 4, 21. 
Pruth, River, 8. 
Punch, 216. 

Q. 

Quarantine Bay, 238, 256. 
Quarantine Fort. 81. 
Quarries. The, 246, 248, 253. 
Quarry Ravine, 141, 144, 147. 

R. 

Raglan, Lord, 25, 32, 38, 44. 50, 54. 59, 60, 62. 

65, 69- 75, 80, 100, 115, 167, 171, 183, 235, 248, 

256, 264. 
Railway from Balaklava, 178. 
Read, General, 269. 

Redan, 82, 89. 92, 96, 105, 190, 246, 248, 282. 
Redan, Little, 89, 274, 281. 
Regiments, 1st, 31 ; 7th, 32, 56, 58 ; 19th, 

32 ; 20th, 31 ; 21st, 31, 148 ; 23d, 32 ; 28th, 

31 ; 30th, 31, 59, 145 ; 33d, 32 ; 38th, 31 ; 

41st, 31, 56, 59, 145 ; 44th, 31 ; 46th, 31 ; 

47th, 31, 59, 143 ; 49th, 31, 56, 59, 142 ; 50th. 

31; 55th, 31, 59, 60; 57th, 31, 67; 62d, 253; 

63d, 31, 148 ; 68th, 31 ; 77th, 32, 143 ; 88th. 

32, 14? ; 95th, 31, 56. 
Rifle Brigade, 32, 148 
Rifle Pits, 195, 238, 248. 
Roads, Want of, 177. 
Rodolph, Mount, 97, 103, 196. 
Roebuck, Mr, 183. 
Rousset, 262. 
Royal Dragoons, 112. 
Russell, Lord John, 217, 224. 



A 



12 



Index. 



Russia, i, 3, 297, 299, 305. 

Russian Army, 52, 86, 109. 129, 194, 232, 269. 

Russian Army, Losses of, 62, 106, 158. 254, 260, 

267, 272, 285, 300. 
Russian Fleet, 17, 30, 68, 223, 241, 288, 292. 
Russian Manifesto. 8. 



Sandbag Battery, 127, 136, 144, 148, 161. 

Sanitary Commission, 182. 

SanspareiL The, 106. 

Sardinians, 242, 244, 268, 271, 279. 

Saurian, Skeleton of, 244. 

Scarlett. General, 112. 

Scots Greys, 67, in, 112. 

Scutari, 172, 180. 

Sebastopol, 18, 23, 25, 37, 43. 68, 8o, 213, 291, 

295, 304. 
Sebastopol, Garrison and Defences of, 86, 274, 

287. 
Semiakine, General 279. 
Seymour. Sir Hamilton, 5, 19. 
Shell Hill. 126, 136, 139, 145, 153, 191. 
Shewell, Colonel, 120. 
Shirley, Colonel, 253. 
Shumla, 20, 
Silistria, 20, 86. 

Simpheropol, 37. 43, 63, 213. 219, 226, 235, 290. 
Simpson, General, 267. 
Sinope, 17. 
Sinope, The, 305. 
Soimonoff, General, 129, 137, 144. 
Soujak-kale, 242. 
Spencer, General, 291. 

St Arnaud. Marshal. 27, 35, 44, 50, 54, 62, 69, 72. 
St Jean d'Angely, Regnaud, 256. 
St Petersburgh, 132, 298, 
St Pol, General, 278. 
Stanley, Miss, 180. 
Star Fort, 68, 71, 85, 107. 
Stratford. Lord, 7, 13. 
Sultan, The, 6, 301. 
Surgeons, 179, 297. 

T. 

Taganrog, 240. 

Tarkan Cape. 38. 

Tarkhanlar, 51. 

Taurida. 36. 

Tauric Chersonese, 24. 

Tchatir-dagh Mountain. 219. 

Tchemaya, River, 38, 77, 8i, 109, 116. 126, 203. 

235. 268, 301. 
Tches7iia, The, 305. 
Tchorgoun, 109. 203, 242, 269. 
Telegraph Hill, 49, 61. 
Tiflis, 295. 
Times, The, 23, 181, 305. 



Todleben. Colonel, 70, 79, 85, 86, 89, 105, 107, 

126. 162, 195. 238. 261. 273, 285. 
Torrens, General. 149. 
Traktir Bridge, no. 116, 203, 242, 269. 
Transport, Want of. 41, 168, 186, 208, 296, 303. 
Trenches, The, 95, 170. 192, 200, 209, 238. 
Trevelyan, Sir Charles, 208. 
Trochu, General, 279. 
Truce for burial. 201, 267. 
Tulloch, Colonel. 184. 
Turkey, 2, 297, 299, 301 
Turkish Fleet, 17, 30. 
Turkish Troops, 3. 14, 21, 40, 82, no 113, 128, 

205, 243, 268. 
Turkish Ultimatum, 10. 
Turcos, 251. 
Typhus Fever, 296. 

U. 

Upland, The, 81, 82, 93, 116, 123. 166, 242, 302, 

3°5- 

V. 

Vaii.lant, Marshal, 224. 230.235, 237, 264. 293 

Valley of the Shadow of Death, 95. 

Varna. 20, 28, 36 

Victoria Battery, 96. 

Victoria, Queen. 12. 17, 23, 221, 298. 

Victoria Ridge, 139, 192, 199. 

Vienna, 298. 

Vienna. Conference at, 9, 216, 222. 

Vienna Note, 9 16. 

Vinoy, General, 127, 278. 

V ladimir. The 30. 

Vladimir Regiment, 58, 61. 286. 

W. 

Walewski, Count, 224. 

War Office, 179. 

Waterloo, 32. 258. 

Wellington, Duke of. 32. 

White. Works. The. 198. 232. 246, 250. 

Windham, Colonel. 283 

Windsor, 224. 

Wood, Sir Charles, 224. 

Woronzoff Mount. 96, 98, 116. 

Woronzoff Road, 84. no, 115. 177, 192 

Wrangel, General. 241. 



Yalta, 84. 

Yea, Colonel, 260 

Z. 

Zouaves, Algerine, 25 c. 
Zouaves, French, 251. 



COLSTON AND COMPANY, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. 



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